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FAKE BARNS AND FALSE DILEMMAS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2014

Clayton Littlejohn
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Abstract

The central thesis of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) is that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves success that is attributable to a subject's abilities. An influential objection to this approach is that RVE delivers the wrong verdicts in cases of environmental luck. Critics of RVE argue that the view needs to be supplemented with modal anti-luck condition. This particular criticism rests on a number of mistakes about the nature of ability that I shall try to rectify here.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 369 - 389
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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