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GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND CONSULTATION OVER USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, 1950–1954*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2011

MATTHEW JONES
MATTHEW JONES
Affiliation:
University of Nottingham
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Abstract

The subject of when nuclear weapons might have to be employed by the United States during the early Cold War period was the setting for a prolonged and uneasy dialogue within the Anglo-American relationship. While British governments pressed for a formal agreement that there should be prior consultation before the atomic bomb was ever used, the Americans were determined to retain the freedom to take this crucial decision alone. This article explores the debates that ensued and the tensions that were created by this issue, between the meetings of Attlee and Truman in December 1950 and the Indochina crisis of 1954, and highlights the contrasting geopolitical positions of Britain and the United States as they sought to reconcile their views. For the British, playing host to a clutch of important US airbases, the risk of early nuclear devastation in any outbreak of general war was a paramount consideration. Although impatient with British caution, the Americans recognized an overriding need for allied support in general war giving British views the capacity to exercise a restraining influence.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 797 - 828
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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35 Attlee to Churchill, 3 December 1950, PREM 8/1559, TNA.

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