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Paths towards coalition defection: Democracies and withdrawal from the Iraq War

  • Patrick A. Mello (a1)

Abstract

Despite widespread public opposition to the Iraq War, numerous democracies joined the US-led multinational force. However, while some stayed until the end of coalition operations, and several increased their deployments over time, others left unilaterally. How to explain this variation? While some studies suggest that democratic defection from security commitments is primarily motivated by electoral incentives or leadership change, scholars have not reached a consensus on this issue. To account for the complex interplay between causal factors, this article develops an integrative theoretical framework, using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on original data on the Iraq War involvement of 51 leaders from 29 democracies. The findings document the existence of multiple paths towards coalition defection. Among others, the results show that: (1) leadership change led to early withdrawal only when combined with leftist partisanship and the absence of upcoming elections; (2) casualties and coalition commitment played a larger role than previously assumed; and (3) coalition defection often occurred under the same leaders who had made the initial decision to deploy to Iraq, and who did not face elections when they made their withdrawal announcements.

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Copyright

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.

Corresponding author

*Corresponding author. Email: patrick.mello@uni-erfurt.de

References

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1 Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Bilmes, Linda J., The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008); Danchev, Alex and MacMillan, John (eds), The Iraq War and Democratic Politics (London: Routledge, 2005).

2 Schweller, Randall L., ‘Domestic structures and preventive war: Are democracies more pacific?’, World Politics, 44:2 (1992).

3 Baum, Matthew A. and Potter, Philip B. K., War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); Sobel, Richard, Furia, Peter, and Barratt, Bethany (eds), Public Opinion and International Intervention: Lessons from the Iraq War (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2012).

4 Choi, Ajin, ‘Fighting to the finish: Democracy and commitment in coalition war’, Security Studies, 21:4 (2012); Leeds, Brett Ashley, Mattes, Michaela, and Vogel, Jeremy S., ‘Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments’, American Journal of Political Science, 53:2 (2009); Reiter, Dan and Stam, Allan C., ‘Understanding victory: Why political institutions matter’, International Security, 28:1 (2003); Desch, Michael C., ‘Democracy and victory: Why regime type hardly matters’, International Security, 27:2 (2002); Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor, ‘Democratic states and commitment in international relations’, International Organization, 50:1 (1996); Gartzke, Erik and Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, ‘Why democracies may actually be less reliable allies’, American Political Science Review, 48:4 (2004); Fearon, James D., ‘Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes’, American Political Science Review, 88:3 (1994); Smith, Alastair, ‘Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems’, International Studies Quarterly, 40:1 (1996).

5 Weitsman, Patricia A., Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Auerswald, David P. and Saideman, Stephen M., NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Farrell, Theo, ‘Introduction: Military adaptation in war', in Farrell, Theo, Osinga, Frans, and Russell, James A. (eds), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Mello, Patrick A. and Saideman, Stephen M., ‘The politics of multinational military operations’, Contemporary Security Policy, 40:1 (2019); Mello, Patrick A., ‘National restrictions in multinational military operations: a conceptual framework’, Contemporary Security Policy, 40:1 (2019).

6 Pilster, Ulrich, Böhmelt, Tobias, and Tago, Atsushi, ‘Political leadership changes and the withdrawal from military coalition operations, 1946–2001’, International Studies Perspectives, 16:4 (2013); Tago, Atsushi, ‘When are democratic friends unreliable? The unilateral withdrawal of troops from the “coalition of the willing”’, Journal of Peace Research, 46:2 (2009).

7 Croco, Sarah E., ‘The decider's dilemma: Leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment’, American Political Science Review, 105:3 (2011).

8 Brown, Michael E. et al. (eds), Do Democracies Win Their Wars? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); Croco, ‘The decider's dilemma’; Croco, Sarah E. and Weeks, Jessica L. P., ‘War outcomes and leader tenure’, World Politics, 68:4 (2016); Rose, William, Murphy, Rysia, and Abrahms, Max, ‘Correspondence – does terrorism ever work? The 2004 Madrid train bombings’, International Security, 32:1 (2007).

9 Ragin, Charles C. (ed.), Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Schneider, Carsten Q. and Wagemann, Claudius, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

10 Others have limited their analyses to the initial phase of the war, examined the aggregate country level, or conducted studies on individual states’ involvement, see Tago, ‘When are democratic friends unreliable?’; Cristian Cantir, ‘Coalition of the Leaving: What Causes the Disintegration of the Multi-National Force in Iraq (2003–2009)’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kansas, 2011); Davidson, Jason W., ‘Heading for the exits: Democratic allies and withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan’, Democracy and Security, 10:3 (2014).

11 Additional documentation is provided in the appendix and supplementary material. For replication data and R code, see Harvard Dataverse, available at: {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/patrick_mello} accessed 25 April 2019.

12 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Boston, MS: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

13 Weitsman, Waging War, p. 36; Scott Wolford, The Politics of Military Coalitions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 7.

14 Choi, ‘Fighting to the finish'; Fearon, ‘Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes’; Gaubatz, ‘Democratic states and commitment in international relations’; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, ‘Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments’; William Reed, ‘Alliance duration and democracy: an extension and cross-validation of “democratic states and commitment in international relations”', American Journal of Political Science, 41:3 (1997).

15 Desch, ‘Democracy and victory'; Gartzke and Gleditsch, ‘Why democracies may actually be less reliable allies’; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Smith, ‘Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems'.

16 Mello and Saideman, ‘The politics of multinational military operations', p. 31.

17 Kreps, Sarah E., Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011); Davidson, Jason W., America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); von Hlatky, Stéfanie, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Henke, Marina E., ‘The politics of diplomacy: How the United States builds multilateral military coalitions’, International Studies Quarterly, 61:2 (2017).

18 Wolford, Scott, ‘Power, preferences, and balancing: the durability of coalitions and the expansion of conflict’, International Studies Quarterly, 58:1 (2014); Morey, Daniel S., ‘Military coalitions and the outcome of interstate wars’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12:4 (2016).

19 Mello, Patrick A., Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict: Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Saideman, Stephen M., ‘The ambivalent coalition: Doing the least one can do against the Islamic State’, Contemporary Security Policy, 37:2 (2016); Haesebrouck, Tim, ‘NATO burden sharing in Libya: a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61:10 (2017).

20 Cantir, ‘Coalition of the Leaving’; Davidson, ‘Heading for the exits’, p. 276.

21 Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, ‘Political leadership changes', p. 13.

22 See Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, ‘Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments’, p. 475; Choi, ‘Fighting to the finish', p. 649.

23 Alex Weisiger, ‘When do states abandon coalition partners during war?’, International Studies Quarterly, advance access (2016), available at: {doi: 10.1093/isq/sqw029}. For conceptual work on coalition defection with illustrations from the Iraq War, see Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Varieties of defection strategies from multinational military operations: Insights from Operation Iraqi Freedom', Contemporary Security Policy, 40:1 (2019).

24 Massie, Justin, ‘Why democratic allies defect prematurely: Canadian and Dutch unilateral pullouts from the war in Afghanistan’, Democracy and Security, 12:2 (2016).

25 See Tago, ‘When are democratic friends unreliable?’; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, ‘Political leadership changes’; Weisiger, ‘When do states abandon coalition partners during war?’

26 See Davidson, ‘Heading for the exits’; von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War; Cantir, ‘Coalition of the Leaving’; Massie, ‘Why democratic allies defect prematurely’.

27 Mackie, John L., ‘Causes and conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2:4 (1965), p. 245.

28 For discussions of set-relational causation, see Mahoney, James, ‘Toward a unifiedt heory of causality’, Comparative Political Studies, 41:4/5 (2008); Rohlfing, Ingo, Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 5160.

29 Gartzke and Gleditsch, ‘Why democracies may actually be less reliable allies’; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, ‘Political leadership changes’.

30 Croco, ‘The decider's dilemma’.

31 Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, ‘Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments’.

32 Schuster, Jürgen and Maier, Herbert, ‘The rift: Explaining Europe's divergent Iraq policies in the run-up of the American-led war on Iraq’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 2:3 (2006); Mello, Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict.

33 Bennett, Andrew, ‘The guns that didn't smoke: Ideas and the Soviet non-use of force in 1989’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 7:2 (2005); Saunders, Elizabeth N., Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

34 Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War, p. 200.

35 Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor, ‘Election cycles and war’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35:2 (1991), p. 232.

36 Huth, Paul K. and Allee, Todd L., The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 159.

37 Williams, Laron K., ‘Flexible election timing and international conflict’, International Studies Quarterly, 57:3 (2013), p. 459.

38 Haesebrouck, ‘NATO burden sharing in Libya’, p. 18.

39 Tago, ‘When are democratic friends unreliable?’, p. 230. See also Davidson, ‘Heading for the exits’; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, ‘Political leadership changes’.

40 Allan, James P. and Scruggs, Lyle, ‘Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies’, American Journal of Political Science, 48:3 (2004); Iversen, Torben and Stephens, John D., ‘Partisan politics, the welfare state, and three worlds of human capital formation’, Comparative Political Studies, 41:4/5 (2008).

41 Wagner, Wolfgang et al. , ‘The party politics of legislative-executive relations in security and defence policy’, West European Politics, 40:1 (2017); Mello, Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict; Arena, Philip and Palmer, Glenn, ‘Politics or the economy? Domestic correlates of dispute involvement in developed democracies’, International Studies Quarterly, 53:4 (2009); Rathbun, Brian C., Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Schuster and Maier, ‘The rift’.

42 Strøm, Kaare, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

43 Rathbun, Partisan Interventions.

44 Wagner et al., ‘The party politics of legislative-executive relations’; Tim Haesebrouck and Patrick A. Mello, ‘Patterns of Political Ideology and Security Policy’, unpublished manuscript (2019).

45 Mello, Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict; Schuster and Maier, ‘The rift’.

46 As one of the reviewers rightly noted, this implies that the presence of a leftist leader at the time of the initial deployment should work against early coalition withdrawal. A prominent example is the United Kingdom, where Prime Minister Blair did not have to be concerned about electoral ramifications, at least not during the early phases of the war, because the conservative opposition had already indicated its support for the military operation. For a detailed account of the British case, see Strong, James, Public Opinion, Legitimacy and Tony Blair's War in Iraq (London: Routledge, 2017).

47 Snyder, Glenn H., ‘The security dilemma in alliance politics’, World Politics, 36:4 (1984).

48 Bennett, Andrew, Lepgold, Joseph, and Unger, Danny, ‘Burden sharing in the Persian Gulf War’, International Organization, 48:1 (1994); Bennett, Andrew, Lepgold, Joseph, and Unger, Danny (eds), Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1997); Davidson, America's Allies and War; Davidson, ‘Heading for the exits’. See also the applications by Baltrusaitis, Daniel F., Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of Choice (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2009); Weitsman, Waging War; and Haesebrouck, ‘NATO burden sharing in Libya’. See also Massie, Justin, ‘Public contestation and policy resistance: Canada's oversized military commitment to Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12:1 (2016).

49 Weitsman, Waging War, ch. 6.

50 Farrell, ‘Introduction: Military adaptation in war’; Kreps, Sarah E., ‘Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public opinion gardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 6:3 (2010).

51 Newnham, Randall, ‘“Coalition of the bribed and bullied?” U.S. economic linkage and the Iraq war coalition’, International Studies Perspectives, 9:2 (2008); Davidson, America's Allies and War; Tim Haesebrouck, ‘Democratic participation in the air strikes against Islamic State: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis’, Foreign Policy Analysis (2016), available at: {doi:10.1093/fpa/orw035}; Ringsmose, Jens, ‘NATO burden-sharing redux: Continuity and change after the Cold War’, Contemporary Security Policy, 31:2 (2010); Haesebrouck, ‘Democratic participation in the air strikes against Islamic State’; Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, Friends in Need.

52 Smith, Hugh, ‘What costs will democracies bear? A review of popular theories of casualty aversion’, Armed Forces & Society, 31:4 (2005); Baum, Matthew A. and Potter, Philip B. K., ‘The relationship between mass media, public opinion, and foreign policy: Toward a theoretical synthesis’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (2008); Schörnig, Niklas, ‘Casualty aversion in democratic security provision: Procurement and the defense industrial base’, in Evangelista, Matthew, Müller, Harald, and Schörnig, Niklas (eds), Democracy and Security (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008).

53 Geis, Anna and Wagner, Wolfgang, ‘How far is it from Königsberg to Kandahar? Democratic peace and democratic violence in international relations’, Review of International Studies, 37:4 (2011), p. 1571.

54 I use the terms fatalities and casualties synonymously. My analysis includes military and civilian fatalities, as I describe below.

55 Luttwak, Edward N., ‘A post-heroic military policy’, Foreign Affairs, 75:4 (1996).

56 Everts, Philip P., Democracy and Military Force (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Gelpi, Christopher, Feaver, Peter D., and Reifler, Jason, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

57 Tago, ‘When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable?’, p. 231.

58 For instance, Baum and Potter develop a theory of democratic constraint, where public opinion and media access are central ingredients, see Baum and Potter, War and Democratic Constraint. Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall argue that the combination of parliamentary war powers and a war-averse public stopped many European governments from participating in the Iraq War, see Dieterich, Sandra, Hummel, Hartwig, and Marschall, Stefan, ‘Bringing democracy back in: the democratic peace, parliamentary war powers and European participation in the 2003 Iraq War’, Cooperation and Conflict, 50:1 (2015).

59 Baum and Potter, ‘War and democratic constraint’, p. 104; Peter Furia and Bethany Barratt, ‘Conclusion’, in Sobel, Furia, and Barratt (eds), Public Opinion and International Intervention, p. 238; Mello, 'Democratic participation in armed conflict, p. 168; Sobel, Furia, and Barratt (eds), Public Opinion and International Intervention.

60 Horowitz, Michael C., Stam, Allan C., and Ellis, Cali M., Why Leaders Fight (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Chiozza, Giacomo and Goemans, H. E., Leaders and International Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Croco and Weeks, ‘War outcomes and leader tenure’; Foyle, Douglas C., ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: Elite beliefs as a mediating variable’, International Studies Quarterly, 41:1 (1997).

61 Recent QCA applications in conflict and security studies include Bara, Corinne, ‘Incentives and opportunities: a complexity-oriented explanation of violent ethnic conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 51:6 (2014); Binder, Martin, ‘Paths to intervention: What explains the UN's selective response to humanitarian crises?’, Journal of Peace Research, 52:6 (2015); Haesebrouck, ‘NATO burden sharing in Libya’.

62 For comprehensive introductions to QCA, see Ragin (ed.), Redesigning Social Inquiry; Rihoux, Benoît and Ragin, Charles C. (eds), Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009); Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences. On robustness tests, see Duşa, Adrian, QCA with R: A Comprehensive Resource (Cham: Springer, 2018), p. 256; Skaaning, Svend-Erik, ‘Assessing the robustness of crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA results’, Sociological Methods & Research, 40:2 (2011).

63 Ragin, Charles C., Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 22; Ragin, Charles C., The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).

64 Collier, David, Brady, Henry E., and Seawright, Jason, ‘Sources of leverage in causal inference: Toward an alternative view of methodology’, in Brady, Henry E. and Collier, David (eds), Rethinking Social Inquiry (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 147; Goertz, Gary and Mahoney, James, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

65 I follow the set-theoretic literature in the usage of these terms. As a caveat, it is important to note that neither correlations nor set relations imply causation when found in observational data.

66 For an inventory of causes based on set theory, see Mahoney, James, Kimball, Erin, and Koivu, Kendra L., ‘The logic of historical explanation in the social sciences’, Comparative Political Studies, 42:1 (2009); Rohlfing, Case Studies and Causal Inference.

67 Ragin (ed.), Redesigning Social Inquiry.

68 Detailed information on calibration and descriptive statistics of the data are provided in the supplementary material (link provided at the end of the article).

69 Among others, this distinguishes the Iraq campaign from Afghanistan, where operations were taken over by NATO in August 2003. For a detailed account of the ISAF mission, see Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan.

70 This follows an informal usage of the term ‘most-likely case’, see Rohlfing, Case Studies and Causal Inference, p. 85.

71 On ‘elite collusion’ over Afghanistan, see Lagassé, Philippe and Mello, Patrick A., ‘The unintended consequences of parliamentary involvement: Elite collusion and Afghanistan deployments in Canada and Germany’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20:1 (2018).

72 Other countries provided political and/or financial support, but made no military contribution, see US-GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007).

73 I follow Wolford in avoiding the term ‘unilateral’ due to its loaded nature. Instead I use the term ‘early’ withdrawal to qualify the observed foreign policy decisions. See Wolford, The Politics of Military Coalitions, p. 23.

74 UN Security Council Resolution 1511 authorised ‘a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq …’ (16 October 2003). The mandate for MNF-I was extended several times up until resolution 1790 (18 December 2007).

75 Dale, Catherine M., Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009).

76 Across the observed countries, the average time between withdrawal announcement and actual troop exit was 6.75 months. Hence, placing the cutoff seven months in advance of MNF-I's expiry helps to separate cases of early withdrawal from regular departure near the end of coalition operations. Empirically, there is a clear separation between instances of early withdrawal up until November 2007 and departures toward the end of MNF-I, as visualised in Figure 1.

77 See Table S2 (supplementary material) for a documentation of my calibration criteria and the assigned scores.

78 The only such case was Romania, where the Supreme Defense Council voted down the government's withdrawal initiative. As a robustness test, I also ran an analysis where Romania (RO2) was coded as a negative case (see Table S10 in the supplementary material). The results broadly confirm my findings.

79 Following a change in leadership, Bulgaria redeployed to Iraq after withdrawing in March 2005. For comparative reasons, this article focuses on the country's first deployment and eventual withdrawal (BG1).

80 See Tables A1 and A2 (appendix) for raw data and calibrated fuzzy-set conditions. For comprehensive documentation of my calibration strategy see the supplementary material.

81 The results of more restrictive criteria, where leadership change without elections was coded negatively, are shown in Table S9 in the supplementary material. This procedure yields substantively similar results, indicating the robustness of my analysis.

82 This coding follows Tago, ‘When are democratic friends unreliable?’, p. 229. I also ran a robustness test where a time of six months before elections was taken as crossover point (see Table S11 in the supplementary material). The change of calibration thresholds has only a minor effect on the substantive pattern of the solution term, which suggests that the findings are robust.

83 Bakker, Ryan et al. , ‘Measuring party positions in Europe: the Chapel Hill Expert Survey trend file, 1999–2010’, Party Politics, 21:1 (2015); Kitschelt, Herbert, Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2013); Budge, Ian et al. (eds), Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945–1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

84 SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armament, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015); Carney, Stephen A., Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, DC: United States Army, 2011); Mello, Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict.

85 Iraq Casualties Project, available at: {http://www.icasualties.org/Iraq} accessed 15 November 2018.

86 Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, available at: {http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/ terrorism-incidents.html} accessed 15 November 2018.

87 As a robustness test, I also ran analyses with crisp-set conditions. Table S8 in the supplementary material shows that the resulting solution paths are substantively similar.

88 The analysis was conducted with the R packages ‘QCA’ (version 3.2) and ‘SetMethods’ (version 2.3.1); see Duşa, Adrian, ‘User manual for the QCA(GUI) package in R’, Journal of Business Research, 60:5 (2007); Juraj Medzihorsky et al., ‘SetMethods: Functions for Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research and Advanced QCA’, R Package Version 2.3.1 (2018). The R code and replication data is available on Harvard Dataverse: {https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/patrick_mello} accessed 25 April 2019.

89 For the calculation of consistency and coverage, see Ragin (ed.), Redesigning Social Inquiry, pp. 44–68. For the relevance of necessity indicator, see Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences, pp. 220–49.

90 On thresholds for necessary conditions, see Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences, p. 278.

91 The results of a robustness test based on a six-month period are documented in Table S10 (supplementary material).

92 Croco, ‘The decider's dilemma’.

93 Tago, ‘When are democratic friends unreliable?’; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, ‘Political leadership changes’.

94 Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences, p. 242.

95 On threshold setting, see ibid., p. 279.

96 Duşa, ‘User manual for the QCA(GUI) package in R’; Ragin (ed.), Redesigning Social Inquiry, p. 164.

97 The intermediate solution rests on the exclusion of logical remainder row 5. Of the rows without empirical cases, this combination is judged to be least plausible to show the outcome because leftist partisanship is the sole condition that points in the expected direction but here it does not combine with leadership change (for the truth table with logical remainders, see Table S3. For all three solution terms, see Table S5).

98 Charles C. Ragin and Peer C. Fiss, ‘Net effects versus configurations: an empirical demonstration’, in Ragin (ed.), Redesigning Social Inquiry; Fiss, Peer C., ‘Building better causal theories: a fuzzy set approach to typologies in organization research’, Academy of Management Journal, 54:2 (2011).

99 Barbara McMahon, ‘Rudd sets date for Iraq pull-out’, The Guardian (1 December 2007).

100 ‘Italian force to leave Iraq by December’, The Guardian (7 June 2006).

101 Luis R. Aizpeolea, ‘Zapatero anuncia la retirada de las tropas de Irak en “el menor tiempo posible”’, El País (19 April 2004).

102 ‘Latvia to withdraw troops from Iraq in mid-June’, Xinhua News Agency (23 April 2007).

103 Alison Mutler, ‘Romanian PM proposes pulling Iraq troops’, The Washington Post (29 June 2006). As a robustness test, I have also conducted an alternative analysis where Romania (RO2) was coded negatively on the outcome. Apart from slight decreases in unique coverage, the results are nearly identical (see Table S10 in the supplementary material).

104 Croco, ‘The decider's dilemma’.

105 Gelpi, Christopher, Feaver, Peter D., and Reifler, Jason, ‘Success matters: Casualty sensitivity and the war in Iraq’, International Security, 30:3 (2005); Weisiger, ‘When do states abandon coalition partners during war?’.

106 ‘Honduras to withdraw troops from Iraq’, Associated Press (16 March 2004); ‘Powell urges coalition to stay’, CNN (21 April 2004).

107 Cantir, ‘Coalition of the Leaving’, pp. 161–5.

108 ‘Japan to eithdraw troops from Iraq’, The New York Times (20 June 2006).

109 Philip Everts, ‘The Netherlands’, in Sobel, Furia, and Barratt (eds), Public Opinion and International Intervention.

110 ‘New Zealand to pull Iraq army engineers’, Associated Press (2 April 2004).

111 Reports based on leaked diplomatic cables suggest that economic interests also played a role in the Clark government's decision to contribute. ‘Clark sent troops to Iraq over Fonterra – cables’, New Zealand Herald (20 December 2010).

112 Note that points have been jittered to make overlapping cases visible.

113 See Schneider, Carsten Q. and Rohlfing, Ingo, ‘Combining QCA and process tracing in set-theoretic multi-method research’, Sociological Methods & Research, 42:4 (2013).

114 See Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, ‘Political leadership changes’.

115 See Choi, ‘Fighting to the finish’; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, ‘Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments’.

116 See the exchange in Rose, Murphy, and Abrahms, ‘Correspondence – does terrorism ever work?’

117 Rory McCarthy, ‘Philippines begins Iraq withdrawal’, The Guardian (14 July 2004).

118 ‘Bulgaria sends first group of guard troops to Iraq’, Reuters (31 March 2006).

119 ‘Latvia to withdraw troops from Iraq in mid-June’, Xinhua.

120 Tago, ‘When are democratic friends unreliable?’; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, ‘Political leadership changes’. Potential reasons for the different results between these studies and mine include the level of analysis and the time period under study.

121 Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan.

122 One particularly fruitful avenue could be the analysis of leaders’ beliefs about public opinion; see Foyle, ‘Public opinion and foreign policy’. See also Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, Why Leaders Fight; Chiozza and Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict.

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