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There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough to be a reason one has for believing other things.

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Jessica Brown . 2008. ‘Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.’ Nous, 42: 167–89.

Jeremy Fantl , and Matthew McGrath . 2009. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

John Hawthorne , and Jason Stanley . 2008. ‘Knowledge and Action.’ Journal of Philosophy, 105: 571–90.

Joseph Raz . 1999. Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Timothy Williamson . 2005. ‘Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 55: 213–35.

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  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
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