Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 15
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Heesen, Remco and van der Kolk, Pieter 2016. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement. Erkenntnis,

    Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen 2015. Epistemic modals and credal disagreement. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 172, Issue. 4, p. 987.

    Rosenkranz, Sven and Schulz, Moritz 2015. Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities. Dialectica, Vol. 69, Issue. 4, p. 551.

    Russell, Jeffrey Sanford Hawthorne, John and Buchak, Lara 2015. Groupthink. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 172, Issue. 5, p. 1287.

    Staffel, Julia 2015. Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 44, Issue. 3, p. 273.

    Brössel, Peter and Eder, Anna-Maria A. 2014. How to resolve doxastic disagreement. Synthese, Vol. 191, Issue. 11, p. 2359.

    de Donato Rodríguez, Xavier and Zamora Bonilla, Jesús 2014. Scientific Controversies and the Ethics of Arguing and Belief in the Face of Rational Disagreement. Argumentation, Vol. 28, Issue. 1, p. 39.


    Lord, Errol 2014. From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, Issue. 2, p. 365.

    Lam, Barry 2013. Calibrated probabilities and the epistemology of disagreement. Synthese, Vol. 190, Issue. 6, p. 1079.

    Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria 2013. Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation. Noûs, Vol. 47, Issue. 4, p. 767.

    Yang, Eric 2013. Thinking animals, disagreement, and skepticism. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 166, Issue. 1, p. 109.

    Decker, Jason 2012. Disagreement, evidence, and agnosticism. Synthese, Vol. 187, Issue. 2, p. 753.

    Steele, Katie 2012. Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 41, Issue. 6, p. 983.

    Cariani, Fabrizio 2011. Judgment Aggregation. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 6, Issue. 1, p. 22.


What is the “Equal Weight View”?


In this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (EWV), but rather to raise awareness about some of the difficulties inherent in formulating such precisifications.

Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

P. Diaconis and S. Zabell 1982. “Updating Subjective Probability.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 77: 822–30.

A. Elga 2007. “Reflection and Disagreement.” Nous 41: 478502.

H. Greaves and D. Wallace 2006. “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility.” Mind 115: 607–32.

R. Jeffrey 1987. “Indefinite Probability Judgment.” Philosophy of Science 54: 586–91.

J. Joyce 1998. “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.” Philosophy of Science 65: 575603.

K. Lehrer and C. Wagner 1981. Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study. Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel.

K. Lehrer and C. Wagner 1983. “Probability Amalgamation and the Independence Issue: A Reply to Laddaga.” Synthese 55: 339–46.

B. Loewer and R. Ladagga 1985. “Destroying the Consensus.” Synthese 62: 7995.

C. Wagner 1984. “Aggregating Subjective Probabilities: Some Limitative Theorems.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25: 233–40.

C. Wagner 1985. “On the Formal Properties of Weighted Averaging as a Method of Aggregation.” Synthese 62: 97108.

C. Wagner 2002. “Probability Kinematics and Commutativity.” Philosophy of Science 69: 266–78.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

  • ISSN: 1742-3600
  • EISSN: 1750-0117
  • URL: /core/journals/episteme
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *