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A NEW STATISTICAL SOLUTION TO THE GENERALITY PROBLEM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2017

Samuel Kampa Open the ORCID record for Samuel Kampa [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

The Generality Problem is widely recognized to be a serious problem for reliabilist theories of justification. James R. Beebe's Statistical Solution is one of only a handful of attempted solutions that has garnered serious attention in the literature. In their recent response to Beebe, Julien Dutant and Erik J. Olsson successfully refute Beebe's Statistical Solution. This paper presents a New Statistical Solution that countenances Dutant and Olsson's objections, dodges the serious problems that trouble rival solutions, and retains the theoretical virtues that made Beebe's solution so attractive in the first place. There indeed exists a principled, rigorous, conceptually sparse, and plausible solution to the Generality Problem: it is the New Statistical Solution.

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Episteme , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 228 - 244
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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