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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2011
A study of rabbinic legal rulings concerning the barren wife reveals the subordinate place of women in rabbinic Judaism's systematic vision of an ideal reality. Yet at the same time, aggadic texts demonstrate that demands of necessity and compassion often prevailed over halachic prescription, illuminating the rift which not infrequently separated rabbinic theory and actual practice. Moreover, a review of aggadic reflections on barren women also yields suggestive insights into the dilemma of suffering, and the efficacy of prayer, as well as examples of the ways in which biblical models could become paradigms and symbols of empowerment in women's lives.
1 See e.g., Baskin, Judith R., “The Separation of Women in Rabbinic Judaism,” in Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck and Findly, Ellison Banks, eds.. Women, Religion, and Social Change (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985) 3–18Google Scholar; Neusner, Jacob, “Thematic or Systemic Description: The Case of Mishnah's Division of Women,” in idem, Method and Meaning in Ancient Judaism (BJS 10; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979) 79–100Google Scholar; and Wegner, Judith Romney, Chattel or Person? The Status of Women in the Mishnah (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1988Google Scholar).
2 Baskin, “Separation of Women,” 8–12.
3 On the variety of attitudes towards women expressed in rabbinic texts, see, e.g., Hauptmann, Judith, “Images of Women in the Talmud,” in Ruether, Rosemary Radford, ed., Religion and Sexism: Images of Women in the Jewish and Christian Traditions (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974) 184–212Google Scholar; Hauptmann writes, “A woman's prime function in life is to concern herself with man's welfare and to provide for his physical comfort” (197).
4 Neusner, “Division of Women,” 97. For Neusner's crucial perception that rabbinic social legislation, particularly as depicted in the Mishnah often represents an ideal vision rather than an actuality, see Ibid., 95, and Baskin, “Separation of Women,” 9 – 10. It seems likely that aggadic remarks or anecdotes referring to everyday life can be more accurate indications of actual social practice in a specific time and place than legal ordinances. The difficulty, of course, is to pinpoint the time and place which any given anecdote reflects.
5 Neusner, “Division of Women,” 97.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 100. That woman's sexuality is the issue here is made clear by Wegner, Judith Romney, “Dependency, Autonomy and Sexuality: Woman as Chattel and Person in the System of the Mishnah,” in Neusner, Jacob, Borgen, Peder, Frerichs, Ernest S., and Horsley, Richard, eds., New Perspectives on Ancient Judaism 1 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987) 89–102Google Scholar. Wegner points out (91) that if a legal relationship is present “in which some man owns the exclusive right to use or dispose of a woman's biological function,” “the system classifies the woman as legally dependent on the man in question; if not the system grants her legal autonomy.” She argues that the Mishnah perceives of woman as chattel rather than person only when the context is control of her sexual and reproductive functions. She notes, however (101–2), that mishnaic rules governing women's relationship to the public domain tell quite a different story, systematically excluding all women from the life of the mind and spirit, which is perceived as belonging to men. These and related issues are dealt with in more detail by Wegner in Chattel or Person?
8 On the subject of procreation in rabbinic law, see Feldman, David M., Marital Relations, Birth Control, and Abortion in Jewish Law (New York: Schocken, 1975) 46–59Google Scholar; Biale, Rachel, Women and Jewish Law: An Exploration of Women's Issues in Halakhic Sources (New York: Schocken, 1984) 198–203Google Scholar; Epstein, Louis, Marriage Laws in the Bible and Talmud (HSS 12; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942Google Scholar); idem, Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism (New York: Ktav, 1967Google Scholar); see also the appropriate entries in the EncJud and Daube, J. E. David (The Duty of Procreation [Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh Press, 1977Google Scholar]) presents a comparison of societal attitudes towards procreation in the Hebrew Bible, rabbinic Judaism, classical antiquity, and early Christianity.
9 Feldman (Marital Relations, 46–47) notes that traditionally Gen 9:1, and esp. 9:7—the divine charges to Noah and his sons to “be fruitful and multiply”—were taken as the first commandment concerning procreation, while the directive in Gen 1:28 was said (based on b. Ketub. 5a) to be for “blessing only.” B. Yeb. 63b remarks that the command in Gen 9:7 is mentioned where it is because it directly follows the prohibition of murder, “in order to liken one who abstains from having children to one who sheds blood.”
10 B. Ned. 64b; see below, n. 21.
11 Biale, Women and Jewish Law, 202.
12 Feldman, Marital Relations, 54 n. 49
13 B. Ber. 31b; the same interpretation of Num 5:28 appears in b. Sota 26a. In this text, R. Ishmael points out to R. Akiba the consequences of a literal understanding of the verse: “In that case, all barren women will seclude themselves and be visited, and since this one did not seclude herself she will be the loser [by not conceiving].” The ranking of desirable traits in offspring, with the addition in Sota that “if she formerly bore girls, she will now give birth to boys,” is an insight into rabbinic prejudices.
14 Feldman, Marital Relations, 54.
15 On rabbinic views concerning contraception, see Biale, Women and Jewish Law, 203–18; Feldman, Marital Relations, 109–250.
16 On the issue of Jewish polygamy in rabbinic times, see Epstein, Marriage Laws, 3–25; Falk, Zeʿev W., Jewish Matrimonial Law in the Middle Ages (London: Oxford University Presś, 1966) 1–10Google Scholar; and b. Yeb. 65a, where the opposing views of R. Ammi, against any polygamy, and Raba, who allows that a man may marry as many wives as he wishes provided he has the means to support them, are contrasted.
17 According to an interpretation of Gen. Rab. 45:3, however, commenting on “And Sarai, Abram's wife took Hagar her maid, the Egyptian, after Abram had dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, and gave her to her husband Abram to be his wife” (Gen 16:3), only the time spent by an infertile couple in the land of Israel is to be considered in reckoning the ten years which constitute barrenness. Thus, too, y. Yeb. 6.6, 7c and t. Yeb. 8.5–6.
18 There are indications that taking a second wife was the more common alternative to divorcing a barren spouse. Although the midrashic literature is clear on the discomfort that can be present in a polygynous household, particularly where one wife has children, and the other does not (see below, 106–7), later sources, cited by Epstein (Marriage Laws, 25–33) and Falk (Jewish Matrimonial Law, 13–34) verify that in a childless situation, a man might prefer taking a second spouse to divorce. Friedman, Mordechai A. (Jewish Polygyny in the Middle Ages: New Documents from the Cairo Genizah [Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, Tel Aviv University, 1986Google Scholar]) presents a number of medieval documents describing bigamous marriages because of the barrenness of the first wife (153– 204). Similarly Falk indicates (Jewish Matrimonial Law, 13) that the case of the barrenness of the first wife was one of the major reasons for polygyny in medieval Jewish society, and that polygyny in this instance continued to be permitted among Ashkenazic Jews, even for several centuries after the eleventh-century ban attributed to R. Gershom b. Judah (Ibid., 14–15). Falk indicates (Ibid., 29) that the barren wife would apparently be given a choice over whether she wished a divorce or would permit a co-wife. Although the divorced wife would have the option to remarry, it seems likely that in most cases she would prefer to stay within an already established marriage and household. As Epstein notes, in connection with the Sephardic Jewish sphere, “Even with the pre-nuptial agreement for monogamy in case the wife was childless, it was wisdom on her part not to raise objection to the husband's designs to marry another, because the law would not sustain her protests. The law took the attitude that an agreement that interferes with the husband's duty of procreation is contrary to public policy and therefore not valid” (Marriage Laws, 32–33; I thank Professor Mordechai Friedman for our conversation on this point). Similar situations are also possible in presentday Israel. Abramov, S. Zalman (Perpetual Dilemma: Jewish Religion in the Jewish State [Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976] 187Google Scholar) notes that, according to modem Israeli law, a husband may be given permission to remarry without the dissolution of his previous marriage, since a Jewish religious marriage may be polygamous, according to the Penal Law Amendment (Bigamy) Law of 1959, section 5, which states that such a marriage is valid “if a new marriage was contracted after permission to marry had been granted by a final judgement of the rabbinical court, and the judgement had been approved by two Chief Rabbis of Israel.” (I thank Professor Judith Romney Wegner for this reference.)
19 B. Yeb. 65b, and see the same passage for other anecdotes which make the same point. Here, presumably, is a case of a man who already has children by an earlier marriage, or another wife, or who is so happy in his present relationship, and/or satisfied with the economic basis on which it rests, that he would wish to maintain the marriage rather than to fulfill the mandate to procreate. This situation (which must have occurred frequently) in fact, is the one approved by the midrashic material cited in this paper. It is telling that Maimonides inveighs against what must have been a commonplace circumstance, insisting that a childless husband divorce his wife after ten years of marriage: “If he refuses to divorce her, he should be compelled to do so, by being scourged with a rod until he divorces her, … or else [he must] marry another wife capable of giving birth” (Mishneh Torah, Book of Women, 1.15.7, in The Code of Maimonides, Book Four: The Book of Women [trans. Klein, Isaac; New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1972Google Scholar) 95. This interpretation reappears in the Shulkan Aruch, Eben HaEzer 154:10. Moses Isserles, however, ruling for Ashkenazic Jewry, comments on this text that nowadays one does not force the issue of the requirement to procreate.
20 The same midrash appears in Songs Rab. 1:1–2.
21 An aggadah in b. Sanh. 21a, however, does attribute Michal's childlessness to her despising David in her heart (2 Sam 6:16). It seems likely, based on such midrashim as those cited below and n. 23, that in the popular imagination childlessness for women, as well, was often seen as a divine punishment.
22 See, e.g.. Gen. Rab. 71:6, where the verse is interpreted in context. According to b. Sanh. 36b, the childless scholar is not eligible to sit on the Sanhedrin.
23 See also Gen. Rab. 71:1 on Gen 29:31, “And the Lord saw that Leah was hated and he opened her womb,” where “and despiseth not His prisoners” (Ps 69:34) is said to allude to childless women “who are as prisoners in their houses, but as soon as the Holy One, blessed be He, visits them with children, they become erect [with pride]”; and see further Gen. Rab. 71:2, on the same verse: “‘The Lord upholdeth all that fall’ (Ps 145:14)—that is, childless women who fall [are disgraced] in their own homes; ‘And raiseth up all those who are bowed down’: as soon as God visits them with children, they are raised up.”
24 Similar midrashim are told about Leah's suffering before she first conceived, based on “And the Lord saw Leah was hated and opened her womb” (Gen 29:31). Gen. Rab. 71:2 relates: “All hated her: sea-travellers abused her, land-travellers abused her, and even the women behind the beams abused her, saying, ‘This Leah leads a double life: she pretends to be righteous, yet it is not so, for if she were righteous, would she have deceived her sister!’ R. Judah b. R. Simon and R. Hanan said in the name of R. Samuel b. R. Isaac: When the Patriarch Jacob saw how Leah deceived him by pretending to be her sister, he determined to divorce her. But as soon as the Holy One, blessed be He, visited her with children he exlaimed, ‘Shall I divorce the mother of these children.’ “Here is a paradigmatic instance of fecundity transforming the despised wife into the respected mother of the Patriarch's offspring.
25 Along these lines is a comment in Gen.Rab. 71:2, which understands Gen 29:31, “Rachel was barren (aqarah)” as “Rachel was the chief (ʿiqar) of the house.”
26 Although this translation of the passage is questionable, it seems likely that it contains a reference to one of the most popular safeguards against infertility, the amulet. References to material in Jewish folklore concerning remedies for barrenness, including amulets, may be found in Theodor Gaster, The Holy and the Profane (New York: Sloane, 1955Google Scholar) 1–8; Patai, Raphael, “Jewish Folk cures for Barrenness,” Folklore 54 (1943Google Scholar) 117–24 and 56 (1945) 208–18; and Trachtenberg, Joshua, Jewish Magic and Superstition: A Study in Folk Religion (New York: Atheneum, 1939Google Scholar; reprinted 1970), see appropriate entries in index.
27 According to Gen. Rab. 72:1, e.g., Leah, who was born without a uterus, bore seven children, while Rachel from whom, as the beloved wife, it was natural that most of the children should have been born, remained barren. “And who has caused this? ‘The Lord [who] killeth and maketh alive, and He bringeth down to the grave and bringeth up’ (1 Sam 2:6 [an excerpt from Hannah's prayer for children]).”
28 Biale, Women and Jewish Law, 20.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. Chava Weissler has discussed the development of teḥine (supplication) literature in the early modern period, and provides bibliographical information on such earlier studies as exist (“The Traditional Piety of Ashkenazic Women,” in Green, Arthur, ed., Jewish Spirituality: From the Sixteenth Century to the Present [New York: Crossroad, 1987] 245–75Google Scholar). A methodological framework for this material is suggested in idem, “The Religion of Traditional Ashkenazic Women: Some Methodological Issues,” AJSRev 12 (1987) 73–94Google Scholar.
31 See the passage beginning, “R. Hamnuna said: How many of the most important laws [relating to prayer] can be learnt from these verses relating to Hannah.” It is also interesting that the three obligations incumbent upon women, for transgression of which, according to b. Šab. 32a, they die in childbirth, are also said to be derived from Hannah's prayer. Thus b. Ber. 31b comments on “If Thou wilt indeed look on the affliction of Thy handmaid … and not forget Thy handmaid, but wilt give unto Thy handmaid” (1 Sam 1:11) as follows: “R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: Why these three ‘handmaids’? Hannah said before the Holy One, blessed be He: Sovereign of the Universe, Thou has created in woman three criteria [bidke] of death (some say three armour-joints [dibke] of death), namely niddah, hallah and the kindling of the light [on Sabbath). Have I transgressed in any of them?”
32 Callaway, Mary, Sing, O Barren One: A Study in Comparative Midrash (SBLDS 91; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986Google Scholar).
33 Ibid., 59–65.
34 Weissler (“Traditional Piety”) has studied many supplicatory prayers for Jewish women in the early modem period. Discussing an eighteenth-century text called the Shloyshe šeʿorim, attributed to a female author (253), she notes (265–66) the importance of the theme of women's helping to bring about Israel's redemption, and she comments as well (266–67) on the significant roles played by the matriarchs, who are generally missing from the standard liturgy, in this group of women's prayers, and in teḥhine (supplication) literature in general. She writes (267) that “this assertion of the power of mothers may have been particularly important to women living in the uncertain conditions of Jewish Eastern Europe, who were in fact powerless to protect their families from many of the dangers that beset them.” No doubt positive homiletical references to the matriarchs and appeal to their merits and efficacy fulfilled a similar function for Jewish women of earlier periods.
35 I would like to thank Murray Schwartz, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Fine Arts at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst for the research leave which enabled me to complete this paper.
