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PRACTICAL REASONING, DECISION THEORY AND ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2012

Jessica Brown
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Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the most important form of argument for anti-intellectualism, one that exploits alleged connections between knowledge and practical reasoning. I first focus on a form of this argument which exploits a universal principle, Sufficiency, connecting knowledge and practical reasoning. In the face of putative counterexamples to Sufficiency, a number of authors have attempted to reformulate the argument with a weaker principle. However, I argue that the weaker principles suggested are also problematic. I conclude that, so far, there is no good argument for anti-intellectualism that rests on connections between knowledge and practical reasoning.

Type
Symposium on Pragmatic Encroachment
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 43 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

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