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HOW TO SOLVE HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

  • Alexander Jackson
Abstract

This paper explains what's wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume's argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally.

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Corresponding author
alexjackson@boisestate.edu
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