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Article contents

The Threshold Problem, the Cluster Account, and the Significance of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 March 2020

Daniel Immerman*
Affiliation:
Cycorp, Austin, Texas, USA

Abstract

The threshold problem is the task of adequately answering the question: “Where does the threshold lie between knowledge and lack thereof?” I start this paper by articulating two conditions for solving it. The first is that the threshold be neither too high nor too low; the second is that the threshold accommodate the significance of knowledge. In addition to explaining these conditions, I also argue that it is plausible that they can be met. Next, I argue that many popular accounts of knowledge cannot meet them. In particular, I lay out a number of problems that standard accounts of knowledge face in trying to meet these conditions. Finally, near the end of this paper, I argue that there is one sort of account that seems to evade these problems. This sort of account, which is called a cluster account of knowledge, says that knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of truth, belief and a cluster of epistemic properties and also that knowledge doesn't require having all members of the cluster, but merely some subset.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

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