Sarah Moss has recently suggested that when they encounter conflict, epistemic peers should not split the difference between the credence that they each assign to some disputed proposition p, as has been suggested by conciliatory approaches to belief revision in the debate surrounding disagreement in the literature. Moss contends that an epistemic compromise between peers need not be the arithmetic mean of prior credences, in the sense that if my credence in some proposition p is x and yours is y, the credence that is the result of our compromise need not be (x + y)/2. More generally, Moss's proposal advocates an approach to how estimations of truth value, exhibited in credences, should in fact be considered in resolving conflict and disagreement. The general idea is that splitting the difference between credences may be inadequate, seeing as agents may assign different epistemic values to different credences. While novel and clearly argued, I think that Moss's proposal fails to provide entirely convincing reasons for abandoning the traditional symmetrical approach to epistemic compromise and for adopting the scoring rule model instead. I demonstrate two problems with the model that Moss advocates.