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Moral Reflection: Beyond Impartial Reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Abstract

This paper considers two accounts of the self that have gained prominence in contemporary feminist psychoanalytic theory and draws out the implications of these views with respect to the problem of moral reflection. I argue that our account of moral reflection will be impoverished unless it mobilizes the capacity to empathize with others and the rhetoric of figurative language. To make my case for this claim, I argue that John Rawls's account of reflective equilibrium suffers from his exclusive reliance on impartial reason.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by Hypatia, Inc.

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