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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
1 von Bülow, Bernhard, Memoirs 1903–1909 (London, 1931), p. 118Google Scholar.
2 E.g. compare the view of Philipp Eulenburg in Haller, Johannes, Aus dim Leben des Fürsten Philipp zu Eulenburg (Berlin, 1924)Google Scholar, with the material presented in Röhl, John C. G., Germany without Bismarck (London, 1967)Google Scholar, and for a commentary on the reliability of the Bülow memoirs, see von Gaertringen, Friedrich Freiherr Hiller, Fürst Bülows Denkwürdigkeiten (Tübingen, 1956)Google Scholar. Röhl has published revealing commentaries on the doctoring of memoirs and diaries to meet the apologetic exigencies of the situation Imperial statesmen found themselves in after the collapse of 1918, exigencies which continued to be felt long after those immediate circumstances had past, in some cases right up to the present. For discussion of the latest example: Fischer, Fritz, Juli 1914: Wir sind nichl hineingeschlittert. Das Staatsgeheimnis urn die Riezler-Tagebücher. Eint Streitschrift (Hamburg, 1983)Google Scholar; Sösemann, Berndt, ‘Die Tagebücher Karl Riezlers. Untersuchungen zu ihrer Echtheit und Edition’, in Historische Zeitschrift, CCXXXVI (1983), 327–69Google Scholar; Erdmann, Karl-Dietrich, ‘Zur Echtheit der Tagebücher Karl Riezlers. Eine Antikritik’, loc. cit. pp. 347–402Google Scholar.
3 Büllow, , Memoirs 1903–1909, p. 82Google Scholar.
4 Langer, William L., The diplomacy of imperialism, 1890–1902 (New York, 1935), I, 235Google Scholar.
5 Craig, Gordon, Germany, 1866–1945 (Oxford, 1978), p. 246Google Scholar.
6 Taylor, A. J. P., ‘The ruler in Berlin’, in Europe: grandeur and decline (Harmondsworth, 1967), P. 158Google Scholar.
7 See e.g. Frauendienst, Werner, ‘Die Demokratisierung des deutschen Konstitutionalismus inder Zeit Wilhelms II’, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschqft, CXIII (1957), 721–46Google Scholar. The incipient pluralism of German society before 1914 was a common theme of writing in the 1950s and early 1960s, even where the explicit parliamentarization thesis was not embraced. E.g. it was very much a part of Gerhard A. Ritter's analysis of the labour movement in the 1890s. It was also implied by some of the earlier work on the problem of the pressure groups in the German political system, until this feature was latched on to as evidence of reactionary corporatism and plebiscitary manipulation in the wake of the Fischer controversy. See Ritter, , Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich (Berlin, 1959)Google Scholar, and compare Schulz, Gerhard, ‘Uber Entstehung und Formen von Interessengruppen in Deutschland seit Beginn der Industrialisierung’, in Politische Vierteljahresschrift, II (1961–1962), 124–54Google Scholar, and Fischer, Wolfram, ‘Staatsverwaltung und Interessenverbände im Deutschen Reich, 1871–1914’, in Wirtschqflund Gesellschaft im Zeitalterderlndustrialisierung (Göttingen, 1972CrossRefGoogle Scholar; orig. pub. 1967), pp. 194–213, with Puhle, Hans-Jürgen, ‘Parlament, Parteien und Interessenverbände, 1890–1914’, in Stürmer, Michael (ed.), Das kaiserliche Deutschland (Düsseldorf, 1970), pp. 340–77Google Scholar.
8 Hartung, Fritz, ‘Das persönliche Regiment Kaiser Wilhelms II’, in Sitzungsberkhte der Deutschen Akademie zu Berlin (1952), p. 15Google Scholar and passim.
9 There is not space to burden these footnotes with complete references. Fischer's own book was published in 1961, and was accompanied by those of Immanuel Geiss (1960) and Helmut Böhme (1966). Subsequent monographs included those by Peter-Christian Witt (1970), Dirk Stegmann (1970), Klaus Wernecke (1970), and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (1970). All of the preceding were students of Fischer in Hamburg. Other related works included those by Hans Rosenberg (1967), Hans-Ulrich Wehler (1969), Hans-Jürgen Puhle (1966) and Volker Berghahn (1971). Röhl, Pogge von Strandmann and Berghahn coincided in the archives as exact contemporaries.
10 Here, of course, I speak autobiographically. I read Röhl's book intensively in my final year as an undergraduate in 1969–70, when it was virtually the only book in English based on the kind of extensive archival sources that have since become standard. Aside from Fischer's work, Steinberg's, JonathanYesterday's deterrent (New York, 1965)Google Scholar was the only comparable book.
11 Röhl, , Germany, p. 271Google Scholar.
12 Hamerow, Theodor S., in American Historical Review, LXXIII (1968), 1554CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 Röhl, , Germany, p. 272Google Scholar.
14 Ibid. pp. 273, 278, 279.
15 Again, there is no space for complete references. I am thinking of works by Peter Leibenguth (1975), RolfWeitowitz (1977), Wolfgang Stribrny (1977), Manfred Hank (1977), Ekkehard Böhm (1972), Wilhelm Deist (1976), Berghahn (1971), and Stegmann (1970 and 1973). For my own contribution, see Eley, Geoff, ‘Sammlungspolitik, social imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898’, in MUitärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, xv (1974), 29–63Google Scholar. In many ways the best additional account of the 1890s is a still older work than Röhl's viz. Nichols, J. Alden, Germany after Bismarck. The Caprivi Era, 1890–1894 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ekkehard-Teja, Wilke, P. W., Political decadence in Imperial Germany. Personnel-political aspects of the German government crisis, 1894–1897 (Urbana, 1977)Google Scholar, adds nothing new.
16 The quoted phrase, which has deservedly acquired a certain notoriety, is a good example of the sort of judgemental dismissal by footnote that has become all too common in West German historical writing. It occurs in Stegmann, , Die Erben Bismarcks (Cologne and Berlin, 1970), p. 14Google Scholar: ‘The personalistic research perspective of Röhl is in general untenable, despite all the new results he brings to light’.
17 For useful reviews of the first of the three volumes, see Berghahn, Volker, in Historical Journal, xx (1977), 773–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rich, Norman, ‘Imperial Germany: two views from the top’, in Journal of Modem History, L (1978), 112–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
18 For the details of the Eulenburg Papers' (EP) history, see Röhl's excellent introduction to vol. 1, pp. 53–73.
19 E.g. ‘Admiral von Müller and the approach of war, 1911–14’, in Historical Journal, XII (1969), 651–73Google Scholar; Röhl, (ed.), 1914: delusion or design? the testimony of two German diplomats (London, 1973)Google Scholar; ‘An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: Eine Dokumentation über den “Kriegsrat” von 8. Dezember 1912’, in Militädrgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, XVIII (1977), 77–134Google Scholar.
20 See Röhl, John C. G. and Somhart, Nicolaus (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II: new interpretations. The Corfu papers (Cambridge, 1982)Google Scholar; Evans, Richard J., ‘From Hitler to Bismarck: “Third Reich” and Kaiserreich in recent historiography’, part 1, Historical Journal, XXVI (1983), 487–91Google Scholar; Lerman, Kathy, ‘Bernhard von Bülow and the governance of Germany, 1900–1909’ (D. Phil, thesis, University of Sussex, 1983)Google Scholar. See also Hull, Isabel V., The entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888–1918 (Cambridge, 1982)Google Scholar.
21 Bülow to Eulenburg, 23 July 1896 and 4 December 1896, letters no. 1245 and 1281, in EP, in, 1714, 1763.
22 Of course, there are some important recent exceptions, including Jarausch, Konrad H., Students, society, and politics in Imperial Germany (Princeton, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Field, Geoffrey G., Evangelist of race. The Germanic vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (New York, 1981)Google Scholar; Albisetti, James C., Secondary school reform in Imperial Germany (Princeton, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rauh, Manfred, Die Parlamentarisierung aes Deutschen Retches (Düsseldorf, 1977)Google Scholar. Modesty cannot prevent me from mentioning the possible contributions of David Blackbourn and myself in this respect: Blackbourn, David, Class, religion and local politics in Wilhelmine Germany (New Haven and London, 1980)Google Scholar; Eley, Geoff, Reshaping the German Right (New Haven and London, 1980)Google Scholar; Blackbourn, and Eley, , The peculiarities of German history. Bourgeois society and politics in nineteenth-century Germany (Oxford, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Forthcoming books by Stanley Suval (on Wilhelmine elections), James Retallack (on the Conservative party), and Michael John (on law and society) will also be very important in this respect. The Bismarckian years are not much better served. But see Anderson, Margaret Lavinia, Windthorst: apolitical biography (Oxford, 1981)Google Scholar, and Pflanze, Otto (ed.), Innenpolitische Probleme des Bismarck-Reiches (Munich, 1983)Google Scholar.
23 Most recent monographs have focused less on the politics of the government than on the actions of the Verbande. This is classically true of Stegmann (1970), and also applies to the works of Klaus Saul (1974), Siegfried Mielke (1976) and Klaus-Peter Ullmann (1976).
24 Messerschmidt, Manfred, ‘Die politische Geschichte der preussisch-deutschen Armee’, in Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte, 11, 4/1 (Munich, 1979), 167Google Scholar.
25 See Röhl, , Germany, pp. 178ff., 224 f, 237 f., 242 ffGoogle Scholar.
26 Deist, Wilhelm, ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II in the context of his military and naval entourage’, in Rohl, and Sombart, (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, p. 187Google Scholar.
27 Ibid. The War Minister in question was Karl von Einem, who held the post from 1903 to 1909.
28 Ibid.
29 The quoted phrase was used by Miquel in the Ministry of State on 29 July 1897, cited by Röhl, , Germany, p. 247Google Scholar.
30 For a full discussion of Sammlungspolitik in 1897–8, with critical commentary on the main secondary sources, see Eley, ‘Sammlungspolitik, social imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898’, and for a not entirely persuasive critique of the concept in the context of Bismarck, , Pflanze, Otto, ‘“Sammlungspolitik” 1875–1886. KritischeBemerkungen zu einem Model’ in Pflanze, (ed.), Innenpolitische Probleme, pp. 155–93Google Scholar.
31 For a good example, see Eulenburg's comment to his cousin Botho zu Eulenburg on 14 April 1892: ‘…the gradually somewhat worn phrase that the King must stand above the parties means, when translated into political terms, nothing more, surely, than that he must depend on the middle parties’ (EP, II, 850). Eulenburg's own inclinations were solidly Conservative. But he was realist enough to recognize the different exigencies of politics in the new nation-state. Hence (as he put it to Bülow on 8 June 1896) the watchword was ‘moderate conservative in Prussia an d moderate liberal in the Reich’ (EP, III, 1697).
32 Miquel's inclusion of the Centre in his plans is disputed by Berghahn, but in my view the evidence is unequivocal. For a full account, see Eley, , ‘Sammlungspolitik, social imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898’, pp. 36–9Google Scholar. See also Berghahn, Volker, Der Tirpitz-Plan (Düsseldorf, 1971), pp. 151Google Scholar (note 162), 15 ff., 592 ff., and ‘Das Kaiserreich in der Sackgasse’, in Neue Politische Literatur, xvi (1971), 497–501Google Scholar.
33 This is again contentious, although in my own view the evidence is again compelling. See Eley, , ‘Sammlungspolitik, social imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898’, pp. 33ffGoogle Scholar.
34 Of course, the Navy Office took great pains in assembling the necessary Reichstag majority for the first Navy Law which eventually passed in April 1898, by assiduously cultivating relations with parliamentarians and the press. But there is no evidence that Tirpitz involved himself in any of the more general political debates of that time. For Büllow's abstention from domestic politicking before he assumed the premiership, see Lerman, 's excellent account, ‘Bernhard von Bülow’, pp. 70 ffGoogle Scholar. See also her essay in the Röhl-Sombart, volume (note 20 above), ‘The decisive relationship: Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, 1900–1905’, pp. 221–47Google Scholar.
35 Although Stegmann, , Erben, p. 66Google Scholar, refers to this as Wilhelm IPs ‘great Sammlung speech’, the description seems somewhat overstated. Lucanus seems to have been working closely with Miquel at this time, but in the absence of his private papers or other biographical materials we remain very ignorant about his role. Hull's view that he had no coherent politics reflects this lack of evidence as much as the real situation. See Hull, , Entourage, p. 28Google Scholar. There is no evidence that either Eulenburg or any other exponent of personal rule in Röhl's sense played any part in the drafting of the Kaiser's Bielefeld speech (if indeed the relevant part of it was drafted at all).
36 Röhl, 's ‘Introduction’ to Röhl, and Sombart, (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, p. 15Google Scholar.
37 In fact, Podbielski's position provides a good example of the Kaiser's essential inconsistency and political frivolity. He was a known exponent of the agrarian interest, with close links to the Agrarian League. Lerman observes that after 1901 he formed ‘an agrarian opposition to Bülow’ in the Prussian Ministry of State with the Finance Minister Georg von Rheinbaben. Now, Wilhelm is well known to have been incensed by the Conservative agrarian opposition to the Prussian Canal Bill in 1899–1901, to the extent of taking strong disciplinary measures against Conservative civil servants known to have opposed the Bill. Yet at the same time Podbielski was retaining his standing as one of the Kaiser's favourite ministers. See Lerman, , ‘The decisive relationship’, pp. 232–4Google Scholar.
38 Partly in ‘The decisive relationship’, partly in her excellent dissertation, which eminently deserves a publisher.
39 There is a judicious survey of the various ministerial appointments between 1900 and 1905 in Lerman, , ‘The decisive relationship’, pp. 228–35Google Scholar, while Lerman, ‘Bernhard von Bülow’ is now the best source for the internal governmental relationships during Bülow's Chancellorship. See also Witt, Peter-Christian, ‘Konservatismus als “Überparteilichkeit”. Die Beamten der Reichskanzlei zwischen Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik 1900–1933’, in Stegmann, Dirk, Wendt, Bernd-Jürgen, Witt, Peter-Christian (eds.), Deutscher Konservatismusim 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Bonn, 1983), pp. 231–80Google Scholar.
40 For an account of the Kaiser's routines see Hull, , Entourage, pp. 31–44Google Scholar.
41 I have discussed the Daily Telegraph affair in more detail in Reshaping, pp. 285–90, and in an unpublished paper, ‘The political reality of personal rule in Germany, 1908–14’.
42 Bülow, to Eulenburg, , 23 July 1896, in EP, III, 1714Google Scholar.
43 Röhl, John C. G., ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II., Grossherzog Friedrich I. und der “Königsmechanismus” itn Kaiserreich’, in Historischt geitschrift, ccxxxvi (1983), 554 fGoogle Scholar.
44 Ibid. pp. 558–62.
45 For the details of this affair, which seems to have produced a definite cooling in the relationship of Philipp Eulenburg and the Kaiser, see Hull, , Entourage, pp. 109 ff.Google Scholar, and Röhl, 's Introduction, EP, I, 35 ffGoogle Scholar.
46 EP, I, 33.
47 See Sosemann, Bernd, ‘Die sog. Hunnenrede Wilhelms II. Textkritische und interpretatorische Bemerkungen zur Ansprache des Kaisers vom 27. Juli 1900 in Bremerhaven’, in Historische Zeitschrift, CCXXII (1976), 342–58Google Scholar.
48 E.g. at the time of the SPD's successes in the 1903 elections, ‘the Kaiser outlined how he would deal with the coming revolution. He would, he said, mow down all Social Democrats, “but only after they had first plundered the Jews and the rich”’. He had also ordered the Commanding General of Berlin in two separate telegrams to fire on the people. See John C. G. Röhl, ‘The emperor's new clothes: a character sketch of Kaiser Wilhelm II’, in Rohl, and Sombart, (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, p. 31Google Scholar, quoting Eulenburg's report of the conversations to Bulow, , 9 08 1903, published in EP, III, 2096–9Google Scholar. It should be noted that the Kaiser's statements occurred at a time when Bülow was fending off Conservative calls for a new Anti-Socialist Law as politically impracticable, and when the dominant voices on the party-political right were also opting for a course of propagandist as opposed to state-repressive anti-Socialism. See Eley, , Reshaping, pp. 226–35Google Scholar.
49 See Fehrenbach, Elisabeth, Wandlmgen des deulschtn Kmsergedankens 1871–1918 (Munich, 1969). PP. 133, 143Google Scholar; and Bulow, , Memoirs 1897–1903, p. 590Google Scholar.
50 Kennedy, Paul, ‘The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: reflections on Wilhelm II's place in the making of German foreign policy’, in Rohl, and Sombart, (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, pp. 157–64Google Scholar.
51 Röhl's ‘Introduction’, ibid. p. 17.
52 Ibid. p. 15, and in ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II., Grossheraog Friedrich I. und der “Königsmechanismus” im Kaiserreich’, pp. 555 f.
53 Röhl, 's ‘Introduction’ to Rohl, and Sombart, (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, p. 6Google Scholar; Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 (Göttingen, 1973), pp. 63–72Google Scholar.
54 To have done so would have overburdened an already lengthy text. I have discussed the problem of the Imperial state in this more theoretical way in my contribution to Blackbourn and Eley, , Peculiarities of German history, pp. 127–43Google Scholar.
55 Röhl, , ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II., Grossherzog Friedrich I. und der “Konigsmechanismus” im Kaiserreich’, p. 572Google Scholar.
56 Ibid. pp. 568, 567.
57 Röhl, 's ‘Introduction’ to Rohl, and Sombart, (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, p. 17Google Scholar; Rohl, , Germany, p. 271Google Scholar.
58 This is a point made by Mommsen, Wolfgang J. in his review of Rohl and Sombart (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, in the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, London, xi (1982), 18Google Scholar.
59 Rohl, , Germany, p. 10Google Scholar.
60 Zmarzlik, Hans-Günther, Bethmam Hottwtg als Rekhskanzler 1909–1914 (Düsseldorf, 1957)Google Scholar.
61 See Fehrenbach, Elisabeth, ‘Images of Kaiserdom: German attitudes to Kaiser Wilhelm II’, in Rohl, and Sombart, (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II, pp. 269–85Google Scholar. See also Field, , Evangelist of race, pp. 248–61Google Scholar, for Houston Stewart Chamberlain's impact on the Kaiser.
