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A DILEMMA FOR THE KNOWLEDGE DESPITE FALSEHOOD STRATEGY

  • Christopher Buford and Christopher Michael Cloos
Abstract

One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.

Copyright
Corresponding author
cb72@uakron.edu, cloos@umail.ucsb.edu
References
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Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
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