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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
After almost forty years of discussion and analysis, British policy at Munich in 1938 remains as controversial a subject as ever. But despite the fact that many thorough and important studies have been written, the focus of the controversy has not shifted very substantially. Much emphasis is still placed upon the ‘men of Munich’ and the question of whether they were guilty men who betrayed Czechoslovakia or reasonable and astute statesmen who sought to preserve the peace of Europe. And, in consequence, both their defenders and their critics have invested a great deal of effort in scrutinizing their contemporary writings to see whether their intentions in September 1938 were laudable or contemptible. However, it is by no means certain that the fundamental causes of governmental behaviour during a crisis are revealed in their clearest perspective by a concentration upon the contemporary utterances of policy-makers. For, by the time such a situation has been reached, the available options are normally strictly limited so that the task of the ‘decision-maker’ is often to provide a rationalization, both for himself and posterity, for a course of action which has been all but predetermined by earlier decisions. This article seeks to demonstrate that the Munich crisis was of such a type: that it represented a continuity in Britain's Central European policy and that the behaviour of the ‘men of Munich’ can only be judged in the context of this continuity. It argues, in fact, that the British adopted a policy of ‘passive pragmatism’ in defence of their world position throughout the inter-war period and that it was this which accounted both for their inaction between 1933 and 1937 and the Munich policy in 1938.
1 In ‘Munich and the British tradition’, Historical Journal, xix (1976), no. 1, P. W. Schroeder also attempts to interpret Munich in the context of the continuity in British foreign policy. However, since he seeks to demonstrate its relationship with British actions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he is naturally unable to concentrate upon the specific characteristics of policy during the inter-war period which provides the continuity which is emphasized here.
2 In An economic background to Munich: international business and Czechoslovakia, 1918–38 (Cambridge, 1974), A. Teichova offers a totally different interpretation, arguing that British economic interests in Central Europe were sufficiently important for Germany's refusal to respect them eventually to lead to the Second World War (p. 382). However, Mrs Teichova herself admits that British investment in Europe as a whole only amounted to 8% of her total foreign investment in 1930 (p. 2) and it is therefore unwarranted to suggest that the British would have risked war merely to safeguard a proportion of this European investment.
3 At first Italy was not regarded as so important but, after the deterioration in Anglo-French relations during the Ruhr occupation, Britain increasingly tried to use Italy as a further pressure against French intransigence. See Edwards, P., ‘Anglo-Italian Relations, 1924–29’ (D.Phil, thesis, Oxford University, 1971).Google Scholar
4 See, for example, Public Record Office, FO 371/10701, c13386/13131/62, 24 Oct. 1925, minute by Austen Chamberlain. (Hereafter all British governmental documents cited are in the PRO unless otherwise stated.)
5 Austen Chamberlain papers, Birmingham University AC/24/7/14, 10 March 1925, Chamberlain to Lord Grey.
6 The policy was institutionalized in the treaties of Locarno when the British believed that a final recognition of Germany's western frontiers would ameliorate all other European tensions. (FO 371/11064, w1560/9/98, 20 Feb. 1925, FO memo on foreign policy.) However, it under-estimated the seriousness of the rivalry between the other Great Powers in the Danubian region. After the grave post-war tension between France and Germany had given way to a period of easier relations between them following the Dawes and Locarno settlements, Franco-Italian rivalry in the Danubian region deteriorated whilst, until the end of the decade, Germany concentrated upon other questions. French influence was based upon an anti-revisionist alliance system with the Little Entente states of Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia, which Italy sought to undermine by a variety of expedients, culminating in a close relationship with the revisionist, anti-Little Entente, Hungary and with Austria. German expansionism, initially with regard to the desire for Anschluss with Austria, was resumed during the last three years of Weimar and the region was henceforth dominated by a complex and intractable conflict between the three powers.
7 Thus, for example, after initially supporting it the British became disenchanted about the Tardieu plan for Danubian economic co-operation largely because they objected to French financial policy towards Germany. Treasury papers, T172/1780, ‘The Danubian States’, 3 April 1932, memo from chancellor of the exchequer to prime minister.
8 The Anschluss would, almost inevitably, provide Germany with such a dominating economic position in the Danubian region that French and Italian influence there would be undermined. See Basch, A., The Danube basin and the German economic sphere (London, 1944)Google Scholar, ch. 14 and Newman, M., ‘Britain and the German–Austrian customs union proposal of 1931’, European Studies Review, VI (1976), no. 4.Google Scholar
9 This was particularly evident in the attitude of the government to Mussolini's proposal for a four-power pact in March 1933. See Carmi, O., La Grande Bretagne et la Petite Entente, 1920–37 (Geneva, 1972), pp. 202–56.Google Scholar
10 FO 800/291, 29 July 1934, Simon to MacDonald.
11 By the announcement on 9 March 1935 of the existence of an air force and the subsequent introduction of conscription.
12 The Anglo-German naval agreement of 18 June 1935 allowed the German navy, in contravention of the treaty of Versailles, to reach approximately 35% of Britain's own naval strength.
13 Joint statements of support for Austrian independence were issued on 15 Feb. 1934, 27 Sept. 1934 and after the Stresa conference of 11–14 April 1935. For further evidence of the tortuous nature of British policy, see Cabinet Conclusions series 23, nos. 20 and 21, 8 April 1935, discussions of the stance to be adopted at Stresa.
14 FO371/15922, c3025/58/62, 21 April 1932, memo by Vansittart, ‘The Danubian Situation and British Policy’. In March 1931 the German government had tried to establish a customs union with Austria, but the French had thwarted this through exploitation of their temporary financial dominance. However, in 1932, the Germans, backed by the Italians, had retaliated by blocking the ‘Tardieu plan’ by which the French had hoped to maintain their influence over the Little Entente and to ensure Austrian independence. For further analysis of these events see Newman, M., ‘British policy towards the Danubian states, 1926–36, with special reference to concepts of closer political and economic co-operation’ (D.Phil, thesis, Oxford University, 1972).Google Scholar
15 FO 371/15923, C4478/58/62, 31 May 1932, memo by Scrivener on Danubian co-operation; FO 371z/15922, C3O25/58/62, 21 April 1932, Treasury memo by Leith-Ross.
16 FO 371/16628, C6979/8/3, 10 Aug. 1933, minute by Vansittart.
17 Cabinet paper (hereafter CP) 212 (33), 28 Aug. 1933, memo by Vansittart (also in Documents on British foreign policy 1919–39, series 2, v, no. 371).
18 FO 371/18352, 14227/37/3, 26 July 1934, minute by Simon.
19 He was unusual in regarding the Empire as an ‘incubus’ and in believing that Europe was the major British interest (Churchill College, Cambridge, Vansittart papers 1/19, memo of 31 Dec. 1936, quoted in Cowling, M., The impact of Hitler: British politics and British policy, 1933–40 (Cambridge, 1975), p. 158)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But although he frequently criticized the government for its fear of commitments in Central Europe (see FO 371/18356, 15179/37/3, 20 Sept. 1934, Vansittart to Selby [Vienna]; FO 371/18357, papers 15309 and 15331, file 37/3, 29 Sept. and 2 Oct. 1934; FO 371/18354, 14568/37/3, 13 Aug. 1934; FO 371/18389, 13952/3366/67, 22 July 1934, minutes by Vansittart), he was determined to avoid involvement in war and this led him later to adopt an attitude of hostility to the Czechoslovak government over the Sudeten German issue. See Bruegel, J., Czechoslovakia before Munich – The German minority problem and British appeasement policy (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 132 ff.Google Scholar
20 He was one of the authors of the notorious Hoare-Laval proposals for the division of Abyssinia, and it is generally held that this weakened his position.
21 He later believed that, if it was necessary to offer any territorial concessions, they should be granted in the Empire on condition that Hitler abandoned European expansion. (FO 371/18811, C7837/6562/62, 7 Nov. 1935, Vansittart to the king's secretary; FO 371/18852, c8524/55/18, 1 Dec. 1935, memo by Vansittart; CP 42 (36), 3 Feb. 1936, cabinetmemorandum.) But this naturally brought him into conflict with the dominant imperial lobby who preferred the idea of concessions in Central Europe.
22 On 12 February 1934 Dollfuss, in an attempt to convert Austria into a one-party state on the Italian fascist model, deliberately provoked socialist rebellion by a seizure of power from the socialist municipality of Vienna. It was crushed brutally in three days of fighting during which time several hundred people were killed.
23 FO 371/18351, 12190/37/3,26 Feb. 1934, memo by E. H. Carr, ‘Austria, the latest phase’.
24 ‘… but the Czechs are an intelligent and adaptable race, and would probably know how to make peace with their German neighbours, even if the terms involved a certain loss of political and economic independence’; loc. cit.
25 Loc. cit.
26 FO 371/19498, 12201/1/67, 30 Mar. 1935, memo by Carr for Stresa conference.
27 The German-Austrian agreement of July 1936, under which Hitler undertook to respect Austria's sovereignty in return for Austrian recognition of her ‘Germanism’ was purely bilateral and without specified duration. It paved the way for the Rome-Berlin axis, by which time Mussolini was pre-occupied in Abyssinia and Spain and unable significantly to influence events in the Danubian region. Lowe, C. J. and Marzari, F., Italian foreign policy, 1870–1940 (London, 1975), pp. 298–302.Google Scholar
28 Carmi, O., La Grande Bretagne, ch. 8.Google Scholar
29 Lammers, D. in Explaining Munich (Stanford, 1966)Google Scholar attempts to refute the suggestion that anti-communism was an important motive in British policy. Certainly, it was normally implicit rather than explicit, but it was undoubtedly influential. See, for example, FO 371/18833, C2656/55/18, 1 April 1935, minute by Sargent and FO 371/19495, 13805/3805, 12 June 1935, minutes by various officials.
30 FO 371/18851, c7752/55/18, 21 Nov. 1935, joint memo by Wigram and Sargent; FO 371/20379, 1759/125/67, 11 Feb. 1936, minute by Sargent.
31 Medlicott, W., Britain and Germany: the search for agreement, 1930–37 (London, 1969), pp. 19–24 and references.Google Scholar
32 FO 371/18811, 07837/6562/62, 7 Nov. 1935, Vansittart to the king's secretary.
33 CP 42 (36), 3 Feb. 1936.
34 Special committee on Germany, G(36) 6, 27 Feb. 1936, memo by O'Malley. (Carni, O., La Grande Bretagne, pp. 320–1Google Scholar, cites this memo, which he reproduces in full as an appendix, as evidence that, by 1936, the British had already abandoned the Danubian area to German domination. However, he seems to exaggerate both British resistance to German expansion in 1931–3 (pp. 159–201) and acquiescence in 1936 without providing any real explanation of the change in policy which he perceives.) For other examples of O'Malley's policy recommendations, see FO 371/20375, 16724/32/12, 13 Oct. 1936 and FO 371/21139, 14O48/770/67, 19 June 1937, minutes by O'Malley.
35 It was advocated in memos by Ashton-Gwatkin and Gladwyn Jebb and secured a wide measure of support (FO 371/18851, c7752/55/18, 21 Nov. 1935 and FO 371/19884, c807/4/18, 31 Jan. 1936). It was, however, opposed by the president of the board of trade with the argument that it would stimulate the demand for other preferential spheres. Cab 27/599, 17 Feb. 1936 and 6(36) 7, 26 Feb. 1936.
36 It is one of the major arguments put forward by Middlemas, K. in Diplomacy of illusion: the British government and Germany, 1937–39 (London, 1972).Google Scholar
37 The fact that Halifax included the possibility of peaceful change in Austria in his conversations in Germany in November 1937 was probably influenced not so much by fears of war over Austria itself as by the wish to avert a general war from breaking out over some Central European issue by showing Hitler that a bargain was still possible. FO 371/20736, c8094/270/18, 23 Nov. 1937, report of Halifax's conversations. See also Middlemas, , Diplomacy of illusion, pp. 136–8.Google Scholar
38 For details of Foreign Office attitudes and ‘advice’ on the Sudeten German problem after 1935, see Bruegel, J., Czechoslovakia before Munich, pp. 132 ff.Google Scholar, Newman, M., ‘British policy towards the Danubian states’, pp. 242–50Google Scholar and Robbins, K., ‘Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten question and British foreign policy’, Historical Journal, XII (1969), no. 4.Google Scholar
39 And it is surely significant that when those who generally supported government policy did suffer doubts about Britain's role in the Czechoslovak crisis, anxieties about the Empire were often in the forefront of their minds. Thus, for example, when Cadogan, who succeeded Vansittart as permanent under secretary, momentarily opposed acceptance of Hitler's Godesberg ultimatum, his private thoughts were: ‘I know we and they [French] are in no condition to fight: but I'd rather be beat than dishonoured. How can we look any foreigner in the face after this? How can we hold Egypt, India and the rest?’ (Dilks, D. (ed.), The diaries of Alexander Cadogan (London, 1971)Google Scholar, entry for 24 Sept. 1938, pp. 103–4.)
