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SKEPTICISM ABOUT META-SKEPTICISM: MEDITATIONS ON EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2016

Michael Hannon
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Abstract

Drawing on new empirical data, a group of experimental philosophers have argued that one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism is much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have thought. Contrary to this claim, I argue that this brand of skepticism remains as threatening as ever. My argument also reveals an important limitation of experimental philosophy and sheds light on the way professional philosophers should go about the business of doing philosophy.

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Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 213 - 231
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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