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Caring Actions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 May 2020

Steven Steyl*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of Notre Dame, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
*
Corresponding author. stevensteyl@hotmail.com

Abstract

Though the literature on care ethics has mushroomed in recent years, much remains to be said about several important topics therein. One of these is action. In this article, I draw on Anscombean philosophy of action to develop a kind of meta- or proto-ethical theory of caring actions. I begin by showing how the fragmentary philosophy of action offered by care ethicists meshes with Elizabeth Anscombe's broader philosophy of action, and argue that Anscombe's philosophy of action offers a useful scaffold for a theory of caring actions. Following this, I defend an account of caring actions as those that aim to meet needs. I argue that care aims at satisfying eudaimonistic needs, those things without which one cannot flourish. I then consider the place of caring actions in care ethics. I suggest that if caring actions are to be a starting point for an ethical theory, we ought to reject the notion that a caring action must bring about its intended consequences, and I show how the concept of practice better equips us to evaluate caring actions.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © by Hypatia, Inc. 2020

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