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Why do firms oppose entry-deterring policies? Environmental regulation and entry deterrence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2014


Ana Espínola-Arredondo
Affiliation:
School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, 111C Hulbert Hall, Pullman, WA 99164, USA. E-mail: anaespinola@wsu.edu
Félix Muñoz-García
Affiliation:
School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, USA. E-mail: fmunoz@wsu.edu
Corresponding

Abstract

This paper investigates the design of environmental regulation under different regimes: flexible and inflexible policies. We analyze under which settings strict emission fees can be used as an entry-deterring tool, and become socially optimal. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the incentives of the social planner and the incumbent firm are aligned regarding policy regimes ifentry can be easily deterred by setting a stringent regulation. Their incentives, however, can bemisaligned when entry becomes more costly to deter, leading the incumbent to actually preferenvironmental policies that attract entry.


Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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