I. The unhappy understanding

Hägglund's extended discussion of Hegel in This Life occurs in Conclusion and centres on the figure of the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ in the Phenomenology (PhG: §§206–30). While acknowledging that Unhappy Consciousness was understood by Hegel as a critique of a ‘certain understanding of Christianity’, Hägglund seeks to broaden its scope to all forms of ‘religious faith’ and their shared understanding of finitude:

The experience of the Unhappy Consciousness is organized around a distinction made within self-consciousness. On the one hand, there is the ‘changeable’, ‘inessential’, and ‘contingent’ consciousness of the ‘singular individual’. On the other hand, there is the ‘unchangeable’ and ‘universal’ consciousness that consciousness takes itself to essentially be. In more explicitly religious terms: I am not really my fragile body and ever-changing mind, and certainly not whatever social role I happen to play; I am in truth only my immortal soul. For our purposes, the key point is that the Unhappy Consciousness is unable to reconcile its changeable contents with the unchangeable universality it takes itself to truly be, in so far as its ‘elevation’ beyond the changeable would remain act of the singular individual (PhG: §209). As a result, the unchangeable and universal is represented as a ‘securely fixed […] otherworldly beyond’, and the singular individual's ‘hope of coming to be at one with it must remain a hope, which is to say, it must remain without fulfillment, without ever being present’ (PhG: §212). It is in this picture of an unchangeable beyond that the Unhappy Consciousness most clearly figures the religious longing for and faith in an eternal life exempt from change and loss.

While ‘finitude’ does not explicitly figure in Hegel's Phenomenology account of the Unhappy Consciousness, if we turn to ‘finitude’ in the Logic, we find it begins with an analogous structure to the Unhappy Consciousness—and with the same pathos. Finitude is the ‘most obstinate category of the understanding’ (SL: 101/21.117), and the understanding ‘persists in this sorrow of finitude’ (SL: 102/21.117). In Hegel's Logic and Encyclopaedia, the ‘Understanding’ (Verstand) is standardly opposed to ‘Reason’ (Vernunft), as differing accounts of conceptual content (EL: §§79–82). For the Understanding, concepts are independently intelligible and exclusive of their contraries, while for Reason—as we will see in more detail in Section II below—concepts are properly understood in terms of their dialectical interdefinability. As such, the Understanding's ‘official claim’—and the claim that generates its ‘sorrow’—is that finitude is to be opposed to an infinity it excludes, and with which it cannot be united: ‘the finite is incompatible with the infinite and cannot be united with it; that the finite is absolutely opposed to the infinite (SL: 102/21.117). So the Understanding at this moment in the Logic repeats the unhappy and estranged consciousness of the Phenomenology: on the one side, the ‘positive’ and essential; on the other, the ‘negative’ and inessential. On this picture, the finite and infinite constitute ‘two worlds’, the infinite emerging at the limit of the finite, and vice-versa (SL: 111/21.127). But because to be finite (endlich) on Hegel's definition is to be limited by an other and thus to come to an end in an other (SL: 101/21.116), the Understanding's conception of the infinite as limited by the finite is not truly or genuinely in-finite (un-endlich) at all, but rather only a ‘finite infinite’ (SL: 111/21.127), a ‘bad’ or ‘spurious’ (schlechte) infinite.

What would for Hegel count as a self-consistent conception of infinity will be outlined in Section III of this essay. My point here is simply that Hägglund's counsel against the Unhappy Consciousness—that we should not understand finitude as a ‘negative restriction’ that holds us back from our desire—indicates at the same time opposition to the Understanding's account of the relation between finite and infinite, an account that generates the ‘sorrow’ of the bad infinite. As such, This Life's reading of finitude as constitutive of spiritual life cannot be said—despite initial appearances—to be an endorsement of the bad infinite, but rather arraigns itself against the Understanding's approach to contrary conceptual contents that generates the bad infinite. It also means—and as the remainder of this essay bears out—that This Life cannot follow Derrida in taking true infinity to be an exemption from finitude and the reinstallation of unadulterated self-presence, because such an exemption would simply reassert the Understanding's incoherent account of the finitude-infinity relation.

So Hägglund follows Hegel in arguing that finitude ought not to be understood as a mere restriction. But how exactly is Hegelian dialectical Reason, in Hägglund's words above, to help us ‘leave behind’ this sorrow of the Understanding? To elucidate Hägglund's answer to this question in explicitly Hegelian terms, we need to reconstruct the way in which, for Hegel, individuality—and further, the relation between finitude and infinity—cannot be understood with the resources of the Understanding alone.

II. Negation and the individual

Hegel's meta-conceptual distinction between the Understanding and Reason broadly maps onto the distinction in the Logic between ‘abstract negativity’ or the ‘first negation’ and ‘absolute negativity’ or the ‘negation of negation’. Following the Phenomenology's usage, commentary often terms the two modes of negation ‘abstract’ and ‘determinate’ (PhG: §59). For the Understanding, a given content is not its contrary. Reason ‘negates’ this ‘first’ negation as necessary but insufficient for a coherent grip on the determinacy of conceptual contents. This picture will of course be familiar to readers of Hegel. I nonetheless take the time to reconstruct the derivation of determinate negation in the Existence chapter in some detail, in order to show that determinate negation is bound up with Hegel's attempt to think the minimal logical form of individuality, and later in the same chapter, of infinity. While this material is extremely abstract, it is ultimately indispensable to a proper grasp of This Life's account of living individuals: living beings are, of course, not dead, but this merely abstract negation is insufficient to render living activity as self-maintenance intelligible. I am also motivated by Pippin's recent account of the Logic in Realm of Shadows (Reference Pippin2019a), which, however indispensable, does not pick out the dependence of individuality on determinate negation.Footnote ⁹

At the start of the Existence chapter, negation constitutes what Hegel takes to be the minimally intelligible form of qualitative difference, i.e., being real rather than being negative, where the latter means not being real. This first negation is the ‘not’ that renders the quality of ‘being real’ qualitatively distinct from ‘being negative’. Hegel here emphasizes the way in which the first negation results in two qualities mutually excluding one another: ‘reality only has, therefore, the value of something positive from which negating, restriction, lack, are excluded’ (SL: 85/21.99). Negation is thus immediately understood in the Logic as material incompatibility.Footnote ¹⁰ However, negation at this point in the Logic only grounds a distinction between ‘ways of being determinate’ (being real, being negative); it does not of itself account for the qualitative determinateness of an individual ‘something’, i.e., something being itself and not another something (Houlgate Reference Houlgate2006: 313). The logical form of the latter is more complex, and results from Hegel's diagnosis of the ‘one-sidedness’ or incomplete intelligibility of negation as it is immediately conceived, i.e., in terms of mutual exclusion.

Hegel thinks negation understood as the mutual exclusion of contrary terms is a partial or incomplete model of determinacy for the following reason. While the first or most immediate negation figures reality and negation as mutually exclusive, it at the same time implicitly indicates their mutual imbrication, in the sense that their respective determinacy is dependent on their relation to one another. To borrow the language of the Phenomenology, what is meant or intended (gemeint) here is not what is actually said (PhG: §97). We mean to say that reality excludes negation, but what we actually say—what is legible in such a claim—is that reality ‘includes’ negation in the sense that it necessarily has reference (Beziehung) to negation in order to be qualitatively distinguishable from it, and negation similarly ‘includes’ reality.Footnote ¹¹ So we might say that the first negation is termed ‘abstract’ because it abstracts from the mutual dependence of reality and negation that it nonetheless makes legible. Once we come to see this, we have followed Hegel in ‘negating’ negation understood as mutual exclusion. Importantly, this does not mean dismissing our immediate understanding of negation as simply false, but—to use Hegel's famous term of art—to sublate (aufheben) that understanding, embedding it as a logical moment of a more robust account of determinacy: contents are determinate by not being—and through that negation necessarily referring to—their contraries. To dismiss abstract negation as simply false would be only to repeat its one-sidedness: we would figure abstract negation and determinate negation as mutually exclusive, assigning truth value to the latter only.

One way we might understand the relation between first and second negations—and the crucial importance of this difference for Hägglund's account of living beings—is by distinguishing Hegel from Meister Eckhart, who first coined the formula, ‘negation of negation’, and whom Hägglund criticizes in Radical Atheism. For Eckhart, the created world is characterized by negation: finite beings will, sooner or later, not be what they are—they change into others, they come to an end. Through contemplation, we detach ourselves from desire for any changeable, perishable being, so as to be ‘as little moved by joy and sorrow, honour and disgrace, as a broad mountain by a gentle breeze’ (cited in Hägglund Reference Hägglund2008a: 117). We thus approach God's nature, defined by Eckhart as the ‘negation of the negation’ (negatio negationis; Versagen des Versagenes), the ‘Indistinct Being’ who is ‘free and empty’ (McGinn Reference McGinn2021: 3). Hegel's understanding of the ‘negation of the negation’ formula is crucially different. While not specifically targeting Eckhart, the Logic criticizes theology that understands God, as in the ontological proof, ‘as something affirmative that contains no negation’ (SL: 86/21.99-100). Such a God would be the pure Being Hegel has shown to be indistinguishable from pure Nothing, an ‘empty absolute, void of determination and content, in which all is one’ (SL: 86/21.99–100). Such a theology would only mean God while in fact saying nothing. Importantly, although Radical Atheism does not refer to Hegel in critiquing Eckhart, that critique is already Hegelian: since to be free from negation is to be free from any determinacy, Eckhart's ‘God is Nothing, since everything that is finite (which is to say everything) must be eliminated in God’ (Reference Hägglund2008a: 118). While those sympathetic to Eckhart will point out that God's Nothingness is the very point of an apophatic theology, Hägglund's basic claim is that the identification of spirituality and freedom with emptiness and passivity is deeply misguided; for Hägglund, our commitment to freedom in collective, ‘spiritual’ life is constituted through the activity of individual living beings. It is indicative that Hegel's God is identified not with perfection, purity, and impassibility, but with ‘activity, creation, power’ (SL: 62/21.72).Footnote ¹² For Hegel, the negation of negation does not cancel or remove negation, necessary as it is for determinate difference. Rather, as we will see in the remainder of this section and the next, the Hegelian negation of negation brings the logical form of individuality—and infinity as the minimal logical form of living activity—into view.

The logical transition from negation to the negation of negation is simultaneously the derivation of a qualitatively distinct, self-identical individual. Unfortunately, Hegel himself puts this movement extremely rapidly:

Hegel here presents the ‘sublation’ of the first negation that constitutes the logical structure of an ‘existent’ or ‘something’ via contrast with the ‘pure Being’ ‘void of distinctions’ that famously begins the Logic. ‘Pure Being’ was said to be ‘self-equal only to itself’, but that self-equality proved radically indeterminate in so far as it immediately proved to be indistinguishable from its contrary, i.e., pure Nothing. It is through the distinction between the qualitative determinacies of reality and negation—and the mutual reference implicitly entailed in that distinction—that the Logic can for the first time articulate a stable form of self-equality. Unlike pure Being, something possesses a self-equality and self-standing that does not collapse into its contrary only in so far as it contains in itself the reference to its other, or, more specifically, its necessary relation to negation is a moment of its own self. Hegel will call this ‘negative unity with oneself’, being what one is by referring in what one is to what one is not.

At this point in the Logic, Hegel's account of negativity as determinative of self-identity is extremely thin. But the logical form of individuality so derived is essential to the entire progress of the Logic and the Realphilosophie, and especially for any account of the logical form of the living and thinking subject. Hegel immediately highlights this importance:

So if we wish to conceptually grasp the activity that constitutes living and thinking individuals (‘a living thing, a thinking mind’), what is required is determinate negation, i.e., the ‘negative unity with oneself’ that lies “at the base” of all the Logic's further determinations of subjectivity.

As Hegel's own connection of determinate negation to life should indicate, the above elaboration of the distinction between abstract and determinate above provides the resources to articulate Hägglund's account of living activity in Hegelian logical terms. Abstractly speaking, life and death are mutually exclusive in the sense that when one is alive one is not dead. But this abstract negation is insufficient to render intelligible the activity of living individuals: to live just is to actively and continually oppose oneself to one's negation in death, to ‘stave off’ death. This relation to death as the negation of life belongs to the description of any living being: one lives through negating the negation of one's death. But this processual understanding of the individual as coming to itself through what it is not is only articulated in the last stage of the Logic's Existence chapter, in ‘true infinity’.

III. True infinity in the finite

As we have seen above, infinity is for Hegel a qualitative distinction between that which is limited and so finite (endlich) and that which is without limit (un-endlich). Again, the Understanding—availing itself of the resources of abstract negation alone—is only able to articulate a spurious infinity: in taking infinity and finitude as mutually exclusive, it sets a limit on infinity, rendering qualitatively identical what it had hoped to distinguish. To resolve this, Hegel's true infinity further concretizes of the logic of determinate negation and individuality rehearsed above, understanding infinity to ‘include’ the finite as a necessary moment of itself.

Before continuing, it is important to note that the categories of finitude and infinity are themselves derived from the self-standing character of the something. Hegel seeks to demonstrate that the negative self-unity characteristic of the existent something entails opposition to and mutual limitation by an ‘other’ such something. While something and other are initially ‘indifferent’ (gleichgültig)—in the sense of qualitatively indistinguishable from one another—Hegel accounts for the qualitative distinguishability of existents by further articulating something and other as co-constitutive through their shared limit. In the sense that its limitation by an other belongs to the definition of the something, something is by definition finite (endlich), in so far as its limit or end is not contingent but belongs to its constitution.Footnote ¹³ Infinity then immediately presents itself to the Understanding as the abstract negation of the finite, opposed and excluding it.

Understanding the finite and infinite as mutually exclusive gives rise to the ‘infinite progression’ or ‘alternating determination [Wechselbestimmung] of finite and infinite’ in which the finite makes necessary the thought of the infinite, and the infinite in turn that of the finite. The finite points beyond itself into the infinite in so far as limited (endlich) it has reference to its other or contrary. In reaching its limit at the infinite, it proves, however, to have only ‘arrived at itself [bei sich angekommen]’ or ‘in its beyond has only found itself again [sich in seinem Jenseits wiedergefunden]’ (SL: 117/21.134), in so far as the infinite it refers to is itself finite in being limited by the finite. At the same time, because as the finite ‘finds itself’ beyond its limit in the infinite, it is equally unending—infinite (unendlich)—being.Footnote ¹⁴ So just as the finite re-joins itself in the infinite, so the infinite finds itself in the movement in which the limit between finite and infinite is transcended. Once this activity of finding itself in the other is made explicit, the form of true infinity as a further determination of the ‘negation of the negation’ has been derived:

This derivation of true infinity is analogous to the derivation of the something: as we saw, first reality and negation were opposed, but then negation came to be understood as the moment of determinateness in any reality. To think a self-standing individual all that was required was to make explicit this dependency: the something stood on its own only in so far as it was the ‘negation of the negation’, not only not its other, but itself constituted by its relation to it. Here, true or genuine infinity is no longer understood as the limit and ‘beyond’ of the finite, but is rather the process by which finite existence maintains itself as what it is in the relationship to what it is not. To quote Houlgate's recent Hegel on Being, true infinity is ‘the movement or process of returning to, or continuing to be, itself in and through its other’ (Reference Houlgate2022: 243).

As above, were the first negation to be itself simply excluded by the operation of a further negation, the finite and infinite would be rendered immediately identical or indistinguishable—there would be no ‘not’ to distinguish finite and infinite. In this way, Hegel criticizes the characterization of infinity as the ‘unity of finite and infinite’ that would lack distinction between its moments: such ‘unity is abstract, motionless self-sameness […] the infinite is rather essentially only as becoming’ (SL: 118). Hegel's words here serve to highlight Derrida's misreading: the true infinite is not the reinstallation of pure self-presence (‘self-sameness’) but identity only in relation to another, and so because it is a movement, process, or activity (a ‘becoming’). As Hegel says, clearly foreshadowing his account of the characteristic formal activity (Formtätigkeit) of living beings in the Logic's third book, ‘the affirmative truth’—that is, affirmative infinity—is ‘internally self-moving unity’ (SL: 122/21.139). The infinite is reconceived as a process constituted in and by the finite, such that the finite and infinite can no longer be conceived as other than one another (Houlgate Reference Houlgate2006: 424). Derrida's critique misses the deflationary character of Hegel's dialectical reinterpretation of the concept of infinity. To exhibit the form of true infinity is not to be other than—exempt from—the finite; this would be the infinite incoherently conceived as an unreachable beyond. The true infinite rather names the minimal logical form of the activity of maintaining oneself in one's finitude in relation to one's finite others: the activity or process of being what one is by establishing a relation to what one is not.

IV. Infinity as natural life

All of this may sound like an unwarranted imposition of Hägglund's themes of ‘living activity’ and ‘self-maintenance’ language onto Hegel's text, but the link between true infinity and life—and indeed spiritual life—is a deep-seated one in Hegel's thought. For example, the Phenomenology presents infinity immediately before its discussion of living activity and self-consciousness: ‘This simple infinity, or the absolute concept, is to be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal bloodstream’ (PhG: §162). Infinity is here understood as a ‘self-equality’ in and through difference (PhG: §163), just as it is in the Logic, where, as above, true infinity names the form of self-relation in the activity of other-relatedness. Unlike the Phenomenology's brief and difficult discussion of life (PhG: §§168–73), the ‘Life’ chapter of the third book of the Logic elaborates the form of living beings, explicitly identifying living form with the true infinite: ‘Living natures […] are an actuality of infinite power [eine Wirklichkeit von der unendlichen Kraft] […] in their otherness [Anderssein] they preserve themselves’ (SL: 684/12.188). Although Hegel himself does not consistently articulate the form of life in terms of true infinity,Footnote ¹⁵ it is clear that life exhibits the form of true infinity in three interrelated ways, following Hegel's own tripartite schema for the Life chapter: as (a) the ‘living individual’; (b) the ‘life process’; and (c) the ‘genus process’. I restrict my discussion to the first two moments as most directly relevant to Hägglund's text.

(a) Living individuals are infinite on account of the self-identity they exhibit in and through their different parts. As above, to be truly infinite is to be a process composed of finite moments that, as moments of that process, are what they are only in relation to those others. When occupying its proper place within the self-relating whole of the living individual, a hand, for example, is not limited by other organs but is able to fulfil its own function through its relation to them. But, as Aristotle famously remarks, the hand severed from the body is a hand in name only. Hegel at the beginning of the Life chapter rehearses this Aristotelian line of thinking in terms of the contrast between spatiotemporal externality and the unity of the living individual. While the parts of a living body can be conceived ‘as a mutual externality of entirely diverse and atomistic matters’ (SL: 678/12.182), in so far as its organs are outside one another occupying different places in space, this is not to consider the body as living, but rather as dead (SL: 680/12.183). As living, the individual is not the externality of its parts but has unity in and through that externality: the living individual is to be ‘distinguished from its externality but, in thus distinguishing itself from it, pervading it thoroughly and self-identical’ (SL: 681/12.184). This form of self-identity through difference, of differences conceived as moments of a process rather than in opposition, is first articulated in the category of true infinity.

In this way, true infinity is the minimal conceptual determination of the internal purposiveness that for Hegel characterizes living beings: the member organs of the organism do not serve as means to some end external to the life of the organism (‘external purposiveness’) but each organ is both means and end (‘internal purposiveness’). That is, each organ serves to sustain the living individual as a whole, and in so far as each organ is required for the living individual to sustain itself, the continued integrity of each organ is also the purpose of the organism as a whole. In Hegel's words, it is the ‘impulse’ (Trieb) of each organ ‘to produce itself […] but no less to sublate itself and make itself a means for the other’ (SL: 681/12.184). Internal teleology is thus a further determination of true infinity as, again, the Logic's first articulation of the process of self-relation through difference.

Importantly, in his discussion of living individuality, Hegel seeks to show that the self-relation and indeed ‘totality’ characteristic of the living individual—the simple oneness of the living individual in and through its different parts—entails a relation to an ‘indifferent’ world standing over against it (SL: 678/12.181). As glossed in Section II above, the negative self-unity characteristic of the existent something entails opposition to and mutual limitation by an ‘indifferent’ other and in this regard the something is finite. That structure is clearly recalled by Hegel here: in so far as the ‘indifferent’ world stands at the limit of the totality of the living being and opposes it, the living being in its infinite self-relation nonetheless remains finite. It is in this respect that Hegel's favoured image for the true infinite—‘the circle, the line that has reached itself, closed and wholly present, without beginning and end’ (SL: 119/12.136)—is only one half of the full Hegelian picture: the circle drawn by the living individual in negative self-unity sets itself against the world in a relationship of opposition that entails its finitude. Thus, that living natures have ‘infinite power’ does not mean, as it would seem on Derrida's reading of Hegelian infinity, that they possess a self-identity inoculated against difference and otherness. Rather, for Hegel, the living individual remains finite in two interrelated ways. Firstly, the spatiotemporal ‘externality’ of its parts means that organic unity can always ‘break down’, so to speak, into finite components. Secondly, the self-identity of the living individual entails a relationship to the world as other to and limiting of that individual. These two interrelated senses of finitude motivate Hegel's account of the ‘Life Process’ and Hägglund's reading of it.

(b) To be alive is to maintain one's self-organization—to hold oneself together—through relationship to the world standing indifferently over against one, maintaining one's bodily integrity through the establishing of the right kind of relations with that world. The Logic treats this process explicitly in terms of determinate negation, and This Life footnotes the crucial passage:

This is a highly abstract claim, but Hegel has in mind here the prosaic act of eating when hungry. Hunger pangs announce the threat of death to the living being: were the hunger to go unaddressed, the living being would be negated in death. But of course, the living being is not simply or immediately negated by the painful experience of hunger, but rather constitutes and maintains itself by overcoming that need through its living activity. In the same way that in (a) the true infinity of the living individual was bound up with finitude, so the life process exhibits the necessary presence of finitude in the true infinite. In the process of eating, both the finite and infinite moments of the true infinite are demonstrated: when we eat we bring another living thing to an end, demonstrating its finitude; at the same time, we demonstrate the infinite power of living beings, maintaining ourselves as the beings we are through that other we consume.

It is in its treatment of self-maintenance that the Hegelian logical infrastructure of This Life is on full display. In the pain of bodily need, Hägglund notes, ‘a living being is not simply negated but maintains itself in the negative experience of suffering’ (Reference Hägglund2019a: 186), and emphasizes in his footnote to the Logic that Hegel's ‘negation of the negation’ formula does ‘not mean that a living being can overcome its negative relation to pain, loss, and death’. Rather it simply indicates that ‘relation to the negative […] belongs to its positive constitution’ (Reference Hägglund2019a: 403). So just as any individual ‘something’ has negation as a moment of its own self-standing determinacy, and just as infinity is self-relation sustained only through relation to finitude, the living being is constituted not by the simple exclusion of pain and need, but ‘includes’ pain and need as a necessary moment of itself. As Hägglund repeatedly stresses, our finitude as living beings—the necessary possibility of bodily breakdown, the task of maintaining ourselves in a relation to a world immediately indifferent to our needs—cannot be coherently conceived as a merely negative restriction, which we might hope to transcend in an eternal life. To transcend our finitude would be to ‘transcend’ life—that is, to no longer be living.

V. Infinity as spiritual life

Hegel claims in that ‘self-consciousness is the nearest example of the presence of infinity’ (SL: 127/21.145), and thus a more consummate expression of infinity than what he describes as the ‘infinite power’ of living beings as such.Footnote ¹⁶ Hägglund also wants to distinguish between natural and spiritual life, while nonetheless grounding the latter in the former. For Hägglund, for living and rational beings, death not only constitutes the sense of their self-maintenance as living; it is also a necessary condition for the maintaining of any rationally articulable normative commitment. In line with this, a central claim of This Life is that the practical identities we sustain through the management of a suite of normative commitments and the self-maintenance of our bodily life are distinguishable but inseparable (Hägglund Reference Hägglund2019a: 222).

We can demonstrate the Hegelian character of Hägglund's thinking here by considering the concepts of risk and sacrifice. As Hägglund puts it, the ‘motivational force’ of our commitments is traceable to the finitude and so ‘precariousness’ of those commitments and their objects: ‘There has to be a prospective risk of loss for anything to be at stake in sustaining a form of life’ (Reference Hägglund2019a: 50).Footnote ¹⁷ That we can go further than merely risking and in fact sacrifice bodily life for our normative commitments indicates the distinguishability of our normatively constituted identity and our bodily life. However, the first moment of the Phenomenology's Lord and Bondsman dialectic—the famous ‘struggle to the death’—demonstrates that this distinguishability is only formal in so far as the spiritual life of our normative commitments is materially dependent on natural life. Those who would sacrifice their bodily life before abandoning their self-conception do not, as they might have supposed, realize that self-conception. The Phenomenology importantly puts this point in terms of the distinction between abstract and determinate negation: the combatant's ‘deed’—their bodily sacrifice in the name of a commitment to a conception of themselves as independent of others—‘is abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness, which sublates so that it preserves and maintains what has been sublated and which thereby survives its having become sublated’ (PhG: §188). Consciousness in sacrificing its ‘natural location’ in the living body simply comes to its end and does not sustain its identity in otherness. That is, it neither maintains its bodily life through and against its other (death), nor has its self-conception assessed and recognized by an other self-conscious agent (I say more about these two senses of ‘other’ below). Thus the articulation of a normative identity, while formally distinguishable from bodily self-maintenance, is nonetheless materially inseparable from it.

This Life initially develops this intimate relation between bodily vulnerability and rational agency in Heideggerian terms: the ‘horizon of my death’ or ‘anxiety before death’ is the non-psychological ‘condition of intelligibility’ for the activity of undertaking and revising commitments. I lead a life in so far as normative determinations—decisions about what I ought to do—matter to me, and they matter in so far as my time is finite (Hägglund Reference Hägglund2019a: 201). This Life brings this Heideggerian line of thought into dialogue with Hegel by quoting from §32 of the Phenomenology's preface, which serves here to bring into focus the Hegelian infrastructure of Hägglund's model of rational agency:

Hegel here equates ‘death’ with the logically ‘negative’ and the ‘life of spirit’ with the logically ‘positive’. With this equivalence in view, the above passage maps directly onto the logical structure of the negation of the negation and the constitution of individuality (a ‘something’) in the Logic covered above. What converts spirit into ‘being’, what gives it a determinacy distinct from the indeterminacy of pure Being, is its relation to the negative. This relation to or mediation with what it is not cannot be understood to be ‘external’ to spirit but rather belongs to its self-description, ‘is itself this mediation’. Spirit ‘sustains itself’ in relation to death, just as living individuals in general maintain themselves in and against the threat of death. And true to the Logic's claim that the ‘something’ as negation of the negation constitutes the basic logical form of living and thinking individuality (‘a living thing, a thinking mind’), the above passage from the Phenomenology identifies spirit in its constitutive relation to death-as-negation with ‘the subject’.

Put in this way, however, the spiritual life of self-conscious creatures is conceived on the model of the natural life of the individual discussed in section IV above: self-conscious beings are confronted with a world set indifferently over against them in which they must determine their normative identity, an identity only intelligible against the backdrop of finitude. In other words, the relevant other for self-conscious beings on the account rehearsed above is death, just as it was for living beings in general. As such, Hägglund's account of spiritual life as I have reconstructed it to this point inadequately captures the distinguishability of natural and spiritual life, i.e., true infinity as it is expressed more fully and concretely by self-conscious creatures.

One obvious way of distinguishing life and self-conscious life is that, above and beyond self-maintenance in and against the threat of death, the latter implicitly or otherwise takes up other self-conscious beings as moments of their normative identity. Self-conscious living beings constitute their normative identity through mutually recognitive relations with other self-conscious, norm-bearing agents, and can come to understand that identity not as limited by the existence of other self-conscious beings, but come to self-consciously apprehend their identity as not only dependent on but indeed enriched by the other. In the paradigmatic example of love, the individual ‘continues’ into their other in so far as the individual is dependent for a moment of their normative identity on that other (being ‘a good partner’) and comes to see that other's identity as a moment of their own.Footnote ¹⁸ While both natural and spiritual life are instances of true infinity, the latter is the ‘nearest example’ of true infinity because the structure of self-constitution through otherness is not, as it is for non-rational animals, implicit or ‘blind’, but is rather made explicit and self-consciously affirmed as normative for rational beings. In this way, the true infinity of spiritual life takes in the individuality of rational individuals developing unique practical identities, participating in it by undertaking and collectively revisable norms.

Now, none of this of itself constitutes a criticism of Hägglund. This Life draws on Brandom's and Pippin's respective accounts of mutually recognitive relations as constitutive of normativity, and Hägglund is at pains to point out that the mutually recognitive structure of spiritual life transforms our natural lives in so far as how we ought to meet the constitutive demand of self-maintenance is a question for us. But it is to say that there is a danger in beginning and ending one's account of rational agency from the individual confrontation with death, in so far as it threatens to over-emphasize the inseparability between natural and spiritual life, at the cost of their distinguishability.