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KNOWING HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE FIRST IN THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2016

Paul Silva Jr.
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Abstract

In what follows I offer a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). The upshot is a virtue-theoretic, knowledge-first view of justification that is internalist-friendly and able to explain more facts about justification than any other available view.

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Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 393 - 412
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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