Skip to main content
×
Home

What is the “Equal Weight View”?

Abstract
ABSTRACT

In this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (EWV), but rather to raise awareness about some of the difficulties inherent in formulating such precisifications.

Copyright
References
Hide All
Christensen D. 2007. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” Philosophical Review 119: 187217.
Dalkey N. 1972. An Impossibility Theorem for Group Probability Functions. P-4862. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation.
Diaconis P. and Zabell S. 1982. “Updating Subjective Probability.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 77: 822–30.
Elga A. 2007. “Reflection and Disagreement.” Nous 41: 478502.
Feldman R. 2006. “Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.” In Hetherington S. (ed.), Epistemology Futures, pp. 216–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman R. 2007. “Reasonable Religious Disagreement.” In Antony L. (ed.), Philosophers Without God: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fitelson B. 2008. “A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications.” Review of Symbolic Logic 1: 111–25.
Genest C. and Zidek J. 1986. “Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and an Annotated Bibliography.” Statistical Science 1.1: 114–35.
Greaves H. and Wallace D. 2006. “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility.” Mind 115: 607–32.
Jeffrey R. 1987. “Indefinite Probability Judgment.” Philosophy of Science 54: 586–91.
Jeffrey R. 2004. Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Joyce J. 1998. “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.” Philosophy of Science 65: 575603.
Kelly T. Forthcoming. “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.” In Feldman R. and Warfield T. (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lehrer K. and Wagner C. 1981. Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study. Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel.
Lehrer K. and Wagner C. 1983. “Probability Amalgamation and the Independence Issue: A Reply to Laddaga.” Synthese 55: 339–46.
Loewer B. and Ladagga R. 1985. “Destroying the Consensus.” Synthese 62: 7995.
Shogenji T. 2007. “A Conundrum in Bayesian Epistemology of Disagreement.” Unpublished manuscript.
Wagner C. 1984. “Aggregating Subjective Probabilities: Some Limitative Theorems.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25: 233–40.
Wagner C. 1985. “On the Formal Properties of Weighted Averaging as a Method of Aggregation.” Synthese 62: 97108.
Wagner C. 2002. “Probability Kinematics and Commutativity.” Philosophy of Science 69: 266–78.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Episteme
  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 47 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 281 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 21st November 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.