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Ancient and High-Medieval Interpretations of Jesus in Gethsemane: Some Reflections on Tradition and Continuity in Christian Thought*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2011

Kevin Madigan
Affiliation:
Catholic Theological Union

Extract

Although Jesus' agony in the garden (Matt 26:36–46; Mark 14:32–42; Luke 22:40–46) may be powerful and even inexpressibly poignant to modern readers, it was a plague and embarrassment to patristic and medieval interpreters. Few narratives in the New Testament were so inimical to received christological assumptions. Ancient and medieval interpreters, at least those ultimately judged to be orthodox, ascribed to the Incarnate Word the qualities of divine consubstantiality, omnipotence, omniscience, obedience, and impassibility. The pericope, at least in its Markan and Matthean versions, however, presents a figure who appears in utterly human form—powerless, ignorant, recalcitrant, and passible.

Type
Research Articles
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1995

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References

1 In this article, I shall concentrate on the premodern interpretation of selected parts of the Markan and Matthean pericopes.

2 See, for example, the comment of Bonaventure on the christology of the putatively orthodox Hilary of Poitiers, vigorous opponent of the Arians: “Here we ask a question about the remarks of Hilary [on Christ's passion], which seem to be false, doubtful, and erroneous (falsa, dubia et erronea). … It must be said that these remarks… seem to be unorthodox (contra fidem).” Yet Bonaventure will conclude, in characteristic scholastic fashion, “nevertheless, they are orthodox” (tamen pro fide sunt). See Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, in Opera Omnia (10 vols.; Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1887) 3Google Scholar. dist. 16., dub. 1 (p. 359).

3 Noli insidiatrices aperire aures, ut putes filium quasi infirmum rogare, rogare ut inpetret quod inplere non possit potestatis auctor; Ambrose, Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam 5.42 (CChr Series Latina 14; Turnhout: Brepols, 1957) 150Google Scholar.

4 Sed cum Christus omnia facere posset, non videtur ei convenire quod aliquid ab aliquo peteret; Aquinas, ThomasSumma Theologiae, Opera Omnia (16 vols.; Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1887) 11Google Scholar. 3a.21.1 (p. 251).

5 Virtually all ancient and medieval exegetes did so. Thomas Aquinas succinctly summarized the tradition up to the thirteenth century when he declared that, “It was not that he himself was powerless but [he prayed] for our instruction” (non quasi ipse esset impotens, sed propter nostram instructionem); Aquinas Summa 3a.21.1. ad lum (p. 251).

6 Utrum Christus dubitavit quando dixit, “Si possibile est.” See, for example, Albertus Magnus III Sent. 17.8 (p. 309) in Étienne Borgnet, ed., Opera Omnia (38 vols.; Paris: Vivès, 1894) vol. 28.

7 Ambrose, De Fide ad Gratianum Augustum (CSEL 78; ed. Faller, Otto; Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsy, 1962) 75Google Scholar.

8 Bonaventure stated, “Whoever is subject to doubt, can be subject to ignorance and error.” (Item, in quemcumque cadit dubitatio, cadere potest ignorantia et error; III Sent. 17. dub. 3 [p. 376]). Aquinas stated, “Wherever there is fear, there is doubt… doubt occurs because of lack of knowledge.” (Praeterea, ubicumque est timor, ibi est dubitatio… dubitatio… contingit ex defectu scientiae; III Sent. 17.1.4, in Opera Omnia 7 [Parma: Fiaccadori, 1857; reprinted New York: Musurgia, 1948] 187).

9 Augustine Contra Maximinum 2.20 (PL 42, col. 789).

10 Luke 22:43–44 (“An angel from heaven appeared to him and strengthened him. And being in anguish, he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat was like drops of blood falling to the ground”) is of very doubtful authenticity. The verses are absent in many ancient manuscripts and in other manuscripts are marked with symbols that indicate their spuriousness. The verses may have been added from extracanonical traditions concerning the life and passion of Jesus. See Metzger, Bruce M., A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (New York: United Bible Societies, 1971) 177Google Scholar.

11 Peter Lombard Libri IV Sententiarum (2 vols.; ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae; Ad Claras Aquas: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1916). The Sententiae were a collection of the sayings of the fathers (especially of Augustine, Hilary, and John of Damascus) which were organized around theological loci (“themes”), and followed by the author's determinatio auctoritatum, that is, his resolution of the difficulties posed by the contradictory patristic opinions that he begins by citing. The third book of the Sentences, with which we are concerned here, was dominated by discussion of the incarnation and christology. The Lombard's text was superseded in the sixteenth century by Thomas Aquinas's Summa, but commentaries on it continued to be produced until almost the midseventeenth century. For a superb analysis of the Lombard's thought by an acknowledged master, see Colish, Marcia, Peter Lombard (2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1994)Google Scholar.

12 For general orientation, see Hanson, R. P. C., The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318–381 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988) 667–75Google Scholar.

13 Regarding the Arians, see Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos (ed. Bright, William; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1884)Google Scholar esp. book 3, where Athanasius tackles the Arian exegesis of many of the key texts in the controversy.

14 Ambrosius etiam in libro De Trinitate [sic] ait: ‘… Timet ergo Christus; et dum Petrus non timet, Christus timet…. Ut homo turbatur, ut homo flet… turbatur anima, secundum humanae fragilitatis assumtionem turbatur…. Suscepit tristitiam meam, confidenter tristitiam nomino, qui crucem praedico. Ut homo habuit tristitiam’…. Ceterum non parum nos movent verba Ambrosii, quibus significare videtur, Christum, secundum humanum affectum, de potentia Patris dubitasse, sic dicens in libro II De Trinitate [sic]: ‘Ut homo ergo dubitat.’” Lombard III Sent. dist. 15.1 (pp. 614–15); dist 17.3 (pp. 626–27). The Lombard had his source wrong here. Ambrose actually made very similar remarks in De Fide 2.5.43–7.56 (pp. 71–75).

15 See, for example, Hilary De Trinitate 10.25 ([ed. Pieter Smulders; CChr Series Latina 42a; Turnhout: Brepols, 1980] 479), which begins, “He had a body, but a unique one which was of his own origin…. He is free from the sins and the defects of a human body” (Habuit enim corpus, sed originis suae proprium… a peccatis et a vitiis humani corporis liber).

16 ldquo;Therefore, the man Jesus Christ, the only-begotten God, through flesh and the Word the Son of Man and also Son of God, assumed true humanity according to the likeness of our humanity without relinquishing his divinity. When he absorbed a blow, or when a wound pierced him, or when ropes bound him, or when he was raised up and suspended, he felt the force (inpetum) of the passion, but not the pain (dolorem) of it—just as when a dagger passes through water or fire or air, it causes all the sufferings of its nature, so that it pierces, punctures, and wounds, but the suffering caused does not remain in the nature of these elements, because it is not in their nature for water to be pierced, or fire punctured, or air wounded, though it is in the nature of a weapon to pierce, puncture, and wound.” (Homo itaque Christus Iesus unigenitus Deus, per carnem et verbum ut hominis filius ita et Dei Filius, hominem verum secundum similitudinem nostri hominis, non deficiens a se Deo, sumpsit. In quo, quamuis aut ictus incideret, aut vulnus descenderet, aut nodi concurrerent, aut suspensio elevaret, adferrent quidem haec inpetum passionis, non tamen dolorem passionis inferrent: ut telum aliquod aut aquam perforans aut ignem conpungens aut aera uulnerans, omnes quidem has passiones naturae suae infert, ut foret, ut conpungat, ut uulneret, sed naturam suam in haec passio inlata non retinet, dum in natura non est, uel aquam forari, vel pungi ignem, vel aerem uulnerari, quamuis naturae teli sit et uulnerare et conpungere et forare; ibid. 10.23 [p. 477].)

17 “I ask those who argue this way [that is, that the Son of God felt fear] whether it stands to reason that he was afraid to die when he drove away from the apostles every fear of death and urged them to the glory of martyrdom when he said, ‘He who does not take up his cross…’” (Et interrogo eos qui hoc ita existimant, an ratione subsistat, ut mori timuerit qui, omnem ab apostolis terrorem mortis apellens, ad gloriam eos sit martyrii adhortatus dicens: ‘Qui non accipit crucem suam…’; ibid. 10.10 [pp. 466–67].)

18 For example, when Jesus rebuked Peter for not recognizing the necessity of Jesus' passion. See ibid. 10.26–27 (pp. 481–83).

19 De quibusdam capitulis Hilarii obscuris; Lombard III Sent. 15.3 (pp. 617–20).

20 See, for example, Bonaventure III Sent. 16 (pp. 345–60).

21 Hieronymus etiam ait: “Erubescant qui putant Salvatorem timuisse mortem, et passionis pavore dixisse: ‘Transeat a me calix iste’ (Lombard III Sent. 15.1 [p. 615]). Jerome makes this comment in his Commentariorum in Matheum Libri IV, on Matt 26:39 (CChr Series Latina 77; Turnhout: Brepols, 1969) 244. For general orientation and a biography of Jerome, see Kelly, J. N. D., Jerome (New York: Harper & Row, 1975)Google Scholar.

22 “Commenting on that part of the psalm where it says, ‘I cried out and you did not answer,’ Augustine seems to teach that Christ neither truly feared nor truly sorrowed when he says, ‘How does he say this “Who did not sin, nor is sadness found in his mouth?” He says this about us, his body; he is speaking here in the person of his body, that is, of the church, just as elsewhere, when he says, ‘Let this cup pass from me,’ he speaks for us.” (Nam super illum locum Psalmi: “Clamavi, et non exaudies,” Augustinus tradere videtur, Christum nec vere timuisse, nec vere tristatum esse, sic dicens: “Quomodo hoc dicit, ‘qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius?’ Sed de nobis, corpore suo, hoc dicit; corporis enim sui, id est Ecclesiae, gerebat personam; sicut et alibi, cum dixit: ‘Transeat a me calix iste,’ pro nobis loquitur; Lombard III Sent. 15.1 [p. 615]). Augustine made this remark in Enarrationes in Psalmos I–L (CChr Series Latina 38; eds. Dekkers, D. and Fraipont, J.; Turnhout: Brepols, 1956)Google ScholarEnarratio 2 in Ps 21:3, no. 4 (p. 123).

23 “Jerome also says in his Explanation of the Faith, ‘We say that the humanity assumed by the Son of God is passible, so that the divinity might remain impassible. The Son of God suffered—not putatively but truly—all of the things to which the scripture testifies, in the way that he was able to suffer—namely, according to the nature that he assumed.” (Hieronymus quoque in Explanatione fidei ait: “Nos ita dicimus hominem passibilem a Dei Filio susceptum, ut Deitas impassibilis permaneret. Passus est enim Filius Dei non putative, sed vere, omnia quae Scriptura testatur, secundum illud quod pati poterat, scilicet secundum substantiam assumtam”; Lombard III Sent. 15.1 [p. 615]; Explanatio Symboli ad Damasum [PL 30, col. 176].) The selection extracted from Augustine reads as follows: “He took on sadness this way as he took on flesh. He was sorrowful, as the Evangelist says. If he was not sorrowful when the Evangelist says, ‘My soul is sorrowful, etc.,’ then too when he says, ‘Jesus slept,’ he did not sleep; or when he says, ‘he ate,’ he did not eat; and therefore nothing sensible will remain, so that it could even be said that his body was not real. Whatever is written about him, therefore, is true and happened. Therefore he was also sorrowful, but he assumed true sorrow willingly, as he assumed true flesh.” (Sed tristiam sic assumsit, quo modo carnem. Fuit enim tristis, ut Evangelium dicit. Si enim non tristis fuit, cum Evangelium dicat: “Tristis est anima mea etc.,” ergo et quando dicit: “Dormivit Iesus,” non dormivit; vel quando “dicit manducasse,” non manducavit; et ita nihil sanum relinquetur, ut dicatur etiam, quia corpus non erat verum. Quidquid ergo de illo scriptum est, verum est, et factum est. Ergo et tristis fuit, sed voluntate tristitiam suscepit veram, quo modo voluntate carnem veram; Lombard III Sent. 15.1 [pp. 616–17]; Augustine Enarratio 93, n. 19 [p. 1321].)

24 Jerome Comm. in Matt. 253, on Matt 26:37 (my emphasis). “In Jerome's Commentary on Matthew, on the verse where it says, ‘He began to be saddened and troubled,’ Jerome says that he was truly saddened in order to prove the truth of the humanity he assumed, but not so that his soul was dominated by passion, but by a half-passion (propassio). This is why Matthew says, ‘He began to be saddened.’ It is one thing to be saddened, another to begin to be saddened—which is to say, one is made sad in one way by a half-passion and in another way by a full-blown passion.” (Unde Hieronymus Super Matthaeum, ubi legitur: ‘“Coepit contristari et moestus esse,’ ut veritatem, inquit, probaret assumti hominis, vere contristatus est, sed non passio eius dominatur animo, verum propassio est. Unde ait: ‘Coepit contristari.’ Aliud est enim contristari, aliud incipere contristari,” quod est, aliter contristatur quis per propassionem, aliter per passionem; Lombard III Sent. 15.2 [p. 616].)

25 Ibid., 15.2 (pp. 616–17).

26 “One is affected sometimes by fear or sadness, so that the understanding of the mind is not then moved from rectitude or the contemplation of God, and then a half-passion occurs; at other times, it is moved and troubled, and then a full-blown passion occurs.” (Afficitur enim quis interdum timore vel tristitia, ita ut mentis intellectus non inde moveatur a rectitudine vel Dei contemplatione, et tune propassio est; aliquando vero movetur et turbatur, et tunc passio est; ibid., 15.2 [p. 616].)

27 “Christ had true fear and sorrow in his human nature, but not as we do, who are his members. On account of our sin, we are subject to these defects necessarily.” (Habuit enim Christus verum timorem et tristitiam in natura hominis, sed non sicut nos, qui sumus membra eius. Nos enim, causa peccati nostri, his defectibus necessario subiacemus; ibid., 15.2 [p. 616].)

28 Christus vero non fuit ita turbatus in anima timore vel tristitia, ut a rectitudine vel Dei contemplatione aliquatenus declinaret; ibid., 15.2 (p. 616).

29 Aperte noscis, eundem sibi in his verbis contradicere, nisi varias dictorum discerneret causas; ibid., 15.2 (p. 617).

30 “Therefore, according to this distinction, sometimes it is said that Christ did not truly feel fear, at other times that he did.” (Ideoque secundum hanc distinctionem aliquando dicitur Christus non vere timuisse, aliquando vere timuisse; ibid., 15.2 [p. 616].)

31 “If one can identify the proper way to understand these words, then there is no contradiction.” (Si enim discernatur intelligentiae causa praedictorum verborum, nihil occurrit contradictionis; ibid., 15.2 [p. 617].)

32 “In order that no hostile diversity be thought to exist in the sacred literature, we suggest that the words of these authorities ought to be interpreted in this manner, so that they are understood to remove from Christ not the reality or half-passion of fear and sadness, but the necessity and full-blown passion of fear and sadness.” (Ne autem in sacris litteris aliqua adversa diversitas esse putetur, harum auctoritatum verba in hunc modum accipienda dicimus, ut non veritatem timoris et tristitiae vel propassionem, sed timoris et tristitiae necessitatem et passionem a Christo removisse intelligantur; ibid., 15.2 [p. 616].)

33 Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut dicit Magister in littera, et textus etiam evangelicus confirmat, in Christo fuit vera tristitia (ibid., 15.2.2. resp. [p. 338]). Albert stated, “Christ had true, natural sorrow.” (Dicendum, quod Christus veram tristitiam naturalem habuit; ibid., 15.8, sol. [p. 281].) Aquinas stated, “And therefore, as in Christ there could be true pain, so in him there could be true sorrow.” (Et ideo, sicut in Christo potuit esse verus dolor, ita in eo potuit esse vera tristitia; Summa 3a. 15.6. resp. [p. 192].) See also Aquinas, III Sent. 15.2. quaest. 3, sol. I (p. 167). For an introduction to the christology of Bonaventure, see Hayes, Zachary, The Hidden Center: Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. Bonaventure (New York: Paulist Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

34 Bonaventure III Sent. 15.2.2 (p. 338).

35 Bonaventure maintained “In Christ there was true sorrow, not, however, precisely the way that it is in us.” (In Christo fuit vera tristitia, non tamen omni modo, quo in nobis est; ibid., 15.2.2. resp. [p. 338].) Aquinas stated “but it was different in him than in us.” (Sed tamen aliter in ipso et in nobis; ibid., 15.2.2, quaest. 3, sol. 1 [p. 167].) See also Aquinas Summa 3a.15.6., resp. (p. 192); and 3a.15.4. resp. (p. 189): “Passions of this kind were in Christ differently than they are in us.” (Sciendum tamen quod hujusmodi passiones aliter fuerunt in Christo quam in nobis).

36 Albert III Sent. 15.8. sol. (p. 287); Aquinas III Sent. 15.2.2, quaest. 3, sol 1 (p. 167); and Bonaventure III Sent., 15.2.2, resp. (p. 328).

37 “I say that in Christ there was sorrow only of this third kind, because he was made sorrowful by nothing except what reason told him to be.” (Dico ergo quod in Christo fuit tantum isto tertio modo, quia de nullo tristatus fuit nisi secundum quod dictabat ei ratio; Bonaventure III Sent. 15.2.2. resp. [p. 338].) This is an idea echoed by Aquinas: “No movement of sadness ever occurred in Christ's soul unless according to the command of superior reason, when reason told the sensitive power of the soul to be sad.” (In Christo nunquam surgebat motus tristitiae nisi secundum dictamen superioris rationis, quando scilicet dictabat ratio quod sensualitas tristaretur; III Sent. 15.2.2, quaest. 3, sol. 1 [p. 167]); see also Aquinas Summa 3.15.4. resp. (p. 189): “In Christ, every movement of the sense appetite had its origin in the command of reason.” (In Christo omnes motus sensitivi appetitus oriebantur secundum dispositionem rationis.)

38 “In the third kind of fear, namely, natural fear, there is a threefold distinction: there is fear in which the sensitive part of the soul comes before reason, fear in which the sensitive part of the soul is subject to reason, and fear experienced by the rational part of the soul itself. The first is part of corrupt nature and in a certain way is inordinate, as is the third; the second is also part of corrupt nature, but nonetheless is not inordinate. Since therefore in Christ—although there was the defect of possibility—there was no inordinate or morally faulty defect, it follows that there was in him fear of this second kind, but not of the first or the third.” (Est iterum in tertia differentia, timor scilicet naturalis, et iste est in triplici differentia: quidam est sensualitatis praevenientis rationem, quidam sensualitatis subiacentis rationi, quidam vero est ipsius partis rationalis. Primus timor est naturae corruptae et quodam modo inordinatae, similiter et tertius; secundus vero est naturae corruptae, sed tamen ordinatae. Quoniam ergo in Christo, quamvis esset defectus passibilitatis, non tamen fuit defectus inordinationis et vitiositatis, hinc est quod fuit in eo timor medio modo, non primo vel tertio; Bonaventure III Sent. 15. dub. 3. resp. [p. 342].)

39 See, for example, Aquinas: “In this way there was fear in Christ in the same way as there was sorrow and anger, namely, by the command of reason and of the divinity to which it was united, so that the sensible appetite fled from those things that were contrary to it.” (Unde dicendum, quod hoc modo fuit timor in Christo per eumdem modum sicut et de tristitia et ira dictum est, inquantum scilicet ex dictamine rationis et Deitatis adjunctae, appetitus sensibilis refugiebat ea quae sunt sibi contraria; III Sent. 15.2.2, quaest. 3, sol. 2 [p. 167].)

40 “To the objection that there can be no fear of death unless it is in the rational power of the soul, it must be said that reason, seeing that death was coming, produced an image of death in the sensitive part of the soul. When this was done, the sensitive power was moved and shaken by the horror of death.” (Ad illud vero quod obicitur, quod timor mortis non potuit esse nisi in ratione, dicendum quod ratio praevidens mortem instantem fecit imaginationem mortis in ipsa parte sensuali, qua quidem facta, sensualitas mota fuit et horrore mortis concussa; Bonaventure III Sent. 15. dub. 4. resp. [p. 342].)

41 Securissima enim fuit et bene noverat quod nihil poterat sibi evenire vel inferri quod ipsa prius non desideraret et vellet; Bonaventure III Sent. 15. dub. 4 (p. 342).

42 “It [fear of death] can also be considered according to uncertainty about its coming in the future: as when in the night we are frightened by a sound, because we do not know what it may be. Christ did not experience fear of this kind.” (Alio modo potest considerari secundum incertitudinem futuri adventus: sicut quando nocte timemus ex aliquo sonitu, quasi ignorantes quid hoc sit. Et quantum ad hoc, timor non fuit in Christo; Aquinas III Sent. 3a.15.8. resp. [p. 193].)

43 Et si tu dicas, quod hic non est ordo congnitionis, ut deveniatur a ratione in sensualitatem, dicendum quod hoc est verum in nobis, in quibus est scientia per acquisitionem ab inferiori (Bonaventure III Sent. 16. dub. 4. resp. [p. 342]).

44 In Christo autem aliter esse potuit, qui fuit plenus scientia et in quo fuit obedientia perfecta virium inferiorum respectu superiorum; ibid., 16. dub. 4. resp. (p. 342). This is a point made by Aquinas as well: “In us the inferior powers are not perfectly subject to reason; and therefore whenever the passion of sorrow rises in us beyond the command of reason, which a certain power restrains in virtuous people, it overcomes reason. But in Christ the movement of sorrow never arose except according to the command of superior reason.” (In nobis inferiores vires non sunt perfecte subjectae rationi; et ideo quandoque praeter ordinem rationis insurgunt in nobis passiones tristitiae, quas quidem virtus refrenat in virtuosis, sed in aliis etiam rationi praevalent: sed in Christo numquam surgebat motus tristitiae nisi secundum dictamen superioris rationis; III Sent. 15.2.2., quaest. 3 [p. 167].)

45 See, for example, ibid., 17.1.4. sol. (p. 187): “Ambrose is speaking about fear in the sensitive part of the soul. People who saw Jesus feel fear thought that he experienced doubt in the rational part of his soul.” (Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Ambrosius loquitur quantum ad sensualitatis timorem; quern dum ostendit, videbatur hominibus dubitare etiam quantum ad rationem.)

46 See, for example, Albert III Sent. 17.8. sol. (p. 309): “Doubt is not felt here except insofar as the sensitive part of the soul trembles in following reason, rather than in following its natural inclination, which is to avoid death.” (Dubitatio hic non exprimit nisi tremorem sensualitatis inter hoc quod sequeretur rationem, et naturalem appetitum oppositi, scilicet quod evaderet mortem). See also Bonaventure III Sent. 17. dub. 3 (p. 376): “Doubt also signifies a hesitation of the sensible part in following a feeling that coaxes or reason that commands. This kind of doubt could have been in Christ, and Ambrose is talking about this kind of doubt.” (Alio modo dicitur dubitatio indifferentia quaedam partis sensibilis ad sequendum affectum naturae inclinantem vel rationem imperantem; et talis dubitatio potuit esse in Christo et de hac intelligit Ambrosius.)

47 Ibid.,17.8. sol. (p. 309).

48 Dicendum quod Hilarius non intendit removere timorem a Christo secundum quod timorem ei attribuit Scriptura et Sancti, sed secundum quod attribuebant haeretici, qui dicebant eum timuisse ex defectu securitatis; ibid., 16. dub. 2 (p. 360).

49 Et talis est timor pusillanimitatis, de quo indubitanter verum est quod non fuit in Christo; ibid., 16. dub. 2 (p. 360).

50 “A11 those authorities who say that Christ did not fear say this, not because they wish to remove all fear from Christ… but because he did not have fear which came before reason or which threw it into disorder.” (Nam omnes illae auctoritates, quae dicunt, Christum non timuisse, hoc dicunt, non quia velint a Christo omnem timore removere… sed quia non fuit in eo timor, qui rationem eius praeveniret, vel rationem perturbaret; ibid., 15. dub. 3 [p. 342].)