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A (MAINLY EPISTEMIC) CASE FOR MULTIPLE-VOTE MAJORITY RULE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2012

Richard Bradley  and
Christopher Thompson
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Abstract

Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.

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Type
Articles
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Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 63 - 79
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

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