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Why No True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2020

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij Open the ORCID record for Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij [Opens in a new window]  and
Jeffrey S. Dunn
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, UK
Jeffrey S. Dunn
Affiliation:
Department of Religion, Philosophy, and History, University of Agder, Norway
*
*Email: k.ahlstrom-vij@bbk.ac.uk; jeffrey.dunn@uia.no
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Abstract

Critics have recently argued that reliabilists face trade-off problems, forcing them to condone intuitively unjustified beliefs when they generate lots of true belief further downstream. What these critics overlook is that reliabilism entails that there are side-constraints on belief-formation, on account of which there are some things you should not believe, even if doing so would have very good epistemic consequences. However, we argue that by embracing side-constraints the reliabilist faces a dilemma: she can either hold on to reliabilism, and with it aforementioned side-constraints, but then needs to explain why we should allow the pursuit of justification to get in the way of the acquisition of true belief; or she can deny that there are side-constraints – and in effect give up on reliabilism. We'll suggest that anyone moved by the considerations that likely attract people to reliabilism in the first place – the idea the true belief is good, and as such should be promoted – should go for the second horn, and instead pursue a form of epistemic utilitarianism.

Keywords

Reliabilismepistemic consequentialismtrade-off problemsepistemic utilitarianismepistemic justification
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 39 - 56
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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