Since the 1980s, many African countries began to adopt competition laws alongside structural adjustment and trade liberalization measures, selectively borrowing from existing EU and U.S. regimes. Today, in response to global consolidation in digital markets, African governments are embracing sectoral regulatory schemes that have pro-competitive aims but go beyond traditional competition law. The structure and goals of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) are now being reflected in national and regional African frameworks such as the AfCFTA Competition Protocol, South Africa’s Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry, and Kenya’s Competition Amendment Bill. The proliferation of these pro-competitive regimes in the African region even in the face of emerging trade pressure leads to two principal lessons. First, there seems to be an important alignment of interests between the EU and African jurisdictions vis-à-vis tech (U.S.) giants. Second, despite the many limits of African competition authorities’ enforcement capabilities, pro-competitive regimes illustrate a hopeful appetite for an enforcement approach to tech markets that is not antithetic to traditional economic development rationales and yet leaves space for local and regional African values. Even with a regulatory regime formally on the books, however, adding substance to it requires significant implementation work.

This Article argues that the classic “what is law” question deserves more attention in EU legal studies. First, it shows that questions about the nature and concept of law are of great practical relevance for EU law. Second, the Article endorses a distinctively realist outlook on EU law. This analysis concludes that a realist(ic) concept of EU law cannot be distilled from legal realism as a theory of adjudication. What is needed instead is a theory of law that can account for the social reality of EU law by weaving together law’s ideational and material dimensions. From the realist perspective, EU law is neither autonomous nor singular. This inquiry into the nature of EU law illustrates why different variants of legal and constitutional pluralism and inter-legality provide insufficient tools for theorizing EU law. Moreover, it challenges the EU’s current “politics of legality” and problematizes the law-power relationship in EU law, depicting the concept of law as key to the EU’s prolonged authority crisis.

The Article argues that Australia’s current open access framework remains structurally inadequate because it relies predominantly on soft-law policy mandates rather than enforceable statutory rights within the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). While international jurisdictions increasingly embed open access obligations into legislative and regulatory systems, Australia continues to depend on fragmented institutional compliance and funder policies that are vulnerable to publisher contracts and inconsistent implementation. Through comparative legal analysis, the Article also examines the statutory secondary publication rights adopted in Germany and the Netherlands alongside policy-driven approaches in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. It demonstrates that jurisdictions with legislative open access provisions provide greater legal certainty, author protection, and long-term sustainability than systems dependent solely on administrative mandates. Building on these international developments, the Article proposes a “Three-Phase Open Access Pathway” for Australia consisting of: (1) mandatory repository deposit of publicly funded research outputs; (2) statutory embargo limitations guaranteeing time-bound public access; and (3) mandatory open licensing through mechanisms such as Creative Commons licensing. Further, the Article situates the proposal within Australian copyright jurisprudence by examining the broader public interest and technological balancing principles reflected in cases such as University of New South Wales v Moorhouse, IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd, and Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd. Ultimately, the discussion of the Article contends that statutory reform is both legally feasible and normatively necessary to align Australian copyright law with contemporary principles of open science, transparency, public accountability, and equitable access to publicly funded knowledge.

This Article explores future fact-finding as a distinct subject of legal research. Usually, legal decision makers, such as judges, decide cases based on past or present facts. However, sometimes, legal norms oblige them to engage in future assessments. The Article argues that future fact-finding is fundamentally different from past or present fact-finding and should be treated as a separate legal phenomenon. It conceptualizes this practice in a legal context and sketches an initial theoretical framework for thinking about and engaging in future fact-finding. To do this, the Article draws on philosophical (epistemological) insights and applies a classical doctrinal method by examining positive law, case law, and doctrine.

The goal of this Article is to contribute to the broader discussion on strengthening the resilience of the rule of law in Germany by focusing on how to protect trust in the judiciary and judicial independence against (possibly) radicalized judges. The Article provides an introduction to the current legal situation in Germany regarding judges’ active involvement in politics, as well as an overview of the historical background. It addresses the regulation governing the right to return to a post as a judge after having been a member of parliament, and disciplinary rules regarding appropriate behavior of judges. It illustrates the current legal status quo and considers possible consequences for judicial independence and public trust in the judiciary. The Article concludes with proposals to improve the resilience of the judiciary.

This Article examines the legitimacy crisis in investment arbitration with a particular focus on Africa’s historical and contemporary experiences under the investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. Tracing the colonial origins of international investment law, it argues that the structure and implementation of ISDS mechanisms have disproportionately disadvantaged African states. Through historical analysis, case law, and the reform agenda of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, the Article highlights how Africa was both shaped by and now actively participates in shaping global investment law. While acknowledging colonial-era power asymmetries, the Article contends that the future lies in Africa’s strategic engagement with reform efforts. It concludes by proposing regionally grounded reforms and a shift in perspective that recognizes African states not as passive respondents, but as vital contributors to the evolution of investment arbitration.

Scholars have increasingly discussed the concept of European Militant Democracy, that is, the EU’s defense of Article 2 TEU values against defiant Member States. But does EU law have anything to say about national militant democracy, specifically on measures such as bans of political parties? The possible role that EU law has to play in this area has so far been overlooked. Using the proposed ban of the AfD as an example, this Article discusses whether and under what circumstances EU law is applicable to national party bans. Arguing that national political parties fulfill an essential function for representative democracy in the EU, the Article finds that EU law is applicable to national party bans both within the context of elections to the European Parliament as well as in purely internal situations. Arguing that the concept of democracy in Article 2 TEU nevertheless allows for militant democratic measures such as party bans, this Article then carves out specific standards that national party bans must comply with as a matter of EU Law.

Legislation combating discrimination is oftentimes criticized for its individual focus. Beyond this, the involvement of bystanders to instances of discrimination is increasingly receiving attention. When bystanders intervene, they risk being subjected to adverse consequences. This Article argues from recognition-based, prioritarian, and pluralist theoretical perspectives that they should be protected against these consequences. Therefore, there is a need for legal recognition and protection of these individuals. The Article then positions the bystander within the current European and Belgian discrimination legislation, discussing the legal protection against retaliation and the concept of associative discrimination. The final part of the Article compares the legal doctrinal analysis with the theoretical insights.

In this Article, I delve into a development I call the emergence of new humans in European technology regulation and ethical discourses. This means that instead of natural persons, bureaucrats or civil servants, “humans” are assigned legal assignments and power. Humans are required to be in the loop, on the loop, or in command. This is reflected in legal requirements such as “human intervention,” “human oversight,” or “human judgment.” In the Article, I aim to make two contributions. First, I show and problematize the emergence of “new humans” as a corollary of digital technologies. I argue that this “human” is a conceptual transplant from the discourses of technology and its incorporation into law is uneasy. Second, I suggest that the emergence of “new humans” and the following reimagining of legal professionals give rise to a novel framing: Adopting a wide conception of legal technology. Through this conception, we could dismantle the human/machine distinction in public administration and approach all—digital tools and humans and human legal labor, even mindsets—as legal technologies. I argue that this would add value by making visible the naïve human exceptionalism embedded in our legal thinking and would question its sustainability.

Behavioral economics’ most severe criticism is that it lacks a coherent theory for predicting when irrationality will govern decision-making. BE is often therefore identified as a body of anomalies residual or exceptional to rational choice theory. This Article answers the question of why this is the case and does so by distinguishing between two types of predictive power—endogenous and exogenous. In lacking any normative foundation, behavioral economics is limited to the latter, which illuminates not only its theoretical limits but also why such exogeneity may be incompatible with a legal system based on general and uniform governance structures. The Article thus clarifies this long-running question of not only why behavioral economics is the residual of rational choice but also why it should be.

This Article contributes toward the growing body of literature addressing the burgeoning gap between normative and empirical accounts of constitutional change in the constitutional order of the European Union. It does so by shining a light on how the European Parliament, acting through its unilateral procedural rule making powers, has managed to wield its limited formal constitutional clout to alter the balance of powers between the core Union institutions, and to define its own role in the development of the political component to the EU’s constitutional culture. Given the European Parliament cannot be dissolved, and given there is at least the potential for such rule making power to be put to unconstitutional ends, the Article also considers the extent to which judicial oversight of this particular form of informal constitutional change is possible, and the form it may take should the validity of a particular procedural rule be challenged.