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INFERENTIALISM AND COGNITIVE PENETRATION OF PERCEPTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2016

Jack C. Lyons
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Abstract

Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see (hear, taste, etc.) is influenced by such “cognitive” states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that (a) some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and (b) the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards by which experiences are evaluated. I examine recent defenses of inferentialism by Susanna Siegel, Peter Markie, and Matthew McGrath and argue that the prospects for inferentialism are dim.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 1: The Epistemology of Perception , March 2016 , pp. 1 - 28
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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