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Science as a Persuasion Game: An Inferentialist Approach*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Abstract

Scientific research is reconstructed as a language game along the lines of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. Researchers are assumed to aim at persuading their colleagues of the validity of some claims. The assertions each scientist is allowed or committed to make depend on her previous claims and on the inferential norms of her research community. A classification of the most relevant types of inferential rules governing such a game is offered, and some ways in which this inferentialist approach can be used for assessing scientific knowledge and practices are explored. Some similarities and differences with a game-theoretic analysis are discussed.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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