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Bradley, Seamus and Steele, Katie 2016. Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 83, Issue. 1, p. 1.
Mahtani, Anna 2016. Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour. Noûs,
Sznajder, Marta 2016. What conceptual spaces can do for Carnap's late inductive logic. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Vol. 56, p. 62.
Schoenfield, Miriam 2015. The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences. Noûs, p. n/a.
Weisberg, Jonathan 2015. You’ve Come a Long Way, Bayesians. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 44, Issue. 6, p. 817.
There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.
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