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Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2019

Ganga Shreedhar Open the ORCID record for Ganga Shreedhar [Opens in a new window] ,
Alessandro Tavoni  and
Carmen Marchiori
Ganga Shreedhar*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological and Behavioural Sciences, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
Alessandro Tavoni
Affiliation:
Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Carmen Marchiori
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Management, University of Brescia, Brescia, Italy
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: g.s.shreedhar@lse.ac.uk
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Abstract

With the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount.

Keywords

common pool resourcesmonitoringnetworkspunishment

JEL classification

D62: Externalities Q57: Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services • Biodiversity Conservation • Bioeconomics • Industrial Ecology C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D70: General C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 25 , Special Issue 1: The Economics of Climate Change and Sustainability (Part B) , February 2020 , pp. 66 - 94
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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