Classical models of the God–world relationship tend to emphasize the transcendence of God at the expense of God's immanence to the world of creation. Neo-classical or process-oriented models, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the immanence of God within the world process at the expense of the divine transcendence. Using the distinction originally made by Thomas Aquinas between person and nature within the Godhead, the author offers a modified process-oriented understanding of the God–world relationship in which the transcendence of the triune God to creation is assured but in which creatures derive their existence and activity from the divine nature or ground of being along with the divine persons. Ultimate Reality, therefore, is not God in a unipersonal sense, nor the three divine persons apart from creation, but a Cosmic Society of existents, both finite and infinite, who are sustained by one and the same underlying principle of existence and activity.

The article argues that the motivations for Phillips' construal of all theory-making as necessarily foundationalist go beyond the epistemological debate about foundationalism vs. nonfoundationalism and that his construal is rooted in the anthropological assumption that the subjectivity of human persons is inevitably violated by analyses in terms of objective categories that are not derived from the self-understanding of the subjects under study. The article uses the distinction between etics and emics in linguistics and cultural anthropology and a psychoanalytic understanding of the inevitability of transference and countertransference in order to argue that an appreciation of human finitude and contingency should lead Phillips and others to anthropological views in which the inevitability of theory, transference, and the experience of the otherness of oneself and others is construed as not only inevitable but as pleasurable, i.e., as part of the goodness of created human nature.

The history of theology demonstrates that theological exploration, seeking to understand fully an already given theological concept, regularly brings forth unexpected insights. This article seeks to do just that. Reflecting on an ancient theological word, perichoresis, coined in its original Greek to express the intimate communion of, first, the two natures in the one person of Jesus and, second, the three persons in one God, the article seeks new theological insight into the communion that is essential in, first, Christian marriage and then, church. The analysis underscores communion-through-perichoresis as essential to the definitions of God, marriage, and church, and relates the three one to the other.

This article examines Liberal Theology's claim regarding a universal religious experience and George Lindbeck's rejection of this claim. Since a universal religious experience is frequently put forth as the basis for the transcendental unity of religions, the theological debate regarding such an experience is very pertinent to the current discussion of religious diversity. The author argues that neither Liberal Theology's appeal to religious experience nor Lindbeck's rejection of this appeal is helpful. In lieu of a comprehensive theology of non-Christian religions based on an appeal to a universal religious experience, the author proposes a comparative theology as the best candidate for dealing responsibly and creatively with the plurality of religions.

Certain proposals to construe American Catholic public theology as civil discourse assume that public theological discussion needs to be disciplined to prevent “interest groups” from imposing their agendas on all participants. These proposals urge that all parties be required to employ the language of natural law, which is to be taught to all by theological experts.

Though American Catholic public theology traditionally seeks to avoid sectarianism by employing the philosophical language of natural law, and though civil discourse would presumably reinforce this anti-sectarian tendency, it has a significant shortcoming. Requiring public religious discourse to prescind from all specific interests would rule out prophetic contributions to public theology. Prophets always speak perspectivally and reflect the interests of their historical situations. The interests of religious speakers need scrutiny, but this scrutiny should not exclude from hand prophetic discourse arising out of experiences of oppression.

The essay provides a foundation for this thesis by examining what is at work in prophetic speech. It locates prophetic discourse at the intersection of the prophet's need to proclaim and the community's need to control. The argument of the essay moves to the conclusion that American Catholic theologians need to give more attention than previously to the rhetorical dimensions of public theological discourse.