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A NEW PROSPECT FOR EPISTEMIC AGGREGATION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 August 2013
Abstract
How should the opinion of a group be related to the opinions of the group members? In this article, we will defend a package of four norms – coherence, locality, anonymity and unanimity. Existing results show that there is no tenable procedure for aggregating outright beliefs or for aggregating credences that meet these criteria. In response, we consider the prospects for aggregating credal pairs – pairs of prior probabilities and evidence. We show that there is a method of aggregating credal pairs that possesses all four virtues.
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