In the European Union the legislature has, in the past years, established an increasing number of agencies, granting them increasingly important powers. This phenomenon of agencification is legally problematic because it does not have a legal basis in the EU Treaties. In order to better understand the challenges posed by EU agencification, this Article looks at similar agencification processes in two other federal-type polities, the U.S. and Germany. Germany is especially relevant to understanding the vertical (federal) dimension to EU agencification, while the U.S. experience can inform us about the horizontal (separation of powers) dimension. This is done by looking at three distinct issues: The question of the initial establishment of a new body at the EU (federal) level, the extent to which powers can be entrusted to such a body, and the degree to which the decisions adopted by such bodies are judicially scrutinized. The Article concludes that EU agencification poses a greater risk than agencification in Germany or the US because control is partially less well-established (compared to Germany) and because the EU polity is much less mature (compared to the U.S.).

While the Kadi affair has attracted a lot of attention, this Article approaches it from a rarely used contextual theoretical perspective of resolving institutional conflicts through reflexive sincere cooperation. The argument is short and simple: The institutional relationship between the EU judiciary and the UN Security Council should have been conducted not in strategic-pragmatic terms motivated by institutional power-plays, but rather by genuine pluralist institutional cooperation. The argument is preceded by an in-depth analysis of the theoretical and concrete practical shortcomings stemming from the lack of institutional cooperation between the UN and the EU in the Kadi affair. These shortcomings were not inevitable, as the EU and the UN legal and political systems are already connected with a whole set of bridging mechanisms. These should be, however, strengthened and their use should be made more common. In order to achieve that, the Article suggests an amendment to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU and further improvement of the safeguards in the UN Security Council sanctioning mechanisms procedures. There is no dilemma: Enhanced institutional cooperation between the institutions of the two systems will work to their mutual advantage as well as, most importantly, maintain the rights and liberties of individuals like Kadi.

The aim of this Article is to re-conceptualize the debate about the (theoretical) relationship between international and national law, which has been debated for centuries. Generally, the floor is divided between dualism as developed by Heinrich Triepel and monism developed mainly by Hans Kelsen. In the light of new developments since their inception, I argue that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international or European Union (EU) and national law. Yet, the Article is based on the conviction that a common denominator of international and national law is elementary (i.e. here “the law creators' circle,” in German, “Die Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises,” in short “TREK”) in order to solve possible norm conflicts between different but overlapping legal orders. Therefore, pluralism is also limited in my eyes because it does not offer a satisfying prescriptive account. This common legal framework, however, must not be understood as the “constitutionalization” of international (or EU law) either, as this easily implies too many substantial values, which are not (yet) a common reality.

In light of the uncertainty surrounding recent unilateral declarations of independence, this Article purports to re-visit the question of their legal nature under international law. The Article shows that the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) judgment in the Kosovo advisory opinion (hereafter referred to as the Kosovo Opinion) is of little assistance in establishing whether and to what extent such declarations fall within the ambit of international law. The Article proceeds to examine claims that unilateral declarations of independence are regulated—entirely or partly—by international law and argues that these claims are ill-founded on multiple grounds. The Article asserts that international law is legally neutral towards the claims—a proposition in accord with both the factual nature of the process of state formation in international law and with the relevant practice.

It would be unrealistic to reject secession from the doctrine of self-determination and limit the doctrine to the colonialism context. Nevertheless, the question is: What principles do states need follow in response to secession movements? Democratic principles are not the best—or only—options to address these requirements, but the secession doctrine's development and state practice has made such principles legally and practically relevant, according to many scholars. This Article proposes that the focus of the debate should be transferred to the internal dimension of the right to self-determination. The possibilities that can come from the realization of this aspect of the right to self-determination can be further explored. Certainly there is a very wide and flexible range of options and measures for addressing, protecting, and promoting diversity, and thus overcoming identity conflicts and providing a balance of social power. Those political arrangements, though imperfect, can help to avoid secession, thereby providing stability, harmony, and prosperity of democratic societies. But practice has shown that there are exceptional cases in which the current conditions on the ground make the application of tools for internal self-determination impractical. In these exceptional cases, internal self-determination fails to achieve the desired goal. This Article examines the legal arrangements for realization of internal self-determination through the examples of Basque Country and Scotland as vital quests for secession in countries with long democratic traditions.

In its present state, Article 166 StGB does not satisfactorily achieve its purpose of ensuring the effective enforcement of the ban on insulting of religious beliefs and religious communities. This is largely because of the difficulty satisfying the “disturbance of the public peace” requirement. In this paper, I first refer to the legal limits of the freedom of opinion in consideration of religion and then argue with regard to Article 166 StGB that the disturbance of peace criterion ought to be eliminated because abuse of religion, in itself, already disturbs the public peace.