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ON THE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2015

Charity Anderson
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Abstract

Pragmatic encroachment offers a picture of knowledge whereby knowledge is unstable. This paper argues that pragmatic encroachment is committed to more instability than has been hitherto noted. One surprising result of the arguments in this paper is that pragmatic encroachment is not merely about changes in stakes. All sorts of practical factors can make for the presence or absence of knowledge on this picture – stakes are just one factor among many that are knowledge-depriving. In this way, the focus in the literature on ‘stakes-sensitivity’ is misleading. Furthermore, insufficient attention has been paid to the variety of ways in which on this view pragmatic factors affect knowledge: pragmatic factors are not merely knowledge-depriving but are also knowledge-inducing.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 343 - 353
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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