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A (MAINLY EPISTEMIC) CASE FOR MULTIPLE-VOTE MAJORITY RULE

Abstract
Abstract

Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.

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Corresponding author
r.bradley@lse.ac.uk
References
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R. Ben-Yashar , and S. Nitzan 1997. ‘The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result.’ International Economic Review, 38: 175–86.

J. Cohen 1986. ‘An Epistemic Conception of Democracy.’ Ethics, 97: 2638

F. Dietrich 2006. ‘General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures.’ Social Choice and Welfare, 26: 263–83.

B. Grofman , F. Owen , and S. L. Feld 1983. ‘Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth.’ Theory and Decision, 15: 261–78

G. Owen , B. Grofman , and S. L. Feld 1989. ‘Proving a Distribution-Free Generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.’ Mathematical Social Sciences, 17: 116.

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Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
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