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Privileged Standpoints/Reliable Processes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Kourken Michaelian
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Abstract

This article attempts to reconcile Sandra Harding's postmodernist standpoint theory with process reliabilism in first-order epistemology and naturalism in metaepistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory is best understood as consisting of an applied epistemological component and a metaepistemological component. Naturalist metaepistemology and the metaepistemological component of postmodernist standpoint theory have produced complementary views of knowledge as a socially and naturally located phenomenon and have converged on a common concept of objectivity. The applied epistemological claims of postmodernist standpoint theory usefully can be construed as applications of process reliabilist first-order epistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory, reliabilism, and naturalism thus form a coherent package of views in metaepistemology, first-order epistemology, and applied epistemology.

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Type
Research Article
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Hypatia , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 65 - 98
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by Hypatia, Inc.

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