Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T23:20:45.460Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

BASIC BELIEFS AND THE PERCEPTUAL LEARNING PROBLEM: A SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE FOR MODERATE FOUNDATIONALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2016

Bram M. K. Vaassen
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such ‘basic beliefs’ pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning – the fact that certain ‘expert’ observers are able to form more justified basic beliefs than novice observers – constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, the moderate foundationalist will have to characterize the ‘expertise’ of the expert observer in such a way that it cannot be had by novice observers and that it bestows justification on expert basic beliefs independently of any other justification had by the expert. I will argue that the accounts of expert basic beliefs currently present in the literature fail to meet this challenge, as they either result in a too liberal ascription of justification or fail to draw a clear distinction between expert basic beliefs and other spontaneously formed beliefs. Nevertheless, some guidelines for a future solution will be provided.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 1: The Epistemology of Perception , March 2016 , pp. 133 - 149
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Bonjour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Cecchi, A. S. 2014. ‘Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity.’ Dialectica, 68: 63–95.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. 1981. Brainstorms. Boston, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dienes, Z. and Scott, R. 2005. ‘Measuring Unconscious Knowledge: Distinguishing Structural Knowledge and Judgment Knowledge.’ Psychological Research, 69: 338–51.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Feldman, R. 2003. Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Fu, Q., Fu, X. and Dienes, Z. 2008. ‘Implicit Sequence Learning and Conscious Awareness.’ Consciousness and Cognition, 17: 185–202.Google Scholar
Ghijsen, H. Forthcoming a. ‘Norman and Truetemp Revisited Reliabilistically: A Proper Functionalist Defeat Account of Clairvoyance.’ Submitted Manuscript.Google Scholar
Ghijsen, H. Forthcoming b. ‘The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration.’ Philosophical Studies.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. I. 2011. ‘Commentary on Jack Lyons's Perception and Basic Beliefs.’ Philosophical Studies, 153: 457–66.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. I. 2012. ‘Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism.’ In Goldman, A. I. (ed.), Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology, pp. 51–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Graham, P. J. 2011. ‘Perceptual Entitlement and Basic Belief.’ Philosophical Studies, 153: 467–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Graham, P. J. 2012. ‘Epistemic Entitlement.’ Noûs, 46: 449–82.Google Scholar
Henderson, T. and Horgan, D. 2000. ‘Iceberg Epistemology.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 497–535.Google Scholar
Henderson, T. and Horgan, D. 2011. The Epistemological Spectrum. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Huemer, M. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher.Google Scholar
Jacoby, L. L. 1991. ‘A Process Dissociation Framework: Separating Automatic from Intentional Uses of Memory.’ Journal of Memory and Language, 30: 513–41.Google Scholar
Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Lyons, J. C. 2008. ‘Clades, Capgrass and Perceptual Kinds.’ Philosophical Topics, 33: 185–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyons, J. C. 2009. Perception and Basic Beliefs, Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lyons, J. C. 2011. ‘Response to Critics.’ Philosophical Studies, 153: 477–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyons, J. C. 2013. ‘The Epistemological Import of Morphological Content.’ Philosophical Studies, 169: 537–47.Google Scholar
Lyons, J. C. Forthcoming. ‘Internalism and Cognitive Penetration.’ Submitted Manuscript.Google Scholar
Markie, P. 2005. ‘The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification.’ Philosophical Studies, 126: 347–73.Google Scholar
Markie, P. 2013. ‘Searching for True Dogmatism.’ In Tucker, C. (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, pp. 248–69. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 1998. Meaning, Knowledge and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McGinn, C. 1982. The Character of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Millar, A. 2000. ‘The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge.’ Philosophy, 75: 75–88.Google Scholar
Nanay, B. 2010. ‘Attention and Perceptual Content.’ Analysis, 70: 263–70.Google Scholar
Peacocke, C. 2003. The Realm of Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Price, R. 2005. ‘Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint.’ Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 353–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, R. 2009. ‘Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 59: 508–18.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2006. What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? New York, NY: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pryor, J. 2000. ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.’ Noûs, 34: 517–49.Google Scholar
Siegel, S. 2006. ‘Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?’ In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. (eds), Perceptual Experience, pp. 481–503. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S. 2011. The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Siegel, S. 2012. ‘Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.’ Noûs, 46: 201–22.Google Scholar
Tucker, C. (ed.) 2013a. Seemings and Justification, New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Tucker, C. 2013b. ‘Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.’ In Tucker, C. (ed.), Seemings and Justification, New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, pp. 1–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar