Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-684899dbb8-gbqfq Total loading time: 0.211 Render date: 2022-05-22T08:51:39.158Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true }

Article contents

SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2014

Abstract

There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 277 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bradley, S. 2012. ‘Dutch book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities.’ In Dieks, D., González, W. J., Hartmann, S., Stöltzner, M. and Weber, M. (eds), Probabilities, Laws and Structures, pp. 317. New York, NY: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chandler, J. In press. ‘Subjective Probabilities need not be Sharp.’ Erkenntnis.Google Scholar
Elga, A. 2010. ‘Subjective Probabilities should be Sharp.’ Philosophers' Imprint 10.Google Scholar
Gustafsson, J. E. 2010. ‘A Money-pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences.’ Dialectica, 64: 251–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paris, J. 2005 [2001]. ‘A Note on the Dutch book Method.’ In Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and their Applications, pp. 301–306.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, W. 1995. ‘To Have One's Cake and Eat it too: Sequential Choice and Expected-utility Violations.’ Journal of Philosophy, 92: 586620.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sahlin, N.-E. and Weirich, P. 2014. ‘Unsharp Sharpness.’ Theoria, 80: 100–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schick, F. 1986. ‘Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps.’ Journal of Philosophy, 83: 112–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seidenfeld, T. 1994. ‘When Normal and Extensive Form Decisions Differ.’ Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, IX: 451–63.Google Scholar
Seidenfeld, T. 2004. ‘A Contrast between two Decision Rules for use with (Convex) Sets of Probabilities: Γ-maximin versus E-admissibility.’ Synthese, 140: 6988.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steele, K. 2010. ‘What are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments from the Sequential Setting.’ Theory and Decision, 68: 463–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, B. 1990. ‘Figures in a Probability Landscape.’ In Dunn, M. and Segerberg, K. (eds), Truth or Consequences, pp. 345–56. Amsterdam: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

SHOULD SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES BE SHARP?
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *