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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2011
Studies of Benedict Spinoza's biblical interpretation rarely pay more than cursory attention to the contemporary context of that work. Analyses tend to focus on authors whom Spinoza singled out for attack in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, such as Moses Maimonides (died 1204) and a rabbi who later attacked him, Judah ibn Alfakhar (died 1235). After his excommunication in 1656, however, most of Spinoza's intellectual and social circle—those with whom he shared his philosophical ideas and surely his ideas about the Bible—were Christian, or of Christian background, and not Jews. Spinoza's Treatise was not conceived in a vacuum or in a segregated Jewish context, nor was it aimed primarily at Jewish readers. Among Christians, the work engaged a national debate, involving church, state, and the universities, about the authority and interpretation of the Bible. Great political as well as intellectual issues were at stake.
1 Spinoza, Benedict, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in Gebhardt, Carl, ed., Spinoza Opera, (4 vols.; Heidelberg: Winter, 1925) 3. 1–267.Google ScholarSpinoza, Benedict, A Theological-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise (trans. Elwes, Robert H. M.; 1883; New York: Dover, 1951).Google Scholar Spinoza references are given according to chapter number, Latin page (English translation). Elwes's translation is used, unless otherwise noted. Maimonides, Moses, The Guide of the Perplexed (trans. Pines, Shlomo; 2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).Google Scholar Maimonides is cited according to book, chapter, and page of the Pines translation. Strauss, Leo, Spinoza's Critique of Religion (1930; trans. Sinclair, E. M.; New York: Schocken, 1965)Google Scholar ; Zac, Sylvain, Spinoza etl'intrepretation del'Ecriture (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1965)Google Scholar ; idem, “Spinoza, critique de Maimonide,” Les Etudes Philosophiques 27 (1972) 411-28; and idem, “Les avatars de ['interpretation de l'Ecriture chez Spinoza,” RHPhR 42 (1962) 17-37; Pines, Shlomo, “Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Maimonides, and Kant,” in Segal, Ora, ed., Further Studies in Philosophy (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1968) 3–54Google Scholar ; idem, “Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Jewish Philosophical Tradition,” in Twersky, Isadore and Septimus, Bernard, eds., Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) 499–521Google Scholar ; Malet, André, Le traite theologico-politique de Spinoza et la pensee biblique (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1966)Google Scholar ; Freudenthal, Jacob, Spinoza. Leben und Lehre, vol. 2: Die Lehre Spinozas (ed. Gebhardt, Carl; Heidelberg: Winter, 1927)Google Scholar ; and Tosel, André, Spinoza ou le crépuscule de la servitude: essai sur le Traite theologico-politique (Paris: Aubier, 1984).Google Scholar Judah ibn Alfakhar (died 1235), physician at the court of Ferdinand III of Castile, opposed Maimonides, believing it was impossible to reconcile Judaism with philosophy. See Kayserling, Moritz, “Alfakar,” JE 1 (1901) 373Google Scholar.
2 The exception is Juan de Prado. See Yovel, Yirmiyahu, Spinoza and Other Heretics, vol. 1: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 74.Google Scholar The classic treatment of Spinoza's life and work in its intellectual milieu is Meinsma, Koenraad O., Spinoza et son cercle (1896; trans. Rosenboorg, S. and Osier, J.-P.; Paris: Vrin, 1983)Google Scholar ; the translation is the authoritative version, updated with extensive notes which virtually replace some sections of the original work. The most detailed study of Spinoza's associates is that of Frances, Madeleine, Spinoza dans le Pays Neerlandais de la seconde moitie du XVlIe siecle (Paris: Librarie Felix Alcan, 1937).Google ScholarFix, Andrew C. studied the Collegiants in his Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991)Google Scholar ; see also Andrew C. Fix, “Radical Religion and the Age of Reason,” in idem and Susan C. Karant-Nunn, eds., Germania Illustrata: Essays in Early Modern Germany Presented to Gerald Strauss (Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies 18; Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal, 1992) 35-55. In 1666 Amsterdam Jews were absorbing the news that the Messiah had appeared in Smyrna in the person of Shabbetai Zevi ( Mechoulan, Henry, “Introduction,” in Israel, Menasseh ben, The Hope of Israel [ed. Mechoulan, Henry and Nahon, Gerard; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987] 76)Google Scholar.
3 This agrees with the judgment of Goshen-Gottstein, Moshe (“Foundations of Biblical Philology in the Seventeenth Century: Christian and Jewish Dimensions,” in Jewish Thought in the Seventeenth Century, 80)Google Scholar that Spinoza represents a unique case among Jews–"a mind trained in traditional Jewish learning tackling issues that developed in the world of Christian thinking.” Thus, Popkin's, Richard judgment (“Spinoza and Samuel Fisher,” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 15 [1985] 221–222)CrossRefGoogle Scholar that in the Tractatus “Spinoza's opponents… are exclusively Jewish scholars,” and that he “only discussed Jewish interpretations and Jewish interpreters” must be qualified. Likewise, Shlomo Pines attends only to the Jewish context in “Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-politicus and the Jewish Philosophical Tradition,” 499-521.
4 Meyer, Ludwig, Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres (Eleutheropolis [Amsterdam]: n.p., 1666).Google Scholar References to Meyer are according to chapter and page. Responses include Serarius, Petrus, Responsio ad exertationem paradoxam (Amsterdam: Cunradus, 1667)Google Scholar ; Velthuysen, Lambert van, Disserlatio de usu rationis in rebus theologicis, in Opera Omnia (1667; 2 vols.; reprinted Rotterdam: Leers, 1680) 1. 101–59Google Scholar ; Wolzogen, Louis de, De scripturarum interprete adversus exercitatorem paradoxum libri duo (Utrecht: Ribbius, 1668)Google Scholar ; Vogelsangh, Renierus, Contra Hbellum, cui titulus “Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres” (Utrecht: Versteegh, 1669)Google Scholar ; Meresius, Samuel, De abusu philosophiae Cartesianae (Groningen: Everts, 1670)Google Scholar ; and Wittich, Christopher, Consensus veritatis in Scriptura divina et infallibili revelatae cum veritate philosophica (1668; 2d ed.; Lugdunum: Boutesteyn & Lever, 1682).Google Scholar Of the works cited, Velthuysen and Wolzogen were in Spinoza's library. Embattled Cartesians at the University of Leyden regarded Meyer's work with dismay, since he promoted it precisely as a work of Cartesian persuasion. They condemned two theses from Meyer that provided their orthodox opponents with ammunition in their campaign to persuade the government and public that Cartesian philosophy undermined scriptural authority: (1) “that in matters of faith the norm and measure of truth is clear and distinct perception,” and (2) that “philosophy is the interpreter of scripture.” In 1676 the theses were included in a government decree prohibiting their being taught ( McGahagan, Thomas A., “Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639-1676: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation” [Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976] 327, 344-45)Google Scholar.
5 See “Glossaire des sectes et mouvements religieux au temps de Spinoza,” in , Meinsma, Spinoza, 531–36.Google Scholar
6 To understand the religious and psychological similarities in the Jewish and Christian communities, see Yovel, Marrano 1. passim; and Fix, Prophecy, passim.
7 In a later study I plan to incorporate the other voices in the conversation precipitated by Meyer, which Spinoza probably considered in crafting his own Treatise.
8 , Spinoza, Descartes’ ’Principles of Philosophy,’ in The Collected Works of Spinoza (trans, and ed. Curley, Edwin; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 1. 221–346.Google Scholar This volume also contains relevant correspondence between Meyer and Spinoza about the project.
9 , McGahagan, “Cartesianism,” 333.Google Scholar
10 , Meinsma, Spinoza, 470.Google Scholar, Frances (Spinoza, 55),Google Scholar following Gebhardt, disagrees; the doctor was rather George Hermann Schuller. See The Correspondence of Spinoza (trans, and ed. Wolf, Abraham; New York: Dial, 1928) 53Google Scholar.
11 See Akkerman, F. and Hubbeling, H. G., “The Preface to Spinoza's Posthumous Works, 1677, and its Author Jarig Jelles (1619/20-1683),” LIAS 6 (1979) 103–73.Google Scholar H. J. Siebrand pointed out that early accounts of Spinoza's life and thought by his admirers were preoccupied by the need to show the compatibility of Spinoza's thought with Christianity (Spinoza and the Netherlanders: An Inquiry into the Early Reception of his Philosophy of Religion [Assen/Maastricht: van Gorcum, 1988]).Google Scholar This concern obviously controls Jelles's presentation of Spinoza in his preface to the Posthumous Works.
12 Klaus Scholder asserts that Meyer's work was at first “universally attributed to” Spinoza (The Birth of Modern Critical Theology [1966; trans. Bowden, John; reprinted Philadelphia: Trinity, 1990] 139)Google Scholar.
13 Brief treatments are available in “Introduction,” in Meyer, Louis, La philosophic interprete de I'Ecriture Sainte (trans, [into , French] Legrdc, Jacqueline and Moreau, Pierre-Francois; Paris: Intertextes, 1988) 1–17Google Scholar ; Curley, Edwin, “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece: Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics,” in Hunter, Graeme, ed., Spinoza: the Enduring Questions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 77–79Google Scholar ; Gregory, Brad S., “Introduction,” in Spinoza, Baruch, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (trans. Shirley, Smauel; Leiden: Brill, 1991) 41.Google Scholar Scholder's few pages in The Birth of Modern Critical Theology on Meyer and Spinoza provide the most extensive comparison of their hermeneutical principles available.in English. He fails, however, to appreciate the distinctiveness and significance of Spinoza's “historical” versus Meyer's “philosophical” hermeneutic (see , Scholder, Birth, 141Google Scholar ), embodied in Spinoza's critique of Meyer, which I explicate in this study. Regarding Meyer, Scholder is dependent on Bizer, Ernst, “Die reformierte Orthodoxie und der Cartesianismus,” ZThK 55 (1958) 306–72.Google Scholar Bizer"s essay makes no mention of Spinoza. Akkerman and Hubbeling (“Preface,” 106) make no reference to Meyer's book, even though they urge that “the many-sided activities of this interesting man have been given too little attention as yet.” Thijssen-Schoute, C. Louise (Lodewijk Meyer en diens Verhouding tot Descartes en Spinoza [Leiden: Brill, 1954]Google Scholar ) does not attend to issues of biblical interpretation other than noting Spinoza's broad disagreement with his friend's thesis. Standard treatments of Spinoza's biblical interpretation usually do not mention Meyer at all.
14 , SpinozaTractatus chaps. 7, 15.Google Scholar None of the scholars listed in n. 1 mentions , Meyer, except Malet, Le traité théologico-politique, 303Google Scholar ; and , Zac, Spinoza, 27Google Scholar.
15 I shall not try to settle questions of “influence,” since Spinoza had begun work on the Treatise in 1665, a year before Meyer published his book (Freudenthal, Spinoza, 1. 154).
16 , Frances, Spinoza, 256.Google Scholar On Meyer's differences with Spinoza, she writes (255) “the op-position, admitted by Gebhardt, between the rationalist exegesis of Meyer and the historical exegesis of Spinoza… is not so radical as it first appears. According to the TTP [Treatise], scripture ought to be explicated by scripture, comprehension of the prophet or redactor being so distant in time from our own. But once his meaning is determined, this thought, to obtain our assent, ought to be submitted to the examination of reason.” Although this is true, Frances neglects to mention that for Meyer, a meaning (sensus) that is not true according to our judgment based on knowledge or reason cannot be the intended meaning (verus sensus) of a scriptural text. This makes Meyer's difference from Spinoza radical.
17 I shall not discuss Spinoza's argument with Maimonides over prophets and prophecy, the subject of Treatise chaps. 1-2, or over biblical anthropomorphisms, the pivotal issue in the Guide (see Strauss, Leo, “How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed,” in , Maimonides, Guide, 1. xi–lvi)Google Scholar.
18 , MeyerPhilosophia prol. iii.Google Scholar
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Meyer's definition of skeptic aligns perfectly with the Catholic Pyrrhonists which Popkin, Richard H. described, History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); see especially chap. 3 on MontaigneGoogle Scholar.
22 Spinoza Tractatus 15.180 (ET 190 [altered]).
23 Ibid., 5.79 (ET 80).
24 I discovered this by examining annotations made by Prosper Marchand (died 1756), a learned bookdealer and editor of the Treatise who noticed three parallel passages in Treatise 15 and the Philosophy. See Gebhardt's discussion of the annotations in Spinoza Opera 3. 382-86. Marchand's notations are reproduced in Ibid., 3. 262-63, Adnotationes XXVIII-XXX.
25 Spinoza Tractatus 15.181 (ET 191); [Alfakhar] statuit… rationem Scripturae ancillari debere, eique prorsus submitti; nee aliquid in Scriptura propterea metaphorice explicandum sensit, quod literalis sensus rationi, sed tantum, quia ipsi Scripturae, hoc est, claris ejus dogmatibus repugnat; atque hinc hanc universalem regulam format, videlicet, quicquid Scriptura dogmatice docet, et expressis verbis affirmat, id ex sola ejus authoritate, tanquam verum absolute admittendum; nee ullum aliud dogma in Bibliis reperietur, quod ei directe repugnet, sed tantum per consequentiam, quia scilicet modi loquendi Scripturae saepe videntur supponere aliquid contrarium ei, quod expresse docuit: et propterea tantum eadem loca metaphorice explicanda (XV 181). Marchand's annotation refers to Meyer Philosophia 11.75.
26 Meyer Philosophia 11.75; nullo modo Scripturam nostrae rationi esse subjiciendam: et hoc asserto deinceps quaerebat, Quomodo igitur, unum locum proprie, alium vero figurate esse accipiendum interpretandumque, patebit? Cui quaestioni in hunc modum respondet. Quando S. Scriptura alicubi quid clare et ex professo docet, sive δογματίσει, cui contrarium alio in loco ex occasione, et per consequentiam statuere videtur; turn locus ille clarus proprie et secundum literam est intelligendus; his vero figurate et secundum ilium interpretandus.
27 Meyer Philosophia 11.75. Ex. gr. S. Literae clare dogmatizei “Deura esse unum,” et aliis in locis Deus loquitur numero plurali, unde sequi videtur, ilium non esse unum. Cum igitur prius ex professo doceatur, posterius vero per consequentiam ex iis deducatur, hi textus improprie sumendi, et secondum illos, quo proprie accipi debent, exponendi erunt. The argument [about God's incorporeality is similar, with reference to Deuteronomy 4]: Quibus locis clare docetur, Deum esse incorporeum. Quocirca isto praecepto, et non ratione obligamur, omnes textus, e quibus, Deum corporeum esse, colligi posse videtur, ex hoc praecepto interpretari.
28 Spinoza Tractatus 15.181 (ET 191); Ex. gr. Scriptura clare docet, Deum esse unicum… nee ullibi alius locus reperitur directe affirmans, dari plures Deos: at quidem plura, ubi Deus de se, et Prophetae de Deo in plurali numero loquuntur, qui modus tantum loquendi supponit, non autem ipsius orationis intentum indicat, plures esse Deos, et ideo ipsa omnia metaphorice explicanda, scilicet non quia rationi repugnat, plures dari, sed quia ipsa Scriptura directe affirmat, unicum esse Deum.… Ex sola… hujus loci et non rationis auctoritate, tenemur credere Deum.
29 This explanation of Spinoza's source improves upon Leo Strauss (Spinoza's Critique, 316-17), who introduces what he regards as the relevant text from Alfakhar. The Hebrew text that he quotes, however, lacks the rule that Spinoza has attributed to Alfakhar. My thanks to Professor Hava Rothschild for translating the Alfakhar text for me.
30 Goshen-Gottstein, “Foundations,” 80. The author observes that for Jewish intellectual history in the seventeenth century, attitudes toward the Bible were not problematic (p. 79). His opinion thus supports my suggestion that Spinoza's “Maimonides” and “Alfakhar” in that context are in reality Christian opponents. The Jewish view of the great Hebrew Bibles published by Bomberg's press is instructive: “There is no ideology, no theology. This is not an ‘inerrant’ text in any Christian dogmatic sense, but an attempt to attain a ‘correct’ print in a very traditional sense according to traditional ideas about Spanish codices” (p. 85).
31 Meyer Philosophia 11.75.
32 Spinoza Tractatus 15.182 (ET 191 [altered]).
33 Ibid., 15.182 (ET 192 [altered]).
34 Spinoza Tractatus 15.181 (ET 191); Verum quidem est Scripturam per Scripturam explicandam esse, quamdiu de solo orationum sensu, et mente Prophetarum laboramus, sed postquam verum sensum eruimus, necessario judicio et ratione utendum, ut ipsi assensum praebeamus (my italics).
35 Meyer Philosophia 11.76; Cogetur… cum Scriptura sibi ipsi videtur contradicere, fateri, ratione uti licere. ut dignosci possit, quaenam loca proprie, quaenam improprie sint, et figurate intelligenda atque interpretanda. Qualia sunt, ‘Deum non duci poenitentia.’ Num 23:23 [=19?]. 1 Sam 15:29 &c. ‘et eundem poenituisse, quod hominem fecerat.’ We shall return to the citation from 1 Samuel. Meyer went on to argue (Ibid.) that scripture frequently teaches in “parables,” as Jesus said in Mark 4:33–34.
36 Spinoza Tractatus 15.184 (ET 194).
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. 15.185 (ET 195 [altered]).
39 Meyer Philosophia 11.74. Meyer drew on Robert Bellarmine's classic critical analysis of the Protestant scripture principle, De controversiis Christianae fidei adversus hujus temporis haereticos (4 vols.; Venice: Malichinum, 1721).Google Scholar See Prima Controversia: De Verbo Dei, esp. , Liber III, “De interpretatione & vero sensu Scripturae,” 1.64–79Google Scholar.
40 , MeyerPhilosphia 10.66.Google Scholar
41 As Meyer affirmed (Philosophia Prol. vii).
42 Meyer Philosophia 10.67.
43 Ibid., 11.68.
44 Ibid., 11.69. The key passage is from Augustine's De doctrina Christiana 2.6 in Opere di Sant’ Agostino (ed. Naldini, Mario et al.; 34 vols.; Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 1992) 8.66Google Scholar : Nihil enim fere de ill is obscuritatibus eruitur, quod non planissime alibi dictum reperiatur. See my discussion in From Shadow to Promise: Old Testament Interpretation from Augustine to the Young Luther (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969) 12Google Scholar.
45 Meyer Philosophia 11.69.
46 Ibid., 11.69; Spinoza agrees with this point (for example, Tractatus 7.104 [ET 106], 12.164 [ET 171]) because he does not share the Protestant doctrines of scriptural inspiration or the analogy of faith; they are no part of his adaptation of the notion that scripture interprets itself.
47 Meyer Philosophia 11.70.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 3.30.
50 Ibid., 11.71-72.
51 Ibid., 11.72.
52 Ibid., 11.75.
53 Ibid., 11.75–76. Controversies over these two phrases, “This is my body” and “The Word became flesh,” were frequent and especially ferocious in the early modern era.
54 Ibid., 3.7.
55 Ibid.
56 See my Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) 24.Google Scholar
57 Meyer Philosophia 15.94. Meyer's exposition is as confused as that of his Reformed opponents, for he asserted both that philosophy is divinely inspired and at the same time natural. The mind perceiving things clearly and distinctly cannot err because God is the fons et origo (font and origin) of all truth, and therefore will be the author and conservator of every true philosophy (5.42). Stated in pure Cartesian idiom, he said “Since no perception is clear and distinct which is not able to bring forth consciousness of itself inwardly in us, and since God is the cause of every clear and distinct perception, he will also be the cause of the inward consciousness, and since this persuades, tells, testifies, and inspires us that the thing perceived is indubitably true, therefore not undeservedly is [this clear perception] able to be called the persuasion, dictate, testimony, and inspiration of God or the Holy Spirit” (5.43). Thus, at the same time that Meyer denies the claim of the Reformed exegetes to special illumination, he appropriates it to valorize reason (see, for example, 16.105).
58 Meyer Philosophia Epilogue 115–16.
59 Ibid., 116.
60 Ibid., 114.
61 Ibid., 114-15.
62 Ibid., 115: nulla vero ratione intellectum in veram rerum cognitionem ex aut per se posse deducere; multo minus menti ideas claras distinctasque, si antea infusae, inditaeque non fuerint, indere, aut infundere, aut imprimere, aut alio aliquo modo ingenerare.
63 Ibid., 115: Quod ut praestent, Philosophia, et quicquid jam cognitum atque perspectum habent, in subsidium vocandum, quo, qui praedictum subjecto conveniat, perspiciatur, enunciationis veritas eruatur, et simul verus sensus eliciatur atque educatur.
64 Ibid.
65 Spinoza Tractatus 15.188 (ET 198).
66 Ibid., 15.180 (ET 190 [altered]).
67 Ibid., 7.115 (ET 117).
68 Meyer is vulnerable to this charge because he granted a major role to preconceived ideas: “since the truths of all the meanings of scripture which are with the help of philosophy to be dug out and explored ought to be perceived before they are brought out.” (Philosophia, Epilogue 113; Cum enim omnium scripturae sensum, qui ope Philosophiae eruendi atque explorandi sunt, veritates ante, quam eruantur atque explorentur, perspectae esse debeant).
69 Spinoza Tractatus 7.115 (ET 117).
70 Malet (Le traite, 116) recognizes this.
71 The inability of reason to understand scripture is not, as Strauss contended (Spinoza's Critique, 174-75), due primarily to the presence of supernatural references that Spinoza did not believe, but for much broader reasons. In the felicitous coinage of Vico (Spinoza's best interpreter, along with Richard Simon, in the early modern period), ancient authors explained the world through “poetic universals,” not those of philosophy (see my “Spinoza, Vico and the Imagination of Religion,” JHI 50 [1989] 71–93)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
72 Spinoza Tractatus 7.105 (ET 106 [altered]).
73 Ibid., 7.115 (ET 117 [altered]).
74 Ibid. 7.100 (ET 101 [altered]); sed ne verum sensum cum rerum veritate confundamus, ille ex solo linguae usu erit investigandus, vel ex ratiocinio, quod nullum aliud fundamentum agnoscit, quam Scripturam.
75 Ibid., 7.98 (ET 99 [altered]); sic etiam ad Scripturam interpretandam necesse est ejus sinceram historiam adornare, et ex ea tanquam ex certis datis et principiis mentem authorum Scripturae legitimis consequentiis concludere: sic enim unusquisque (si nimirum nulla alia principia, neque data ad interpretandam Scripturam & de rebus, quae in eadem continentur, disserendum, admiserit, nisi ea tantummodo, quae ex ipsa Scriptura ejusque historia depromuntur) sine ullo periculo errandi semper procedet. Elwes twice omitted the word “history” from this passage. See Spinoza Tractatus 7.100 (ET 102), and 15.185 (ET 195 [altered]); “the meaning of scripture should be gathered only from its own history (ex sola ejus historia), and not from the universal history of nature, which is the basis only of philosophy.” Spinoza complimented the skeptics, despite their trampling on reason, because they were more constrained than Meyer by the text in determining its meaning.
76 Spinoza Tractatus 7.100 (ET 101 [altered]); De solo enim sensu orationum, non autem de earum veritate laboramus. See my “Spinoza, Vico,” especially 74-76. In Spinoza's view, failure to observe this distinction was the common fault of both the dogmatists and the skeptics–that is, the entire exegetical tradition, both Jewish and Christian.
77 Meyer Philosophia 3.8; sensus simpliciter sic dictus, sensus verus.
78 Ibid., 3.8; Hos autem sensus in orationibus occurrere, ex eo apertum est, quod non illico is, quern vocabula sententiae, prout communiter et vulgo sonant, prae se ferunt, sensus sit, quern, dum interpretandae mentis gratia ista vocabula exarabat aut pronunciabat, in animo habuit author. Meyer pointed out that Augustine had already made this distinction in Confessions 12.23 and identified theological mistakes that arise from failure to observe it: the Roman Catholics, for example, mistook the plain sense of “This is my body” for the true sense, because it is the “clear and perspicuous” one. The Reformers, however, held that this is not the true sense that Christ intended. Here is a case where the true sense is not clear, but obscure (3.9).
79 See, for example, Meyer Philosophia 2.4; Maimonides, Guide 2.30, 353.
80 Meyer Philosophia 3.30.
81 Ibid., 3.8.
82 Ibid., 3.8.
83 Ibid., 4.33; Unde patet verum interpretem non tam sollicitum esse debere de Orationis interpretandae veritate aut falsitate, quam vero aut falso sensu: eosque qui investigaverit atque indicaverit, hunc redarguendo, ilium vero confirmando, hoc est, Scriptoris intellectui conformem comprobando, quantumvis etiam rectae rationi dissentaneum, ac veritati repugnantem, suo tamen muneri abunde satisfecisse, omnesque illius partes implevisse censendus est. Thus, according to Meyer, three things must be considered in approaching any text: its plain meaning, its intended meaning, and its truth (sensus simpliciter sic dictus, sensus verus, veritas; 3.8).
84 The practice of exempting the Bible in the analysis of ancient texts and religions is followed by all of Spinoza's contemporaries, as well as by Bernard Fontenelle and Giambattista Vico. Both exempted biblical religion from their theories of religion. See my Explaining Religion, 40-83.
85 Meyer Philosophia 4.34.
86 Ibid., 4.33.
85 Spinoza Tractatus 7.115 (ET 117 [altered]).
88 The following examples show the congruence between Spinoza's remarks and the language of Meyer: Meyer said that “scripture is not the norm for interpreting itself (Philosophia 10.68; scripturam non esse normam seipsam interpretandi). In Philosophia 11.74, he said that its sense is not clear through itself (nullus etiam locus erit per se clarus). Meyer interpreted 2 Pet 1:20 to mean that no prophecy of scripture should be interpreted through itself: nullam Prophetiam Scripturae, aut (si per Prophetiam Scripturae, ipsa Scriptura intelligatur) Scripturam, esse per seipsam, aut a Prophetis interpretandam (Philosophia 12.81).
89 See, for example, Spinoza Tractatus 15.182 (ET 191 [altered]): “after [postquam] we have elicited the true meaning, we must of necessity make use of our judgment and reason.”
90 Ibid., 7.113 (ET 115 [altered]). Meyer wrote: “we insist that true philosophy is the Lydian stone, by which it must be infallibly weighed, and through which most certainly demonstrated, whether some sense of sacred scripture, whether understood with no trouble or dug out with great difficulty, agrees with the intention of the writer, or rather disagrees with it” (Philosophia 16.103). Meyer repeatedly asserted that every biblical passage can have more than one intended meaning; see, for example, Philosophia 3.8, 10, 30, 31; 4.34, 36 (such is the power of God's word, that from a single utterance the hearer/reader is able to draw several truths), 38; Epilogue 109.
91 Maimonides, Guide 2. 25, 327-28.
92 Spinoza Tractatus 7.114 (ET 115-16 [altered]).
93 See Philosophia 4.33, where Meyer explained that scripture, unlike profane writings, can mean nothing but truth in any instance, since “truths and true meanings are everywhere linked with an indissoluble link, which does not obtain in the former case [that is, with profane writings]. And thus the interpreter who draws out those truths, will also have dug out the true meanings by the same operation” (veritates et veros sensus indissolubili nexu ubique copulari, quod in illis non obtinet; atque adeo qui illas eruerit, eadem opera simul et hos eruisse). Thus, in the case of the eucharistic words of consecration, philosophy determines the meaning of Christ's words, and with its help Reformed theologians “have demonstrated from physics that bread, when its accidents are preserved and remain, cannot be transubstantiated” (Philosophia 6.47: a markedly pre-Cartesian argument).
94 This part of the quotation from Guide 2. 25, 328 omitted in Elwes's translation, is an indication that—as Spinoza reads him—there is a “skeptic” element in Maimonides that is missing in Meyer. Menasseh ben Israel, Spinoza's contemporary and teacher, also thought of Maimonides as a creationist; see , Mechoulan, “Introduction,” 30–31.Google Scholar For a powerful contrary argument that Maimonides actually agreed with Aristotle's opinion, see Harvey, Warren Zev, “A Third Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle,” HTR 74:3 (1981) 287-301Google Scholar.
95 Meyer Philosophia 8.59.
96 Spinoza Tractatus 7.114 (ET 115).
97 Maimonides had done the same thing. His nonliteral interpretation of Gen 1:1 (Guide 2. 30, 348) is thoroughly “dogmatic”: each verse is painstakingly interpreted via the latest scientific theory. Maimonides commented on one verse that “its external meaning is exceedingly incongruous, but in it … you will admire the wisdom of the parables and their correspondence to what exists.”
98 Meyer Philosophia 8.59.
99 Spinoza Tractatus 7.117 (ET 116).
100 Spinoza is not the first critic of Meyer to level this charge: Velthuysen makes the same accusation in De usu rationis 116. I plan to include his work in a later study. This feature of Meyer's thought suggests close association with the thinking of the Collegiants: see Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 162, and idem, “Radical Religion,” 52-53.
101 Spinoza Tractatus 15.185 (ET 195 [altered]).
102 Ibid., 15.188 (ET 198).
103 Spinoza Tractatus 7.114 (ET 116 [altered]).
104 According to Maimonides, when “the Torah speaks the language of men,” simple people understand it, but they do not understand its true, intended sense (Guide 1.33, 71).
105 Spinoza Tractatus 7.111 (ET 113).
106 Ibid., 7.114 (ET 116).
107 Ibid., 7.115 (ET 116-17 [altered]).
108 Ibid., 7.117 (ET 119).
109 Ibid. 13.167 (ET 175 [altered]): “the difficulty of understanding Scripture is situated in its language alone, not in the sublimity of its arguments” (in sola lingua, et non in sublimitate argumenti sitam esse).
