Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-rbxfs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-07T07:31:52.810Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A NOTE CONCERNING JUSTIFICATION AND ACCESS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 November 2013

Clayton Littlejohn
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Certain combinations of attitudes are manifestly unreasonable. It is unreasonable to believe that dogs bark, for example, if one concedes that one has no justification to believe this. Why are the irrational combinations irrational? One suggestion is that these are attitudes that a subject cannot have justification to have. If this is right, we can test claims about the structure of propositional justification by relying on our observations about which combinations of attitudes constitute Moorean absurd pairs. In a recent defense of access internalism, Smithies argues that only access internalism can explain why various combinations of attitude are irrational. In this paper, I shall argue that access internalism cannot explain the relevant data. Reflection on Moore's Paradox will not tell us much of anything about propositional justification and cannot support access internalism.

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 369 - 386
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Adler, J. 2002. Belief's Own Ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press.Google Scholar
Alston, W. 1989. Epistemic Justification. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. 1988. ‘The Indispensability of Internal Justification.’ Synthese, 74: 285–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collins, A. 1996. ‘Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 46: 308–19.Google Scholar
Conee, E. and Feldman, R. 2008. ‘Evidence.’ In Smith, Q. (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays, pp. 83–104. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Elga, A. 2010. ‘How to Disagree about How to Disagree.’ In Warfield, T. and Feldman, R. (eds), Disagreement, pp. 175–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fitelson, B. 2012. ‘Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence.’ Analysis, 72: 85–8.Google Scholar
Gibbons, J. 2013. The Norm of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. 2001. ‘Internalism Exposed.’ In Steup, M. (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, pp. 115–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Greco, D. Forthcoming. ‘A Puzzle about Epistemic Akrasia.’ Philosophical Studies.Google Scholar
Horowitz, S. Forthcoming. ‘Epistemic Akrasia.’ Noûs.Google Scholar
Huemer, M. 2007. ‘Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief.’ In Nuccetelli, S. and Seay, G. (eds), Themes from G.E. Moore, pp. 142–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. Forthcoming. ‘Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, C. 2010. ‘Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88: 79–100.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, C.. 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Littlejohn, C.. 2013. ‘Disagreement and Defeat.’ In Machuca, D. (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism, pp. 169–93. Oxford: Routledge.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, C.. Forthcoming. ‘The Russellian Retreat.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.Google Scholar
Lord, E. and Sylvan, K. MS. Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).Google Scholar
McGlynn, A. 2013. ‘Believing Things Unknown.’ Noûs, 47: 385–407.Google Scholar
Nelson, M. 2010. ‘We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.’ Mind, 473: 83–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. 2012. ‘Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule.’ Noûs, 46: 791–802.Google Scholar
Smithies, D. 2011. ‘The Normative Role of Knowledge.’ Noûs, 46: 265–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smithies, D.. 2012. ‘Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85: 273–300.Google Scholar
Sutton, J. 2007. Without Justification. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Swain, M. 1981. Reasons and Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Wedgwood, R. 2002. Internalism Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64: 349–69.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar