Skip to main content Accesibility Help
×
×
Home

EVIDENCE OF EXPERT'S EVIDENCE IS EVIDENCE

  • Luca Moretti
Abstract

John Hardwig has championed the thesis (NE) that evidence that an expert EXP has evidence for a proposition P, constituted by EXP's testimony that P, is not evidence for P itself, where evidence for P is generally characterized as anything that counts towards establishing the truth of P. In this paper, I first show that (NE) yields tensions within Hardwig's overall view of epistemic reliance on experts and makes it imply unpalatable consequences. Then, I use Shogenji-Roche's theorem of transitivity of incremental confirmation to show that (NE) is false if a natural Bayesian formalization of the above notion of evidence is implemented. I concede that Hardwig could resist my Bayesian objection if he interpreted (NE) as a more precise thesis that only applies to community-focused evidence. I argue, however, that this precisification, while diminishing the philosophical relevance of (NE), wouldn't settle tensions internal to Hardwig's views.

Copyright
Corresponding author
l.moretti@abdn.ac.uk
References
Hide All
Almassi, B. 2007. ‘Experts, Evidence and Epistemic Independence.’ Spontaneous Generations, 1: 5866.
Feldman, R. 2006. ‘Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.’ In Hetherington, S. (ed.), Epistemology Future, pp. 216–36. Oxford: Clarendon.
Feldman, R. 2009. ‘Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.’ Episteme, 6: 294312.
Fitelson, B. 2012. ‘Evidence of evidence is not (necessarily) evidence.’ Analysis, 7: 85–8.
Gaon, S. and Norris., S. P. 2001. ‘The Undecidable Grounds of Scientific Expertise.’ Journal of Philosophy of Education, 35: 187201.
Hardwig, J. 1985. ‘Epistemic Dependence.’ Journal of Philosophy, 82: 335–49.
Hardwig, J. 1991. ‘The Role of Trust in Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy, 88: 693720.
Pryor, J. 2013. ‘Problems for Credulism.’ In Tucker, C. (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, pp. 89131. New York: Oxford University Press.
Roche, W. 2012. ‘A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.’ European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2: 111–18.
Roche, W. 2014. ‘Evidence of Evidence is Evidence under Screening-off.Episteme, 11: 119–24.
Romanos, G. D. 1973. ‘Reflexive Predictions.’ Philosophy of Science, 40: 97109.
Shogenji, T. 2003. ‘A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54: 613–16.
Snyder, L. J. 1995. ‘Is Evidence Historical?’ In Achinstein, P. and Snyder, L. J. (eds), Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems, pp. 95117. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed