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On Dreaming and Being Lied To

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Paul Faulkner
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Abstract

As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfied in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has substantial implications for any non-sceptical epistemological theory of testimony.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , October 2006 , pp. 149 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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