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LEARNING TO SIGNAL WITH PROBE AND ADJUST

  • Brian Skyrms
Abstract

This is an investigation of the emergence of signaling using one kind of trial and error learning: probe and adjust.

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Corresponding author
bskyrms@uci.edu
References
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Argiento, R., Pemantle, R., Skyrms, B., and Volkov, S. 2009. ‘Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.’ Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 119: 319–73.
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Hu, Y., Skyrms, B., and Tarrés, P. In preparation. ‘Reinforcement Learning in Signaling Games.’
Huttegger, S., and Skyrms, B. Forthcoming. ‘Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust.’ In Calcott, B., Joyce, R. and Sterelney, K. (eds), Cooperation, Complexity, and Signaling. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
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