Skip to main content Accesibility Help
×
×
Home

CLOSED-MINDEDNESS AND DOGMATISM

  • Heather Battaly
Abstract

The primary goal of this paper is to propose a working analysis of the disposition of closed-mindedness. I argue that closed-mindedness (CM) is an unwillingness or inability to engage (seriously) with relevant intellectual options. Dogmatism (DG) is one kind of closed-mindedness: it is an unwillingness to engage seriously with relevant alternatives to the beliefs one already holds. I do not assume that the disposition of closed-mindedness is always an intellectual vice; rather I treat the analysis of the disposition, and its status as an intellectual vice, as separate questions. The concluding section develops a framework for determining the conditions under which closed-mindedness will be an intellectual vice.

Copyright
Corresponding author
References
Hide All
Alfano, M. MS. ‘Virtues for Agents in Directed Social Networks.’ Unpublished manuscript.
Audi, R. 2018. ‘Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification.’ In Battaly, H. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
Baehr, J. 2010. ‘Epistemic Malevolence.’ In Battaly, H. (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic, pp. 189213. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Baehr, J. 2011. The Inquiring Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Battaly, H. (ed.) 2010. ‘Epistemic Self-Indulgence.’ In Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic, pp. 215–35. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Battaly, H. 2014. ‘Varieties of Epistemic Vice.’ In Matheson, J. and Vitz, R. (eds), The Ethics of Belief, pp. 5176. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Battaly, H. 2016. ‘Epistemic Virtue and Vice: Reliabilism, Responsibilism, and Personalism.’ In Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy, pp. 99120. New York, NY: Routledge.
Battaly, H. 2017 a. ‘Testimonial Injustice, Epistemic Vice, and Vice Epistemology.’ In Kidd, I. J., Polhaus, G. and Medina, J. (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, pp. 223–31. New York, NY: Routledge.
Battaly, H. 2017 b. ‘Intellectual Perseverance.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy. doi: 10.1163/17455243-46810064.
Battaly, H. 2018. ‘Can Closed-mindedness be an Intellectual Virtue?Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 85.
Battaly, H. Forthcoming. ‘Closed-mindedness as an Intellectual Vice.’ In Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Callan, E. and Arena, D. 2009. ‘Indoctrination.’ In Siegel, H. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education, pp. 104–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cassam, Q. Forthcoming. Vices of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cassam, Q. 2016. ‘Vice Epistemology.’ The Monist, 99: 159–80.
Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hare, W. 1979. Open-mindedness and Education. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Kidd, I. J. 2018. ‘Epistemic Corruption and Education.’ Episteme. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.3.
Lindsay, B. C. 2012. Murder State: California's Native American Genocide, 1846–1873. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Lynch, M. 2004. True to Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lynch, M. Forthcoming. ‘Epistemic Arrogance and the Value of Political Dissent.’ In Johnson, C. R. (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
Medina, J. 2013. The Epistemology of Resistance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Orwell, G. 1949. 1984. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
Riggs, W. 2016. ‘Open-mindedness, Insight, and Understanding.’ In Baehr, J. (ed.), Intellectual Virtues and Education, pp. 1837. New York, NY: Routledge.
Roberts, R. and Wood, W. J. 2007. Intellectual Virtues. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed