There has been much discussion of the proper scope of the European Treaty articles on free movement. Central to this discussion has been a debate about the best concept around which to build free movement law, and in this debate “discrimination” has been opposed to “market access.” It is, however, the central thesis of this paper that the opposition is largely false. In general, measures which affect all market actors equally do not, as a matter of economic fact, impede market access. The non-discriminatory measures which impede market access, which some have felt it so important to bring within the Treaty, are therefore more mythical than real. This argument is made with reference to competition law and theory concerning barriers to market entry.

The aim of this working paper is to analyze the compatibility between two relevant provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the World Trade Organization (WTO). The first is art. VII, Recognition, which seems to allow a Member to recognize standards of one or more Members—and not of others—without violating its GATS obligations, although this freedom should not be abused. The second is the general Non-Discrimination provision as of GATS art. II, since the aim of the GATS, at least as it reads in its preamble, is to provide a multilateral framework to trade liberalization in the services market on a non-discriminatory basis. Through the following pages, I will try to explain the rationale to sign Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and their impact on the GATS system. It is true that there is a general principle of transparency and openness of the MRAs, but it is necessary to get our hands dirty with the reality and understand if and how such an openness clause works.

The principle of the rule of law is a well-established notion at the core of modern constitutionalism and the undisputed building block of democratic governments. This principle is characterized by the breadth of its scope, the difficulty to strictly define its content, and the increasing possibility of a more or less broad interpretation. This explains the wide-ranging debate on the rule of law which has been developed over time with significant contributions from several disciplines, including philosophy, constitutional law, and international law.

While the European Union (EU) has been finding itself increasingly involved in providing security in its “near abroad,” the proposal of a “Stabilisation and Association Process for Countries of South-Eastern Europe” has marked the commencement of a nearly all-encompassing commitment to progress in the countries of the Western Balkans. In this context, Kosovo—for which the European perspective of the Western Balkans has been declared open—provides a text book example covering all aspects of external assistance as well as security and defense policies. Among the latter, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in the territory of Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) is indeed characterized by a number of extraordinary factors and circumstances. It is not only EULEX Kosovo's unparalleled European and local staff size or its partly executive mandate that set this EU mission apart from other civilian missions of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which have thus far been deployed to the Western Balkans. Unsurprisingly, the complexity of the mission has generated difficulty in comprehending its deployment, mandate and implementation. Yet, against the backdrop of the 2003 Security Strategy which makes the credibility of the EU's foreign policy dependent on its achievements in the Balkans, a clear understanding of EULEX Kosovo appears paramount.

Having gone through an international process on status settlement, in the aftermath of the proclamation of independence, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a Constitution and a range of essential laws. One of the very basic laws adopted in the aftermath of independence is the Law on the Constitutional Court. The Ahtisaari Commission had given a singular importance to the latter, having seen the Kosovan Constitutional Court as one of the most important guarantors of democracy in constitutional terms. In an Ahtisaarian view, the Kosovan Constitutional Court is, inter alia, thought of as a guarantor of the ethnic communities' constitutional rights. As a result, the law concerned along with the Constitution of Kosovo determined the organization and functioning of the Kosovo Constitutional Court.

At a first glance the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has given a clear negative answer to the question submitted to it by the General Assembly. According to the ICJ's advisory opinion from 22 July 2010, Kosovo's declaration of independence did not constitute a violation of international law. Yet, reading the reasons the ICJ offered in support of its holding, one soon discovers that many relevant questions have been left open.

The most immediately striking aspect of the ICJ's recent ruling on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is the divergence between what the Court actually said and how its decision is being read in the media and by political actors. Typically the Court is said to have found secession by Kosovo to be “legal” or “lawful” under international law. According to Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu, “The decision finally removes all doubts that countries which still do not recognize the Republic of Kosovo could have.” The angry reaction to the decision by Serbian nationalists likewise supposed that the Court had endorsed a right to secession. In fact, what the Court did was to read literally—and some would say narrowly or pedantically—the question it was asked, and thus to avoid opining on the major legal (and related policy) issues raised by the act of secession, including whether there is a right to proceed with a unilateral act of secession, and to whom such a right may or may not belong. On the literal reading, the Court was not asked, and thus it did not rule on, whether international law requires that the final status of Kosovo protect the group and individual rights of minorities, whether Kosovar Serbs or Roma. Likewise, the Court did not rule on whether Serbia or, indeed, any other State in the world community is required to recognize Kosovo as an independent State. Nor did the Court's decision address the borders of an independent Kosovo, or whether and under what circumstances force could legally be used either to impose independence or to resist it.

Very seldom has a judgment or advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) received so much media coverage as the recent Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo rendered on 22 July 2010 in response to a question posed by the General Assembly. The question had been forwarded on behalf of a request by Serbia and was phrased in the following way: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the “ICJ”) delivered its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence dated 17 February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law consisting of general international law, UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter the “Resolution 1244”) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter the “Constitutional Framework”). The ICJ delivered the advisory opinion in response to a question set out in resolution 63/3 dated 8 October 2008 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (hereinafter the “General Assembly”), which asked if “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.”

With the request for an advisory opinion on Kosovo opportunity knocked on the doors of the International Court of Justice. The opportunity was unique for several reasons. First, the case of Kosovo was momentous. It had involved war. International armed forces had intervened to stop ethnic cleansing. Since then, the situation of Kosovo has been politically loaded. It has polarized the entire international community. Second, it is a rare occurrence that such a situation comes to the Court. The regular case, if there is such a thing, before the Court has tended to be a relatively low-profile interstate dispute. The Kosovo incidence had only come to the Court in the first place—like the case of the Wall on the West Bank, the other recent high-profile exception—because the detour via the United Nations General Assembly had been open.

The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion favoring the legal status of the Kosovar declaration of independence came as an exhilarating surprise to many in Kosovo. The spirit of suspicion and negative perception of most internationals (US citizens being a notable but not exclusive exception) meant that a favorable ruling from an international court was unexpected.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in an advisory opinion on 22 July 2010 that Kosovo's 17 February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia did not violate international law. The Kosovo Parliament's declaration of independence stated that Kosovo would continue to be bound by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter “SC Resolution 1244 (1999)”), as well as the Ahtisaari plan. UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari's proposal, produced in February 2007, defined Kosovo's internal settlement, minority-protection mechanisms, and allowed for independence under international supervision. The proposal increased the powers devolved to Kosovar institutions but without providing for the complete removal of international oversight and authority.

When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) released its advisory opinion regarding the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on 22 July 2010, Serbia was not the only State to express its dissatisfaction with the outcome. The broader significance of the ICJ's finding that Kosovo's UDI in 2008 did not violate international law has profound relevance for other States. The United States and its allies claim that Kosovo's situation is unique and does not serve as precedent, but other nations facing separatist movements within their own borders may have reason to be concerned.

On 4 November 2009, the First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) handed down its decision in the Wunsiedel case. In this decision, the Court held that § 130(4) of the Criminal Code does not violate the fundamental right of freedom of expression as it is protected by Article 5 of the Basic Law. § 130(4) of the Criminal Code—in concordance with § 15(1) of the Assembly Act— provides the legal basis for prohibiting certain National Socialist assemblies, particularly those taking place on dates and at locations with a high symbolic meaning for supporters of National Socialism. Therefore, the decision is of the highest importance for the fight against neo-Nazism and other supporters of National Socialist ideologies. Beyond this specific context, the decision has a significant impact on the doctrine of freedom of expression in general.

This brief essay is intended to be read as a supplement to the article “Iraq and the Serious Consequences of Word Games: Language, Violence and Responsibility in the Security Council,” which was published in the German Law Journal on 1 November 2002. The date of publication was exactly one week before the Security Council voted on Resolution 1441, the text of which was still evolving during the last week of October 2002. What follows is a narrative that traces the trajectory of the Resolution's textual language from the provisions of a 21 October US-UK draft to the final form as of Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted on 8 November 2002.