Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-684899dbb8-5dd2w Total loading time: 0.274 Render date: 2022-05-29T08:27:13.487Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true }

Article contents

OPAQUE AND TRANSLUCENT EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE IN COLLABORATIVE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2014

Abstract

This paper offers an analytic perspective on epistemic dependence that is grounded in theoretical discussion and field observation at the same time. When in the course of knowledge creation epistemic labor is divided, collaborating scientists come to depend upon one another epistemically. Since instances of epistemic dependence are multifarious in scientific practice, I propose to distinguish between two different forms of epistemic dependence, opaque and translucent epistemic dependence. A scientist is opaquely dependent upon a colleague if she does not possess the expertise necessary to independently carry out, and to profoundly assess, the piece of scientific labor which her colleague is contributing. If the scientist does possess the necessary expertise, I argue, her dependence is translucent. However, the distinction between opaque and translucent epistemic dependence does not exhaust dependence relations in scientific practice, because many dependence relations are neither entirely opaque nor translucent. I will discuss why this is the case, and show how we can make sense of the gray zone between opaque and translucent epistemic dependence.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 475 - 492
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alexa, M. and Zuell, C. 2000. ‘Text Analysis Software: Commonalities, Differences and Limitations: The Results of a Review.’ Quality and Quantity, 34: 299321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Almassi, B. 2007. ‘Experts, Evidence and Epistemic Independence.’ Spontaneous Generations, 1: 5866.Google Scholar
Audi, R. 1983. ‘Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasability.’ Synthese, 55: 119–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. 2012. ‘Diagramming Phenomena for Mechanistic Explanation.’ In Miyake, N., Peebles, D., and Cooper, R. P. (eds), Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 102–7.Google Scholar
Bogen, J. 2011. ‘‘Saving the Phenomena’ and Saving the Phenomena.’ Synthese, 182: 722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burian, R. M. 2001. ‘The Dilemma of Case Studies Resolved: The Virtues of Using Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science.’ Perspectives on Science, 9: 383404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carusi, A. 2012. ‘Making the Visual Visible in Philosophy of Science.’ Spontaneous Generations, 6: 106–14.Google Scholar
Chang, H. 2011. ‘Beyond Case-studies: History as Philosophy.’ In Mauskopf, S. and Schmaltz, T. (eds), Integrating History and Philosophy of Science: Problems and Prospects, pp. 109–24. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coady, C. A. J. 1992. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Collins, H. 2013. ‘Three Dimensions of Expertise.’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12: 253–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collins, H. and Evans, R. 2007. Rethinking Expertise. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, E. 2006. ‘Second-hand Knowledge.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 592618.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goddiksen, M. 2014. ‘Clarifying Interactional and Contributory Expertise.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.06.001.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Goldberg, S. C. 2011. ‘The Division of Epistemic Labor.’ Episteme, 8: 112–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. I. 2001. ‘Experts: Which Ones Should you Trust?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 85110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gorman, M. 2002. ‘Levels of Expertise and Trading Zones: A Framework for Multidisciplinary Collaboration.’ Social Studies of Science, 32: 933–8.Google Scholar
Hardwig, J. 1985. ‘Epistemic Dependence.’ Journal of Philosophy, 82: 335–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hardwig, J. 1988. ‘Evidence, Testimony, and the Problem of Individualism – A Response to Schmitt.’ Social Epistemology, 2: 309–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hardwig, J. 1991. ‘The Role of Trust in Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy, 88: 693708.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hutchins, E. 1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hutchins, E. 2001. ‘Distributed Cognition.’ In Smelser, N. J. and Baltes, P. B. (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, pp. 2068–72. Oxford: Elsevier.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knorr-Cetina, K. 1999. Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences make Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Knuuttila, T. 2011. ‘Modelling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-based Representation.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42: 262–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kusch, M. 2002. Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Latour, B. 1999. ‘Circulating Reference: Sampling Soil in the Amazon forest.’ In Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Study, pp. 2479. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Laudel, G. 2001. ‘Collaboration, Creativity and Rewards: Why and How Scientists Collaborate.’ International Journal of Technology Management, 22: 762–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lenhard, J. 2006. ‘Surprised by Nanowire: Simulation, Control, and Understanding.’ Philosophy of Science, 73: 605–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leonelli, S. 2007. ‘Growing Weed, Producing Knowledge: An Epistemological History of Arabidopsis thaliana .’ History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 29: 5587.Google Scholar
Leonelli, S. 2010a. ‘Documenting the Emergence of Bio-ontologies: Or, Why Researching Bioinformatics requires HPSSB.’ History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 32: 105–26.Google Scholar
Leonelli, S. 2010b. ‘Packaging Data for Re-use: Databases in Model Organism Biology.’ In Howlett, P. and Morgan, M. S. (eds), How Well do Facts Travel? The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge, pp. 325–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nersessian, N. J. 2006. ‘The Cognitive-Cultural Systems of the Research Laboratory.’ Organization Studies, 27: 125–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nersessian, N. J., Kurz-Milcke, E., Newstetter, W. C., and Davies, J. 2003. Research laboratories as evolving distributed cognitive systems. In Altermann, R. and Kirsh, D. (eds), Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 857–62. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Google Scholar
Polanyi, M. 1958. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Rheinberger, H.-J. 1997. Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
de Ridder, J. 2014. ‘Epistemic Dependence and Collective Scientific Knowledge.’ Synthese, 191: 3753.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riesch, H. 2010. ‘Simple or Simplistic? Scientists' Views on Occam's Razor.’ Theoria, 67: 7590.Google Scholar
Schickore, J. 2011. ‘More Thoughts on HPS: Another 20 Years Later.’ Perspectives on Science, 19: 453–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soler, L. 2011. ‘Tacit Aspects of Experimental Practices: Analytical Tools and Epistemological Consequences.’ European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1: 393433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., and Wilson, D. 2010. ‘Epistemic Vigilance.’ Mind and Language, 25: 359–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strauss, A. 1987. Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
Thagard, P. 1997. ‘Collaborative Knowledge.’ Nous, 31: 242–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wagenknecht, S. 2014. ‘Facing the Incompleteness of Epistemic Trust: Managing Dependence in Scientific Practice.’ Social Epistemology. Online first publication, doi: 10.1080/02691728.2013.794872.Google Scholar
Whitley, R. 1984. The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
16
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

OPAQUE AND TRANSLUCENT EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE IN COLLABORATIVE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

OPAQUE AND TRANSLUCENT EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE IN COLLABORATIVE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

OPAQUE AND TRANSLUCENT EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE IN COLLABORATIVE SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *