Skip to main content
×
Home

GETTIERIZED KNOBE EFFECTS

Abstract
Abstract

We report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.

Copyright
Corresponding author
jbeebe2@buffalo.edu
References
Hide All
Alfano Mark, Beebe James R., and Robinson Brian. 2012. “The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe Effect Cases: A Unified Account of the Data.” The Monist, 95: 264–89.
Alicke Mark D. 2008. “Blaming Badly.” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 8: 179–86.
Beebe James R. 2013. “A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions.” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4: 235–58.
Beebe James R., and Buckwalter Wesley. 2010. “The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.” Mind & Language, 25: 474–98.
Beebe James R., and Jensen Mark. 2012. “Surprising Connections Between Knowledge and Intentional Action: The Robustness of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.” Philosophical Psychology, 25: 689715.
Buckwalter Wesley. forthcoming. “Gettier Made ESEE.” Philosophical Psychology.
Cullen Simon. 2010. “Survey-Driven Romanticism.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 275–96.
DeRose Keith. 2011. “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.” Philosophical Studies, 156: 81110.
Frederick Shane. 2005. “Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 2542.
Gettier Edmund L. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, 23: 121–3.
Harman Gilbert. 1973. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Knobe Joshua. 2003a. “Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis, 63: 190–3.
Knobe Joshua. 2003b. “Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation.” Philosophical Psychology, 16: 309–24.
Knobe Joshua. 2004. “Folk Psychology and Folk Morality: Response to Critics.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24: 270–9.
Knobe Joshua. 2007. “Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31: 90106.
Knobe Joshua, and Mendlow Gabriel. 2004. “The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Considerations in Folk Psychology.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24: 252–8.
Lewis David. 1983. “Introduction.” Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, ix-xii. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nadelhoffer Thomas. 2004. “On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of Intentionality.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24: 196213.
Nagel Jennifer. 2012a. “Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85: 495527.
Nagel Jennifer. 2012b. “Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.” In Brown Jessica and Gerken Mikkel (eds), Knowledge Ascriptions, pp. 171–91. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel Jennifer, San Juan Valerie, and Mar Raymond. forthcoming. “Gettier Case Recognition.” Cognition.
Pinillos N. Ángel, Smith Nick, Nair G. Shyam, Marchetto Peter, and Mun Cecilea. 2011. “Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action.” Mind & Language, 26: 115–39.
Russell Bertrand. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Home University Library.
Schaffer Jonathan, and Knobe Joshua. 2012. “Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.” Noûs, 46: 675708.
Skyrms Bryan. 1967. “The Explication of ‘X Knows that P’.” Journal of Philosophy, 64: 373–89.
Starmans Christina, and Friedman Ori. 2009. “Is Knowledge Subjective? A Sex Difference in Adults' Epistemic Intuitions.” Poster presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Cognitive Development Society, San Antonio, TX, 16 October.
Starmans Christina, and Friedman Ori. 2012. “The Folk Conception of Knowledge.” Cognition, 124: 272–83.
Turri John. 2011. “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.” Philosophers' Imprint, 11: 111.
Weinberg Jonathan M., Nichols Shaun, and Stich Stephen. 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” Philosophical Topics, 29: 429–60.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 3
Total number of PDF views: 28 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 270 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 19th November 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.