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Saving a river: a joint management approach to the Mekong River Basin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2012

Harold Houba ,
Kim Hang Pham Do  and
Xueqin Zhu
Harold Houba
Affiliation:
Department of Econometrics, VU University Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: harold.houba@vu.nl
Kim Hang Pham Do
Affiliation:
School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. E-mail: K.H.PhamDo@massey.ac.nz
Xueqin Zhu
Affiliation:
Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands. E-mail: xueqin.zhu@wur.nl
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Abstract

The Mekong River Basin (MRB) is a trans-boundary river shared by six countries. The governance by the Mekong River Commission (MRC) of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) is weak. This study investigates the welfare effects in the year 2030 arising from strengthening the MRC's governance versus joint management of the entire MRB. Without joint management, strengthening the MRC's governance has a huge potential to achieve welfare gains and it requires that the interests of all stakeholders be equally balanced. A bargaining approach shows that the LMB has no incentive to negotiate with China and is better off strengthening the MRC's governance instead. If such strengthening could be realized, further welfare gains of joint management by a wider and stronger MRC, including China, would be very small.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 18 , Special Issue 1: Strategic behaviour and environmental commons , February 2013 , pp. 93 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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Supplementary material: PDF

Houba Supplementary Material

Appendix

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Supplementary material: PDF

Houba Supplementary Material

Appendix

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