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THE ROLE OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE IN THE REALIZATION OF BASIC GOODS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Anne Baril
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, there is good reason to think that the qualities that make people good reasoners also make them better off. I will focus specifically on epistemic virtue: roughly, the kind of character in virtue of which one is excellently oriented towards epistemic goods. I propose that epistemic virtue is importantly implicated in the realization of some of the goods that are widely believed to be instrumental to, or even constitutive of, well-being. Here I focus on one such good: friendship.

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Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 379 - 395
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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