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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2014
This essay examines the role that the theory of “first principles” plays in Newman's critique of Locke's cognitive-ethical norms. The first section examines in detail Newman's strategy against Locke and argues that there are, in fact, two distinguishable strategies, each with a different concept of the nature and epistemic function of “first principles.” The second section retails examples of what Newman considered to be “first principles” and discusses Newman's claim that our acceptance of these principles is “instinctive.” The final section raises the question of the justifiability of “first principles” and, by reintroducing the distinctions drawn in the first section, argues that Newman can distinguish between “first principles” and unwarranted prejudices and, simultaneously, maintain his criticisms of Locke.
1 Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, collated and annotated by Fraser, A. C. (New York: Dover, 1959), II, pp. 429–30.Google Scholar
2 For a survey of some of this literature, see Livingston, James, The Ethics of Belief: An Essay on the Victorian Religious Conscience (Tallahassee, FL: Scholars Press, 1974).Google Scholar
3 The Philosophical Notebooks of John Henry Newman, ed. Boekraad, A. J. and Tristram, H. (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1969), II, p. 170.Google Scholar
4 This point is made by Moritz Schlick. See “The Foundations of Knowledge,” in Logical Positivism, ed. Ayer, A. J. (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 209–12.Google Scholar
5 This argument occurs frequently in Newman's work. See, for example, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 91, 293–94, 319Google Scholar, and 321; and The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty, ed. Holmes, J. D. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), p. 67.Google Scholar
6 Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, reprinted in The Empiricists (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 329–30Google Scholar; A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Mossner, E. C. (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), pp. 137–38.Google Scholar
7 Newman frequently pointed out the paradox of traditional empiricism to his philosophical conversation partners. See his letters of April 29, 1879 to William Froude and April 19, 1874 to J. R. Mozley. The former letter can be found in Harper, G., ed., Newman (John Henry) and Froude (William), A Correspondence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), pp. 200–01Google Scholar and the latter is cited in Ward, Wilfred, The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman Based on his Private Journals and Correspondence (New York and London: Longmans, 1912), II, pp. 572–73.Google Scholar
8 The major points of his arguments against liberal theologians resemble Coleridge's and are of a practical nature. He argued that a concentration on the evidences for Christianity was of little practical value since it ignored conscience and the emotions (Grammar, p. 308) and that the religion that resulted from intellectual inquiry would be too cold to inspire any real devotion. On this point, see his Sermons, , Chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief, Preached Before the University of Oxford (London: Riverton, 1843), pp. 189-92 and 258Google Scholar; Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects (London and New York: Longmans, 1891), pp. 274–75Google Scholar; Essays Critical and Historical (London and New York: Longmans, 1891), I, p. 294Google Scholar; Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification (New York and London: Longmans, 1892), p. 191Google Scholar; Apologia Pro Vita Sua, ed. Svaglic, M. J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 98.Google Scholar Furthermore, he argued that the liberal theologians, by overestimating the capacities of reason, had not recognized that it, as it exists in fallen man, leads easily to unbelief or scepticism and non-dogmatism. On these points, see Justification, p. 271; Apologia, pp. 216-17; The Idea of a University (New York and London: Longmans, 1907), pp. 28, 382, 387, and 446–48Google Scholar; Discussions and Arguments, p. 199; Essays Critical and Historical, II, p. 202Google Scholar; An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960), p. 338.Google Scholar For further references and a discussion of this point, see Vargish, T., Newman: The Contemplation of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), pp. 77–81.Google Scholar
9 Grammar, p. 209; Oxford Sermons, pp. 280-92; Faith and Certainty, pp. 141-46.
10 Grammar, pp. 216-22.
11 Ibid., pp. 216-17. This latter argument is more clearly expressed on pp. 192 and 293 of the Grammar. It is most clearly stated in an undated set of unpublished papers entitled, “Divers Notes for Previous Articles” (A.23.1). In this context Newman contends that first principles of some kind are necessary for the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever. “For without a cordial acceptance of their truth we have ground for nothing better than guesses and imagination, not for knowledge. So imperative are these primary (elementary) truths, from the nature of the case, that even those metaphysicians who maintain that all truth comes to the mind a posteriori or by experience of fact, are obliged, nonetheless, in spite of themselves, to profess the truth of certain elementary propositions, though they cannot prove them, as starting points in their investigations.” He also argued that scepticism as to the necessity of first principles was self-defeating since scepticism itself proceeded from first principles. See the Oxford Sermons, pp. 223-24 and 293-94.
12 Grammar, p. 194.
13 Ibid., pp. 67-70.
14 Ibid., p. 67. In a variety of places Newman asserts his belief that our ascription of reality to the objects of our sensation is instinctive. See Justification, p. 252; Philosophical Notebooks, II, pp. 204 and 214; see also his letters of June 25, 1869 and August 20, 1869 to Father Meynell. These are cited in Zeno's, FatherJohn Henry Newman: Our Way to Certitude (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957), pp. 231–32 and 246Google Scholar respectively.
15 Grammar, pp. 67-70.
16 Philosophical Notebooks, II, 69-70 and 83–85.Google Scholar See also Oxford Sermons, pp. 206-07.
17 This position is central to Newman and occurs frequently in his works. See, for example, Justification, p. 253; Two Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles (New York and London: Longmans, 1890), pp. 16–17Google Scholar; Oxford Sermons, pp. 50-51 and 238; Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching (New York and London: Longmans, 1891), II, 253Google Scholar; Grammar, pp. 66-70 and 96; Faith and Certainty, pp. 120-21.
18 See “Divers Notes for Previous Articles” (A.23.1).
19 Oxford Sermons, pp. 40-44 and 215-17.
20 Apologia, p. 17.
21 Philosophical Notebooks, II, 35–37.Google Scholar
22 Ibid., II, 63.
23 Ibid., II, 78.
24 See Essays Critical and Historical, II, 347Google Scholar; Difficulties Felt by Anglicans, I, 58–59Google Scholar; Justification, pp. 252-57; Oxford Sermons, pp. 22, 50-51 and 228; Grammar, p. 329.
25 Grammar, p. 67.
26 Cameron, J. M., The Night Battle (Baltimore: Helicon, 1962), pp. 210–11.Google Scholar
27 Ibid., pp. 226-30.
28 Ward, II, 492-93.
29 Grammar, p. 321.
30 Oxford Sermons, pp. 290-92; Apologia, pp. 254-62.
31 Faith and Certainty, p. 67.
32 Ibid., p. 55.
33 The Via Media of the Anglican Church (New York and London: Longmans, 1891), I, 283–84Google Scholar; Idea of a University, p. 497.
34 Grammar, p. 290. See also ibid., pp. 210-12, 282 and 321.
35 These were subsequently published under the title, Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England (New York and London: Longmans, 1893).Google Scholar
36 Ibid., pp. 278-81.
37 Ibid., p. 293.
38 Ibid., pp. 295 and 314.
39 Ibid., p. 314.
40 Ibid., p. 278.
41 Ibid., pp. 303-304.
42 Ibid., pp. 278-79.
43 Ibid. See also Grammar, p. 204.
44 Grammar, pp. 109-10 and 193; Faith and Certainty, pp. 65-67.
45 Chisholm, Roderick, Perceiving (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 102–03.Google Scholar
46 Hume, , Enquiry, pp. 426–27.Google Scholar See also Hume, , Treatise, pp. 234–36.Google Scholar
47 See especially his sermon “Explicit and Implicit Reason” preached in 1840. It is contained in Oxford Sermons, pp. 249-73.
48 The former is described in Grammar, pp. 260-69 and the latter in ibid., pp. 230-59.
49 Philosophical Notebooks, p. 133.
50 Oxford Sermons, p. 257.
51 Grammar, p. 230.
52 Quine, W. V. O. and Ullian, J. S., The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 58.Google Scholar
53 McClendon, James Wm. Jr., and Smith, James M., Understanding Religious Convictions (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1975), p. 163.Google Scholar
54 The fullest statement of this argument is given in Philosophical Notebooks, II, 31–77.Google Scholar
55 Küng, Hans, On Being a Christian, trans. Quinn, Edward (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), pp. 57–88.Google Scholar
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