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BASIC KNOWLEDGE FIRST

  • Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Abstract

An influential twenty-first century philosophical project posits a central role for knowledge: knowledge is more fundamental than epistemic states like belief and justification. So-called “knowledge first” theorists find support for this thought in identifying central theoretical roles for knowledge. I argue that a similar methodology supports a privileged role for a more specific category of basic knowledge. Some of the roles that knowledge first theorists have posited for knowledge generally are better suited for basic knowledge.

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Copyright
Corresponding author
ichikawa@gmail.com
References
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Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
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