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VIRTUOUS INSIGHTFULNESS

  • J. Adam Carter

Abstract

Insight often strikes us blind; when we aren't expecting it, we suddenly see a connection that previously eluded us – a kind of Aha! experience. People with a propensity to such experiences are regarded as insightful, and insightfulness is a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. What's not clear, however, is just what it is in virtue of which being such that these experiences tend to happen to one renders one intellectually virtuous. This paper draws from both virtue epistemology as well as empirical work on the psychology of problem solving and creativity to make some inroads in accounting for insightfulness as an intellectual virtue. Important to the view advanced is that virtuously insightful individuals manifest certain skills which both cultivate insight experiences (even if not by directly bringing them about) and enable such individuals to move in an epistemically responsible way from insight experience to epistemic endorsement.

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VIRTUOUS INSIGHTFULNESS

  • J. Adam Carter

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