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PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT: IT'S NOT JUST ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2012

Abstract

There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough to be a reason one has for believing other things.

Type
Symposium on Pragmatic Encroachment
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

Brown, Jessica. 2008. ‘Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.’ Nous, 42: 167–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fantl, Jeremy, and McGrath, Matthew. 2009. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason. 2008. ‘Knowledge and Action.’ Journal of Philosophy, 105: 571–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raz, Joseph. 1999. Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2005. ‘Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 55: 213–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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